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Abstract 
Some conflict resolution and national security professionals contend there is no shortfall 
of qualitative research on Asia, China, Realism, or war.  That said, this doctoral 
dissertation has two overarching purposes: first, an empirical study of interstate conflict 
at the regional and systematic levels.  Second, is to examine the extent to which the 
Correlates of War covariates associated with the People’s Republic of China’s revisionist 
strategies.  Combining these objectives led to the formulation of the main research 
question: What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist 
strategy in Asia?  Realism contends that strong national capability and displays of 
military resolve guarantees safety.  A counterargument, provided by the steps-to-war 
(STW) theory, is these power politics increases the chances of war.  This dissertation 
empirically explores the latter by examination of 461 dispute dyads that cover a fifty-year 
period, an inductive statistical method was used to determine the relationship between the 
correlates of war and China’s revisionism. Although there were several research findings, 
three are indeed salient: 1) There was no statistical evidence that the STW theory, 
territorial revisions, rivalry, alliance-making, or arms races increase war onset chances; 2)  
When war onset was substituted for low-intensity interstate violence as an outcome 
variable, there was strong empirical evidence that the Correlates of War were statistical 
significant; and 3) China was essentially interstate war-adverse, but violence-prone.  In 
short, this scientific study of war expanded the correlation knowledge of war onset, 
particularly in Asia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
War, the military clash of imposing wills is the greatest calamity in human 
endeavors.  Its conduct is riddled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and lethality.  
The outcomes are often momentous, having imposed exuberantly high economic and 
moral costs on the belligerents. History is filled with empires, great powers, and even 
minor states that fell victim to this scourge of humankind, and therefore no longer exist.  
Yet, despite these known facts, not only have humans managed to retain an appetite for 
destruction but also have remained largely misinformed why war happens.  This 
dissertation is an attempt to remedy this perception.  More pointedly, the research will 
explore why war happens to highlight the means of avoiding it. War comes in many 
guises.  The typology is quite diverse.  Quincy Wright is considered the father of war-
studies and argues that war is comprised of international, imperial, colonial, and Civil 
(Vasquez, 2009).  Others claim it is either dyadic or complex (Vasquez & Valeriano, 
2010).  Even still, war is categorized as interstate, intrastate, or extrastate.  It is pertinent 
to distinguish interstate which are armed conflict between systemic, sovereign actors and 
this is the focus of this dissertation (Lear, 2012).   
Although there are currently more intrastate and extrastate conflict prevalent, 
arguably interstate war poses the greatest threat to both the regional and international 
order (Szayna et al., 2017).  There are several reasons: specifically, a return to great 
power competition.  China and Russia in a fit of revisionism are challenging the 
international status quo.  In turn, the U.S. national security apparatus has declared that 
near-peer competition is the new normal for foreign policy (O’Rourke, 2019).  Another 
rationale is destructive capacity.  States have a wide range of military capabilities.  For 
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example, most great powers have nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, and large-scale 
expeditionary forces capable of toppling regimes and capturing territory.  The abilities 
are perhaps what makes them a great power.  Lastly, states remain the most predominant 
actor in the systemic international order.  They have the preponderance of power over 
their populations and the ability to externally influence other entities.  One can see why 
interstate conflict will drastically matter in the future.  
Summary of the Topic 
Upfront, this dissertation concerns war onset on the continent of Asia, specifically 
as it pertains to China.  More pointedly, it is a scientific endeavor to use the empirical 
study of war to ascertain the correlatory impacts of how realist behavior promulgates war 
between states.  That said, one of the essential and foundational aspects of this 
dissertation is the Correlates of War (COW) project.  Founded by political scientist John 
David Singer and historian Melvin Small in 1963, it is an intellectual movement of 
peace-based researchers dedicated to the empirical study war and its onset attributes—
i.e., correlates.  Initially charged with data collection on interstate armed conflict, Singer 
and Small’s body of work (Singer & Small, 1972; Small & Singer, 1982) was published 
in two seminal books that galvanized the war-studies, peace-research, and international 
relations fields.  In fact, the COW project grew to include empirical research that vastly 
improved the scientific knowledge of war (Izmirlioglu, 2017). 
Since the late-1960s, COW research has grown.  It now consists of 13 datasets 
that provide empirical information on war correlates that illuminate why warfare occurs 
to include interstate, intrastate, and extrastate conflicts.  There have been over 274 
empirical scientific studies conducted base on the concepts and theories of the COW 
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project (Izmirlioglu, 2017).  What is important to remember is that COW research is 
solely quantitative, which is in contrast to the conflict resolution and international 
relations study fields mostly qualitative-based inquiries. 
Equally important are the four core research activities associated with the COW 
project.  They are: 1) theoretical rationale and research strategy; 2) correlate construction 
and data generation; 3) model/hypothesis testing and data analysis, and 4) practical 
implications for policy (Suzuki, Krause, and Singer, 2002).  All of them, to various 
degrees, will be used through this dissertation. 
 
Figure 1. Militarized Dispute by Country in Asia. 
Asia 
Some would argue that Asia, not Europe or North America, is the focal point of 
this planet. It is by far the largest continent in terms of both area and population with 
geography covering 17.2 million square miles, whereby 4.2 billion people live (Sawe, 
2019).  The continent houses five major regions and 48 states.  For clarification, the 
subregions are Central, East, South, Southeast, and Western Asia (Pariona, 2019).  
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Regarding domain status, Asia contains great, major, and minor powers. China and 
Russia are considered great powers, whereas the seven major powers are Japan, India, 
South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.  The remaining states fall into the 
minor category (Rogers, 2019). Economically, Asia is equally distinct.  The G-20, which 
is an intergovernmental forum of finance ministers and central bankers, has eight member 
states that reside on the continent (Rogers, 2019).   The strongest, rising economies have 
been historically in Asia.  With respect to GDP, China, Japan, and India are globally 
ranked in the top ten.  Indeed, Asia’s aggregated GDP is a staggering $31T. This is twice 
the size of the U.S.’s economy (International Monetary Fund [IMF] World Economic 
Outlook, 2018). 
It is also worth mentioning that Asia has a history of interstate warfare.  Outside 
of Europe, there has been more interstate war and battle deaths in Asia on the planet 
(Singer et al. 1972; Szayna et al., 2019).  In fact, three of the five great powers; 
specifically, China, Russia, and the United States are in some form of violent armed 
conflict on the mainland and littorals (Szayna et al., 2019; The Asia Foundation, 2017).  
For further evidence, it is necessary to examine Figure 1. The chart outlaid Asian 
countries by the number of militarize interstate disputes in which participated.  The 
orange bars are major powers; the grey is minor ones.  One could easily determine that 
Asiatic major powers conflict disputes outweigh those of smaller states.  This disparity is 
meticulously assessed throughout this doctoral study.  What is more important is that 
outside of Europe, Asia has the greatest number of states that have formal defense treaties 
with the United States.  The U.S. Department of State website identified South Korea, 
Japan, Philippines, and Thailand as treated partners, which means if one is attacked the 
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U.S. will come to its aid (Department of State, 2019).  More voluminously, all of them 
are involved in some form of militarized dispute with China (The Asia Foundation, 
2019). 
China 
China is vital to regional and global stability.  Considered by many states as a 
great power, China has spread its influence and power throughout Asia and the global 
community, including locales such as Africa and the Middle East.  Jablonsky (1997) 
contended that countries needed to increase their national power to either maintain or 
increase their position in the international order.  He, in turn, qualified national power as 
the state’s required resources to obtain their national objectives and goals.  These 
resources are further defined as natural and social, which is the construct used in this 
dissertation. 
Using Jablonsky’s typology, Sino quest for national power could be examined on 
a two-axis approach.  Natural determinants, comprised of geography, population, and 
natural resources, is one.  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took multiple measures 
to improve these power attributes.  Here are a few examples. First, the CCP laid claim to 
the entire South China Sea including several contested islands, and then built artificial 
islands to protect it (Jablonsky, 1997; O’Rourke, 2019a, 2019b).  Second, the party was 
instrumental in incubating nationalist fervor within the Sino-population, a common 
governmental technique to disguise bad governance and garner collective cooperation 
against a perceived threat.  Last, China secured natural resources near and abroad.  Close 
to their home borders, China built an elaborate road network through Bangladesh and 
Myanmar (O’Rourke, 2019a; Pehrson, 2006). In the Middle East and Africa, scrupulous 
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oil deals were made without any concern for the long-term harm to the sellers’ domestic 
audience. Social determinants, which consisted of economic, military, and diplomatic 
elements, was the other national power subset (Jablonsky, 1997).  Although there are 
significant literature and research on these topics, only the economic and defense aspects 
are addressed here.  China has the second-largest economy after the U.S., fueled by an 
abundance of low-cost labor, manufacturing, and debt financing.  Their current Gross 
Domestic Product per capita is a staggering $16.8T (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2019).  
Militarily, the People Liberation Army (PLA) is China’s 2,000,000 person armed 
forces and has made unprecedented gains.  Case in point, the U.S. Office of the Secretary 
of Defense reported, “China’s announced military budget increase continues more than 
20 years of annual defense spending increases, sustaining China’s position as the second-
largest military spender in the world.” (U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 
2019, p. 93)   What this equates to is $170B expended on war materiel each year (U.S. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019). With this type of spending, PRC has increased 
its warfighting capability.  
Since the turn of the century, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has increased 
its national power by building offensive, expeditionary weapons.  These armaments are 
capital investments, which are defined by a massive expenditure of resources in terms of 
dollars (i.e., $1B or more) and time.  They include H-6 strategic bombers and aircraft 
carriers.  It is also to note that the PLA has a credible nuclear force (Defense Intelligence 
Agency [DIA], 2019).  In fact, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
reports the PLA Rocket Force’s nuclear arsenal is the third largest on the planet behind 
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the U.S. and Russia (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019). Although 
these weapon platforms can be used for defense, their main purpose is offensive in 
nature.  Meaning, they allow the PRC to project power beyond their territorial borders, 
allowing them means to achieve their national security aims. 
With respect to the PRC, all the above actions and activities are geared toward a 
myriad of geostrategic priorities.  According to various international relations scholars, 
they are 1) Finish building modern society under CCP control; 2) Become the global 
leader in innovation, 3) Resolve the Taiwan dilemma, 4) Modernize military capability 
for power projection and 5) Return to great power status (Bosbotinis, 2010; Erickson, 
2016; Krepinevich, 2015).   Chinese President Xi Jinping further contended, “[China is 
to] become a global leader in terms of national strength and international influence.” 
(Erickson, 2016, 75). The aggregation of these strategic goals indicates a grand strategy 
rooted in revisionism.  More important, these five objectives should be considered as 
Sino vital interests; meaning, the 80 million-person strong CCP would be willing to 
initiate a conflict or even war to achieve them. Figure 2 is a testament to this proposition. 
 
Figure 2. Sino Militarized Interstate Disputes. 
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The U.S. Government (USG) contends Chinese goals are two-fold. First, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) seeks to establish China as a great power to shape the 
international order to its benefit.  Second, regional hegemony within its part of Eurasia.  
Revisionist states’ main geopolitical and strategic aim is to change the status quo because 
they are not satisfied with their position in the global construct.  When it comes to China, 
they have embarked on a whole-of-society approach to achieving their goals near and 
abroad (Wright, April 2017). 
Steps to War 
The Steps-To-War (STW) theory is one of the most profound byproducts of the 
COW project.  John Vasquez, credited with its formulation, postulated that it is grounded 
on the behavioral and relational impacts of when two states, who are initially involved in 
a territorial dispute, experience repeated conflict, form alliances and increase military 
capability, all of which intensifies the likelihood of war onset (Senese & Vasquez, 2005, 
2008).  Moreover, there are three distinct characters that distinguish the STW model from 
other international relations (IR) and conflict theories. First, it is empirically based.  This 
construct allows for statistical evaluation of why interstate interactions are either war-
prone or peaceful, Second, it is dyadic.  A characteristic that fosters descriptive and 
inferential assessment. Last, it is not exclusively sequential.  Meaning, step order is not 
imperative instead it is their mutual reinforcement (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014; Senese et 
al., 2005).  That said, an example will help comprehension.  In one way or another, the 
steps of war involve territorial disputes, rivalry, alliances, and arms races.  For 
clarification, the terms State A and State B is used to delineate belligerents.  To start, 
State A is involved in a territorial dispute with State B.  They use power politics to 
9 
 
address this budding security issue, making defense pacts and improving armies.  The 
combined effect poses a security dilemma, a stalwart in realist literature.  Next, State B 
feels threaten and becomes more hostile toward State A, which is now considered a rival.  
As a result, State B responds in kind by making counter-alliances and building up their 
own defense forces.  The overall effect is a heightened level of escalation, which could 
spiral into a violent interstate conflict.  That said, this plausible STW scenario undeniably 
outlays Chinese geopolitical activities in Asia, which is why it is the theory of choice for 
this dissertation (Jones et al., 1996; Senese et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2014). 
Need for Study 
There are four key reasons why this study is necessary. The first one is renewed 
great power competition.  Since September 11, 2001, which fostered an era of extrastate 
and intrastate warfare, the war onset study-field focused on those two phenomena.  Al 
Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) execution of violent conflict 
captivated the international community.  Regarding intrastate war, the Libyan civil war 
had the same effect.  Understandably, these conflicts created a demand signal for political 
scientists, international relations scholars, and policymakers.  However, Beijing, 
Moscow, and Washington’s declaration of the return to great power interstate conflict 
necessitates that the academic field follows in suit.  And arguably, the conflict resolution 
field should lead the way. The second rationale is Asia.  For reasons previously 
explained, Asia is an important region in the international order.  China’s overt and 
covert hostility towards the U.S. and its allies is foreboding.  Equally germane is the 
PRC’s revisionist alliance making and defense spending, which has had an escalating and 
threatening effect on the region. In short, if war breaks out in either East or Southeast 
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Asia, then it would potentially lead to widespread destruction and human suffering on a 
scale not experienced since World War II.  The third justification entails the COW 
project and conflict resolution fields of study.  The former was instrumental in war.  One 
must remember that Singer’s overarching goal was to prevent war and by default, 
increase peace (Singer, 1979).  Conflict resolution is about alleviating all forms of 
disputes, from the individual to the state, in that way promoting peace.  It is therefore 
almost providence that both research areas should be conjoined in a dissertation. The last 
key reason for the need of this dissertation beholds empirical analysis of war onset.  
There is no shortfall of qualitative research on Asia, China, realist’s ideals, and war.  The 
adage that extremes lead to disaster is perhaps applicable here.  A modern quantitative 
assessment could afford different findings on war and peace, which in turn might inform 
governmental leaders and policymakers. 
Problem /Purpose Statement/Research Question 
Taking these gaps and shortfalls in deliberation, the problem summation is there 
are missing literature and empirical analysis on war onset in Asia and China.  So then, the 
purpose of this quantitative study is to explore the steps-to-war correlates as they pertain 
to Sino power politics in Asia.  At this stage in the research, steps-to-war correlates will 
be generally defined as a series of power politics actions and activities between states in 
response to a territory-related dispute that when aggregated increases the probability of 
war onset.  With the above mentioned in mind, this dissertation will answer one main 
research question: What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s 
revisionist strategy in Asia?  More so, there are three supporting research questions that 
are imperative to understanding that relationship.  They are: 1) What is the probability of 
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war onset based on associated militarized interstate disputes in Asia? 2) What revision 
type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia? and 3) What does the war onset 
covariates imply for chances of war in Asia? As with most momentous endeavors, 
specific goals are critical for success and the following are the goals of this project:  1) 
Use COW project ideals and STW theory to evaluate how specific correlates increase the 
chances of war in Asia; 2) Develop a rudimentary, reliable research design to empirically 
assesses individual states and how they relate to war; 3) Introduce empirical war-studies 
to the Department of Defense strategic leaders and Conflict Resolution professionals; and 
4) Review war causation literature and develop empirical analysis skills. 
Definition of Key Terms 
Correlates of War project: A cohort of political scientists and peace researchers dedicated 
to the systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about military conflict in order to 
end it.  Their work is exclusively empirical in nature (Morrow, Clark, Diehl, Ray, & 
Reid, 2010, p. 591). 
Alliance: A formal-signed agreement between states concerning the conditions under 
which they will or will not employ military force.  Alliances are classified as defense 
pact, neutral, and entente (Levy, 1981, p. 587). 
Arms Race: A simultaneous abnormal rate of growth in the military outlays between two 
or more nations, based on the competitive pressure of eternal military rivalry (Wallace, 
1979, p. 5) 
Challenger: A state that challenges another state over either an issue or revision (Dorf, 
2004). 
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Composite Index of National Capability: An index that utilizes six indicators of national 
to reflect power:  energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, 
military personnel, total population, and urban population.  The computed power 
capabilities for each state in then ranked making a prioritized list. 
Dyad: A pair of states who both are members of the international system.  Dyads allow 
the measurement and analysis of interstate behavior and other relational aspects (Senese 
& Vasquez, 2008). 
Dyadic Dispute: An interstate dyad engaged in a militarized interstate dispute (Senese et 
al., 2008). 
Dyadic-History: One interstate dyad that has been constructed from the history of dyadic 
interaction. It often records the total and type of MIDs, war history, rivalry and alliance 
status, and so forth (Senese et al., 2008). 
Dyadic-Year: A dyad measured by what occurs in a one-year timeframe (Senese et al., 
2008).   
Defender: A state that defends itself from either a challenge or attack from another state 
(Dorf, 2004). 
Dominant State: A hegemonic state that has the preponderance of power within either the 
international system or specific region (Dorf, 2004). 
Extrastate war: Wars conducted between a system member and a nonstate entity.  The 
U.S. fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is an archetype (Sarkees, 2010) 
Interstate war: Wars conducted between or among members of the interstate system.  The 
Gulf War (circa 1990), where Iraq battled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATOR) is an example (Sarkees, 2010, p.1) 
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Intrastate war: A civil war conducted between a state and a group within its borders.  The 
violent conflicts in Syria and Libya are examples. (Sarkees, 2010, p.2) 
Great Power: A dominant state that can effectively influence the global order and 
international politics with respect to domestic, economic, and security-related issues.  
Operational indicators of Great Power status are 1) possession of a high level of power 
capabilities (strong economies and often nuclear weapons); 2) heavy participation in the 
international arena; and 3) identification as a Great Power by the international community 
(Levy, 1981, p. 587).  China, Russia, and the United States are great powers. 
Major Power: A state with relatively superior power capabilities, has global interests, and 
must be recognized by other major powers as a major power (Levy, 1981, p. 587).  
France, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and India are examples of major 
powers. 
Militarized Interstate Dispute: An aggressive, dyadic interaction between states that is 
characterized by threat making, force displays, use of military force, and hostility—i.e., 
open warfare (Senese et al., 2008). 
Minor Power: A state with relatively moderate to weak power capabilities, which can 
only influence within their respective region (Levy, 1981, p. 587).  Philippines, Oman, 
Nigeria, and Guatemala are considered minor powers. 
Revisionist State: In power transition theories, a revisionist state is defined as an actor 
that is not satisfied with its circumstances and domain placement in either the 
international or regional order.  As such, they use power politics to change the 
geopolitical dynamic to their satisfaction, and if pressed, could use military means.  For 
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example, in World War II, Germany and Japan were revisionists states that sough war to 
change the international order (Kohout, 2003). 
Rivalry:  The competitive interaction between states (i.e., rivals) that is centered spatial 
consistency, duration, militarized interstate disputes, and linked conflict (Wallace, 1979, 
p. 333). There are three types of rivalry: isolated (1 MID < 6 years); enduring (6 or more 
MIDs <= 20 years); proto (1 MID within 10 years) (Vasquez, 2004, p.10). 
Status Quo State:  In power transition theories, a status quo state is defined as an actor 
that is satisfied with its circumstances and domain placement in either the international or 
regional order.  To maintain this dynamic, they use power politics, which might include 
war.  Case in point, in the Gulf War, the U.S. was a status quo state and used military 
force to expel Iraq out of Kuwait (Kohout, 2003). 
Steps To War Theory: A realist-based theory, founded by one of the original COW 
project members John Vasquez, which explains the phenomenon of interstate war onset 
as either a step-wise function or simultaneous aggregation of territorial disputes, rivalry, 
alliance building, and arms races (Vasquez, 1997, p. 111). 
Target: A state who is the focus of either behavior, activity, or action from another state.  
These attributes could be either positive or negative.  For example, State A targets State 
B to join then against State C is considered a positive situation for State A and B.  
However, from State C’s perspective it has a negative connotation (Dorf, 2004).   
Territorial Dispute: An interstate dispute over the control of salient land and maritime 
terrain.  It is often manifested over territorial borders, strategic access to resources, 
cultural saliency, and economic value (Diehl and Goertz, 1988). 
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War:  The violent use of arms between states to achieve political objectives, characterized 
by sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 
battle-related fatalities in a 12-month period (Sarkees, 2010, p. 10). 
Methodology 
The primary research method is quantitative analysis.  Herein, there are both 
descriptive and inferential statistical techniques employed to answer three supporting 
research questions, which allows synthesis on Sino revisionism and war causal attributes.  
The research design has a straightforward, inductive quality.  Each key question has 
specified the research goal and associated statistical test. The first goal was to illustrate 
the relationship between war onset and militarized disputes.  Central tendencies and 
variance analysis are used to both describe and infer facets of that interaction.   
The second question’s aim is to ascertain how Asiatic revisionism correlates to 
interstate military violence and warfare.  Bivariate analysis will be instrumental in 
assessing the concept of major powers, national capability, and power domains as they 
correspond to war.  Last, and the centerpiece of this research is exploring war onset as it 
corresponds to the steps to war theory.  Stepwise, logistic regression is imperative in 
testing if Asia is congruent with the other COW research.   
Limitations 
Thus far, three critical limitations of this dissertation have been identified. The 
first constraint involves the ability to construct a methodology to statistically examine a 
specific state. After nearly 60 years of COW research, it became evident that regional and 
country-specific empirical research is at a minimum.  In reading and reviewing over 200 
sources, one problem encountered was there are very few studies to use as an example.  
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There was only one related to regions and none in which a country was the focus.  What 
was more troubling was the regional study, which focused on Latin America, did not 
employ any inferential statistical test (Suzuki, 2002).  Even though most COW peace 
researchers remain concerned with the systemic level of analysis, there is indeed a 
requirement for the scientific study of war within a regional framework.  This 
shortcoming will pose design and analytical barriers. 
Validity is another limitation.  By concentrating on China for a period of seven 
decades, the frequency of militarized interstates disputes and war remains relatively 
small.  In fact, the war tally is approximately two. This circumstance will essentially 
create a low-N dataset, which could negatively impact the ability to draw reliable 
conclusions.  After some initial research, the number of militarized disputes associated 
with China totals 61 cases.  As a comparison, most COW research studies have a sample 
size of 380 or more cases.  The low number of MID cases could cause others to question 
the validity, which leads to the last limitation (Bennet & Stam, 2000; Kendrick et al, 
2013; Maoz et al, 2018). 
The last EUGene_v3.2 compatible MID dataset ends in 2001 (Bennet & Stam, 
2000).  The COW project released an updated version time-stamped 2011.  Inside, there 
are an additional 300 more MIDs that represent militarized incidents from 2001 to 2010 
(Kendrick et al., 2013).  However, there is an issue with its compatibility with the 
EUGene_v3.2 dataset generating.  What this means is this dissertation is currently limited 
to MIDs that transpired before 2001.  This circumstance will undoubtedly impact 
findings.  Of significance, there has been contact with the COW dataset stakeholders 
concerning the matter. 
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Scope 
To accomplish these objectives, this remainder of this dissertation follows the 
standard doctoral format.  As such, there are four more chapters that require delineation. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review.  This dissertation’s research centerpiece entails the COW 
project and the steps-to-war theory.  There have been over 250 scholarly articles 
published on the scientific study of war, which affords a vast repository of literature, and 
therefore knowledge.  That said, this chapter describes what subject material has been 
previously studied, identify the linkages between various empirical studies, and establish 
context on the correlates of war, steps-to-war theory, and the key analytical techniques 
used in research (Hart, 2009). 
Chapter 3 is the research method. All-in-all, this chapter is arguably the most vital 
to this dissertation based on two key reasons. Because this research is quantitative, which 
is not frequent in peace research and conflict resolution fields, there is a considerable 
amount of energy expended on outlaying the data requirements, hypotheses formulation, 
and statistical test.  The net result is a comprehensive, research roadmap, which should 
lead to insightful and impactful results on five hypothesis and five propositions (Hart, 
2009). 
Chapter 4 is the data analysis.  Outside the introduction and conclusion sections, 
this chapter is organized by research questions.  As a reminder, the overall research 
approach is inductive.   So, findings are communicated by the three research questions.  
Wherein, in addition to the statistical results, a descriptive analysis of the frequency of 
militarized disputes, revision types, and wars will also be displayed in chart and table 
format.  Of significance, the dissertation’s main research question is also answered.   
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Through inductive reasoning and synthesis, the statistical war onset results from the ten 
suppositions are integrated to formulate an answer in which the relationship between the 
correlates of war attributes and Chinese revisionism (Hart, 2009). 
Chapter 5 is the discussion and conclusion.  Basically, the central theme here is 
repetition.  The purpose of the study is restated.  Next, there is a summary of the 
dissertation where the conceptual framework, literary review, and research methodology 
are discussed. Then, findings and results are again reviewed for context and validity.  
This chapter will conclude with recommendations for future research (Hart, 2009). 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Upfront, this dissertation examines peace as it relates to war.  Perhaps a better 
explanation is that this scientific effort involves the empirical study of war for the 
purpose of peace.  The research centerpiece entails the Correlates of War (COW) project 
and the correlates of war, which is perhaps confusing.  As a cursory primer, the former is 
a cohort of political scientists and peace scholars, who exclusively concentrate on the 
empirical study of war.  The latter is framed by war correlates; that is, the proven factors 
in which the chances of interstate war is increased. 
Since 1963, there has been a plethora of literature and research on the correlates 
of war.  Of the 250 research studies, almost all are predicated on three constants: focus on 
the interstate system, quantitative methodologies, and seek to prove that realist behavior 
is war prone (Izmirlioglu, 2017). The COW project affords the most effective and 
efficient mechanism to conduct applied research.  By that, this dissertation attempts to 
use both the COW project and steps-to-war theoretical insights and delineate a plausible 
path to war on the Asian continent, thereby highlighting signposts where action could be 
taken to prevent such a calamity.  It is key to mention that the research goal is to explain 
a credible connection between the war correlates and Chinese revisionism, with correlates 
being the keyword.  Simply put, this literature review will not focus on China per se but 
on the empirical aspect of investigating war. 
To accomplish these preliminary objectives, several explanations are required.  
The literature review will describe what subject material has been studied up to this point, 
identify the connections between those various empirical studies, and establish context on 
the war correlates and key research techniques used.  More pointedly, this literature 
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review’s chief goal is to provide a comprehensive, overarching examination of the 
empirical study of war within the COW historical and theoretical framework.  
Before proceeding, a succinct scope of what this literature review entails is 
merited.  It is germane to mention that there are four primary sections, which outlay 
pertinent subject material, as well as the associated COW scholars. First is a discussion 
on the originators of peace research and the war study field.  Aside from a brief overview 
of their empirical achievements, this section details how the discipline was initially 
conceptualized to include the research and validity challenges. 
The next literary review area outlines the COW project.  There are several topics 
discussed, therein.  First, a detailed view of David Singer, the COW project’s founder, is 
afforded. It includes his two key seminal works and long-term goals for the empirical 
study of war.  Second, this section chronicles how dyadic statistical analysis became the 
centerpiece for peace research within the COW community.  Lastly, the 
conceptualization of militarized interstate disputes is outlaid.  The latter is one of the key 
concepts that must be comprehended to fully understand the STW theory. 
The third section defines the four tenets in which comprises the steps-to-war 
theory.  Using a historical timeline framework, territory, rivalry, alliances, and arms 
buildups are meticulously discussed. Each concept is addressed in a two-prong manner, 
whereby the key COW researcher and their respective study findings are first delineated 
and then examined.  More importantly, the overall goal is here to showcase the various 
foundational studies and associated researchers that metastasized the COW project into 
the steps-to-war theory. 
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The literature review’s last area delineates and explains the steps-to-war theory.  
It is the inductive culmination of the four tenets as they relate to militarized disputes and 
power politics, wherein the discussion of realism occurs.  This task is divided into three 
steps.  First, a general overview is provided that identifies the STW theory’s founder and 
research rationale.  Second, each tenet is described in a linear fashion, while 
simultaneously stressing correlatory impacts on war onset. Third, a plausible path to war 
is outlined.  Here is the heart of the dissertation because the steps-to-war theory is finally 
synthesized.  Last, criticism is articulated.  Since the COW project and STW theory is 
relatively new and controversial in the IR field, it is indeed subject to many critiques.  
With the literary review roadmap delineated, it is appropriate to continue by examining 
the birthplace of the empirical study of war. 
The Early Years 
After the turmoil of World War I, the scientific study of war causation became 
popular in the 1930s.  It can be accredited to two social scientists.  Quincy Wright and 
Lewis Richardson contended that the study of war was unscientific.  That is, they both 
thought the field lacked empirical data and analysis to either prove or refute war 
causation.  Wright and Richardson, as a result, brought research techniques from the 
physical and biological sciences to the social disciplines. In succession, with Wright 
being the vanguard, the researchers created respective data sets that classified war and its 
causes (Vasquez, 2009).  What is possibly more unique is that both Englishmen were 
unaware of each other’s work and the long-term radical change it would produce in the 
peace and war research fields (Singer, 1981). 
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Quincy Wright, a University of Chicago professor, seminal work classified wars 
from the 1480-1964 time period.  Using the litmus of 50,000 troops involved as 
magnitude and his own war taxonomy, Wright compiled one of the most comprehensive, 
groundbreaking datasets.  The data included initiation/completion dates, belligerent 
identity, and the number of key battles.  Also, in his groundbreaking work A Study in 
War, Wright provided battle frequencies, casualty totals aggregated across all major 
European Powers (Singer & Diehl, 1990).  Wright’s data repository had its shortfalls.  
There was a question of validity because some wars were not included, while others were 
summarily discounted.  Another gap, according to some scholars, was that the 
rudimentary dataset did not include war severity data, which is considered the number of 
battle-related fatalities (Singer et al., 1990).  In Wright’s defense, the severity would not 
be addressed until later by another scholar. 
Lewis Richardson followed in Wright’s steps.  Richardson, a fellow British 
scholar, expounded on Wright’s research by concentrating on the magnitude, dates of 
initiation and termination in years, belligerents, and identification of initiators as a true 
measure of war (Singer et al., 1990).  More so, Wright, in his analysis, did not distinguish 
the various forms of violence.  Domestic violence was equally included with state 
sponsored.  Lewis did not believe this constituted war.  Consequently, his research 
focused on interstate violence, which also included imperial and civil wars.  (Singer, 
1972).  Perhaps, what Richardson is most known for is incorporating interstate dyads in 
his dataset and subsequent analysis.  This technique would be the cornerstone for future 
war study studies (Vasquez, 2009). 
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The Correlates of War Project 
As an extension to Wright and Richardson, the Correlates of War (COW) project 
was a renaissance in data generation and quantitative war studies, particularly concerning 
interstate conflicts.  Suzuki, Krause, and Singer attested, “Numerous scholars conducting 
quantitative empirical research in international and comparative politics have cited and 
used the extensive work of the COW project.” (Suzuki, Krause, and Singer, 2002, p. 69). 
The initiative was implemented in 1963 with a financial grant from the Carnegie 
Corporation to the University of Michigan’s Center for Research on Conflict Resolution 
(Vasquez, 1987).  Its main aim was to quantify war and its causal factors.  The primary 
output was a holistic databank that was revolutionary in scope and size. 
Two key professors and researchers are considered the forefathers of the COW 
movement. David Singer was a political scientist at the University of Michigan, whereas 
his colleague Melvin Small was a renowned historian and professor at Wayne State 
University (Singer & Small, 1972).  Singer dissatisfied with the lack of analytical rigor in 
violent conflict sought to answer a simple research question: Why war?  Singer 
contended the best way to answer this question was to build a catalog that covered the 
international system for a substantially long period and under meticulously defined 
selection criteria and variables (Singer & Small, 1972).   
First and foremost, to accomplish this feat, Singer and Smalls had to resolve what 
is a state and what is precisely is war (The Correlates of War Project, Oct 2019). The 
former was articulated in terms of international system structure, capability distribution, 
and ranking states by their material possessions (Suzuki et al., 2002). More so, 
researching the occurrence of war meant gathering information on various attributes of 
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the international system that theorists argued were indeed the causes of war.  With Smalls 
amassing war data from 1815 to 1960 from historical texts, the COW founding fathers 
assembled a data set, which identified characteristics such as the number of participants, 
battle deaths, and duration (Singer, 1979).   
According to Singer and Diehl (1990), there was also a second focus area, which 
he deemed more important than constructing the COW database. The correlates of war 
can be defined as those factors that are covaried and thereby associated with the 
occurrence, duration, and magnitude of war.  These independent variables, when properly 
operationalized and statistically tested, could afford key synthesis on the dependent 
variable, war and its causes. The outcome of this opening effort were two groundbreaking 
books. The Wages of War was published in 1975 and later in 1982 with Resort to Arms 
(Izmirlioglu, 2017).  Both literary works listed the data and studies that occurred in the 
early years of the COW project. Indicators and datasets on interstate membership, 
incidences of war between states, military alliances, and national capability were 
ascertained. 
The Correlates of War project continued to expand in the 1970s.   With the data 
repository established, researchers conducted landmark empirical studies.  These 
empirical investigations used realpolitik political models at the system-level.  Focusing 
on primarily on polarity, military buildups and arms races, Singer and his acolytes refined 
predictors to war.  These findings were encapsulated in two volumes, Correlates of War 
and The Correlates of War II.  More importantly, a key update to the previous COW 
dataset was accomplished (Suzuki et al., 2002). 
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During the 1980s, progress continued.  Even though testing realpolitik models 
were still common, dyad-level analysis became vogue.  COW scholars focused on 
capability differentials, expected utility, and deterrence theory. What was different is that 
predictors were garnered towards crisis short of war.  This is where the term militarized 
interstate dispute first entered the COW lexicon.  Equally relevant was the dataset grew.  
Variables such as civil war, militarized interstate disputes, crises, military allocation, and 
contiguity were added (Suzuki et al., 2002; Senese, 2005). 
Regarding the COW project, the 1990s proved equally productive.  Multivariate 
models, which encompassed alternative realist and liberal hypotheses, were used in 
quantitative research (Suzuki et al., 2002; Vasquez, 1996).  Dyad-level accretion was still 
the preferred methodology, and the notion of different levels of aggregation was 
introduced.  Of further significance during this timeframe, enduring rivalries and 
recurrent military escalation became critical research topics.  There were also new data 
sets on territorial change, trade, enduring rivalries, and an updated data repository on 
militarized interstate disputes (Jones, D., Bremer, S. & Singer, J.D., 1996; Suzuki et al., 
2002). 
Since the turn of the century, the COW project has become more than a dataset. It 
remains a wellspring for modern war studies and correlation.  According to Izmirlioglu 
(2017), there are approximately thirteen datasets, providing vital detailed information on 
the various indicators that illuminate state conflict.  Some improvements in the COW 
data repository were interstate conflict geographic locale, national material resources, and 
trade flows.  In totality, the current COW project variable set numbers an astounding 395 
and over 250 research studies (Izmirlioglu, 2017).  These attributes were lumped into 
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four core research activities.  They are theoretical rationale and research strategy, data 
and indicator generation, model/hypothesis testing, and practical implications for policy 
and teaching.  As this dissertation proceeds, each one is addressed in various degrees, 
with model and hypothesis testing being the most extensive. 
Foundational Studies and Prominent Researchers 
Over the years, delineating war causation and correlation has taken numerous 
guises. This section outlines that evolution, including several milestone studies that 
dictated the theoretical framework and research design many subsequent scholars 
leveraged. One of Singer’s early studies sought to accelerate the scientific study of war 
prior to the completion of the COW project.  Based on his initial assessment, Singer 
argued there were two key areas that should be immediately examined.  These topics 
were addressed in The Wages of War 1816-1965. As an aside, the year 1816, 
coincidentally the end of the Napoleonic Era, was significant because it marked when 
war records were sufficiently maintained by countries. 
Continuing, Singer’s first area was the quantification of war.  One should 
remember that Richardson also measured this attribute (Singer & Diehl, 1999).   As the 
war study and peace research field grew in number, various researchers did not agree 
with Richardson’s methodology and selection criteria.  Singer and Small (1972) felt that 
it was immediately necessary to rectify this shortfall before scholars proceeded to use the 
COW dataset.  To that end, they settled on three sets of indicators: magnitude, severity, 
and intensity.  Here is a brief synopsis.  Magnitude was intended to operationalize the 
spatial and temporal aspects of war by counting belligerents and how long military 
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conflict lasted.  It was the simplest of the three because it was merely a sum of the 
months and a list of participants for each war. 
Regarding severity, it was meant to gauge the toll of human suffering—the 
number of combat deaths.   Whereas Richardson included civilians’ deaths in his 
research, Singer used only military personnel.  The latter’s rationale was due to 
insufficient data on civilian fatalities.  He proposed a more effective methodology to 
derive severity. Most nations, even during the early-1800s, kept detailed records on the 
number of soldiers and sailors killed in war.  Intensity, a ratio, reflected the battle deaths 
against other baseline measures.  For example, one might ponder if a war was brief and 
bloody or vice versa.  Singer and Small (1972) believed an intensity ratio would provide 
key insight on that premise.  To achieve this indicator, which was based on a state’s 
battle-deaths, a baseline of magnitude, size of armed forces, and total population were 
considered. In short, these three indicators were foundational in the scientific study of 
war and peace, setting the stage for future research. 
Pairwise frequency, or dyad, was the other topic. Upfront, it is worth noting that 
Singer contended that war, by definition, involved at least two parties and therefore 
should be examined as such. Meaning, war cannot be accurately observed in isolation but 
rather as a relationship.  As an example, he stated, “In many social sciences it is 
becoming increasingly clear that much more is to be learned from the relationship 
between and among our objects of analysis than from an exhaustive investigation of their 
discrete properties.” (Singer et al., 1972, p. 299). 
The methodology used by Singer was imaginative.  Taking COW data into 
account, he matched every country within the international system with their respective 
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war-time opponent.  The dependent variables were war duration in months and combined 
battle-deaths.  Pairs were alphabetically arranged, eventually forming a list with each 
step.  The result was 200 pairs with at least one war where they were collaborators. Once 
complete with delineating wartime partners, Singer et al. used the same methodology to 
derive opponents.  The analysis provided 209 pairs sorted by one war where they fought 
on opposing sides (Singer et al., 1972). In sum, these dyadic relationships afforded 
tentative evidence for the idea of traditional amities and animosities (Bremer, 1992). 
The Wages of War 1816-1965 was not without critics, having two major 
contention points.  First, some claimed this body of work was haphazard in overarching 
aim and framework.  Singer and Small, as previously mentioned, wanted to make their 
war data available prior to the completion of the COW project.  To that end, The Wages 
of War 1816-1965 was heavy on data collection and selection criteria and contained 
tomes of tables, which critics argued made the book tiresome (Singer, 1979; Gibler, 
Miller, & Little, 2016). 
Secondly, there was criticism of data validity.  Other researchers questioned the 
accuracy of the dataset, arguing it was impossible to collect and authenticate all military 
statistics and battle-deaths, especially from the pre-industrial age.  Singer and Small 
countered, “if we were to refrain from doing the historical analysis because of the 
unreliability of the available evidence, some of the most import work in archaeology, 
zoology, and astronomy…would also come to a halt.” (Singer et al., 1972, p. 7) 
According to the COW founders, one must remember the scholar's job is to sift, evaluate, 
and collate procedures to satisfy their and others' skepticism.  Singer et al. (1972) 
proclaimed they did just that in their first book. 
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In short, this foundational book was an important book because of several 
reasons.  It offered a roadmap that articulated future studies. Provided the foundation for 
alliances, which later became a cornerstone in the steps-to-war theory. Demonstrated how 
to conduct a dyadic analysis to determine behavioral and relational attributes between 
states. Finally, Singer and Small’s book showed how to capture historical data accurately 
and objectively.  Even with these achievements, Singer believed a more historical 
justification was needed. David Singer’s Correlates of War was a landmark. It 
articulately defined the chronological and intellectual origins of COW.  Within this book, 
Singer (1979) mused over individual and nationalistic values in the international system, 
subjectivity of realist theoretical thought, policy, the role of scientific knowledge, and 
data/indicator generation.  The last two subject areas were indeed salient to the correlates 
of war. 
As earlier discussed, scientific knowledge about war was a motivating influence 
for the peace researcher.  Singer had an interesting viewpoint on knowledge of war 
studies. Knowledge, as far as he was concerned, was existential, correlational, and 
explanatory.  Singer stipulated that existential was merely facts.  Correlation delineated 
the extent two or more conditions are associated.  Explanatory, the most difficult of three, 
is the degree an outcome is caused by one or more conditions.  Singer contended these 
knowledge forms are imperative, ascertaining why states go to war. As such, fact-based 
correlations and explanations were the design backdrop in subsequent peace research 
(Singer, 1979). 
Equally important was the question of war prediction.  Singer (1979) contended 
the decision to go to war was predicated on three factors.  Deterministic is the first.  
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These events were beyond the ability to exercise any control.  Singer does not explicitly 
mean that violence is impending but rather there are constraints that compel policymakers 
to operate within bounds. Probabilistic factors reflect stochasticity.  Since war is 
inherently human, and humans are capricious, then there are unpredictable or random 
factors in which a policymaker can do nothing about.  Of note, some COW critics were of 
this mindset. 
The last element is voluntaristic. Singer contended that humans are thinking 
beings.  Case in point, he stated, “[P]recisely because humans are different from 
lemmings, we need not act as certain scientific models predict we will act.” (Singer, 
1979) Another point was that the better informed about the process by which groups enter 
a violent conflict, decision-makers could determine which factors are within and beyond 
control.  Even so, the more accurate predictions are made, then there is an increased 
chance to avoid war. 
So far, the material showcased how David Singer and his viewpoints formulated 
into modern peace and war study research.  His first book delineated the methodology 
and selection criteria that generated empirical data on interstate war.  The second book 
clarified what type of research is possible on that dataset.  Meaning, the study of war 
should be empirical, correlatory, and explanatory.  Even more, Singer contended COW 
scholars and practitioners should develop a theory in which hypothesis testing and other 
quantitative analysis could occur. That said, it is important to explore the foundational 
studies and researchers that metastasized the COW project into the steps-to-war theory. 
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Dyads and Militarized Interstate Disputes 
From his initial research work, Singer contended there were five areas that needed 
further investigation.  They are dyads, territory, militarized interstate disputes, and arms 
races. The upcoming material outlay Singer’s desires, starring with a dyadic look at 
interstate war, followed by the four concepts instrumental in the formulation of the STW 
theory.  To start, Stuart Bremer is responsible for advancing war quantification with two 
landmark studies that ascertained dyadic methodology and militarized interstate disputes. 
The first one, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 
1816-1965” can best be explained as who fights whom.  Dyad research was a major topic 
that flourished from the COW project.  Bremer, a colleague of Singer and early COW 
contributor, sought to further explore the relational aspect between states and the 
conditions that affected the likelihood of war.   
To start, one must remember that a dyad is a pairing of two entities.  It can be a 
simple as two people or more complex such as a state.  Dyadic data analysis affords the 
ability to examine interactions between pairs, which early COW scholars believed was a 
necessary condition (Frey, 2018).  Bremer's (1992) research characterized dangerous, 
war-prone states and their attributes in a dyadic construct. Although there were five 
findings from his research, three are mentioned here.  First, the preponderance of 
empirical war studies was at the systemic level.  Bremer believed that looking at war 
through a nondyadic lens would render evidence, at best, inclusive (Bremer, 1992). 
Second, most empirical studies were limited in the spatial-temporal domain.  This 
supposition that narrow temporal domains afforded a weak basis for drawing conclusive 
evidence.  Instead, Bremer advocated for an expansive time period to collect as much 
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evidence as possible. Last, bivariate analytical methods often masked relevant statistical 
associations.  Despite multivariate analysis inherent shortfalls, which are war’s low 
frequency and statistical degrees of freedom, Bremer (1992, 1996) strongly insisted 
multivariate analysis would best answer who fights whom.  
All the above-annotated issues were hold-overs from Singer’s (1972,1979) earlier 
work.  As such, Bremer intended to rectify by incorporating a broad timeframe, interstate 
dyadic pairs, both bivariate and multivariate analysis on seven key predictors of war that 
warranted empirical testing.  Before continuing, it is necessary to give a brief overview of 
each.   Proximity is the first predictor.  Here, the main point was that war occurred 
between nations within close geographic proximity to another (Bremer, 1992; Johnson & 
Toft, 2013).  
The second indicator was the notion of power equality.  There are two sides to 
this argument.  One is that power preponderance promotes peace; the other is that power 
parity encouraged peace.  According to Bremer, numerous studies have examined the 
relationship between war and power, but few have done so on a dyadic level (Bremer, 
1992; Braumoeller, 2008). Power status concerned major or minor powers.  There is 
substantial evidence that major power, who possess the industrial, population, economic, 
and military capabilities, are more prone to war than minor powers (Bremer, 1992; Singer 
& Small, 1972). The fourth predictor of interstate war were alliances.  Here, Bremer 
(1992) contended state friendships were key to the initiation of war. 
Regime type is fifth.  This variable tested what type of governments were likely to 
pursue war.  The sixth indicator involved a state’s economic status.  Economically 
advanced polities, according to most research rationale, possessed the necessary means to 
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conduct war, thereby making it a valid variable.  Bremer’s last predictor was 
militarization.  This measurement entailed state resources outlaid to military 
preparedness.  In other words, Bremer, like numerous other peace researchers, believed 
that arms races were instrumental in the onset of war. (Bremer 1992; Colaresi & Thomas, 
2005; Singer, 1972). Taking the seven predictor variables into account, Bremer 
delineated requisite propositions to test. 
The methodology was straightforward, entailing two analytical regression 
techniques. Using bivariate analysis, Bremer (1992) calculated and then compared the 
conditional probabilities of war initiation.  To clarify, bivariate regression is arguably the 
simplest form because it delineates the relationship between two discrete variables. 
(Field, 2013) All seven propositions did support correlatory dyadic analysis, and some 
results were indeed perceptive.  From strongest to weakest, the correlation and size effect 
of the factors proved profound.  Here is the ranking: 1) proximity, 2) power status, 3) 
alliances, 4) arms race, 5) regime type, 6) economic, and 7) power equality (Bremer, 
1992).  What is important, according to Bremer, was that power differentials were the 
weakest predictor of war and a direct contrast to core realist thought.  
The other analytical technique was multivariate.  This regression form is more 
advanced, involving inferential statistical tests that afford comprehension in what manner 
multiple predictor variables are related to an outcome variable. (Field, 2013) Admittedly, 
Bremer suggested bivariate analysis could hide relational impacts between the 
aforementioned factors.  Case in point, he stated, “Under this condition, apparently strong 
relationships with war may be spurious and weak relationships with war may become 
strong when the effects of other factors are removed.” (Bremer, 1992, p. 331) To alleviate 
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this shortfall, each factor was transformed into a binary variable that correlated to a 
specific dyad.  For example, the alliance variable was either assigned as “1” if the dyad 
was allied or “0” otherwise.  This variable transformation was repeated for each variable, 
allowing Bremer to implement a multivariate linear regression.  
Taking the statistical ranking of each factor, a stepwise regression was completed.  
The results were mainly aligned to the bivariate analysis with a few unexpected 
outcomes.  The war onset ranking was adjusted.  Here is the new list: 1) proximity, 2) 
regime type, 3) economic, 4) power status, 5) power equality, 6) alliances, and 7) arms 
races (Bremer, 1992). What was more profound was the association regarding two key 
independent variables.  There was a negative correlation between states with advanced 
economies, meaning states that have robust markets are less likely to go to war.  The 
other observation was alliances and arms build-up were not statistically significant, which 
countered previous research results.  Bremer surmised this result not necessarily valid 
and dictated further research on alliances and arms races impacts on war onset (Bremer, 
1992; Croco & Teo, 2005). 
There were four key findings in this study.  First, disputes over territory when 
coupled with contiguity had the highest probability of resulting in war. Second, states 
with advanced economies were not prone to fight each other.  The rationale is that since 
both have much to lose, they seek alternative conflict resolution techniques. Third, 
democratic states were less likely than other government forms to engage in war.  The 
reason here is that democracies often are more developed and therefore decision-makers 
are beholden to the domestic populace than oligarchies or dictatorship (Bremer, 1992; 
Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014).  That said, this study’s impact is it marked the first time a 
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coherent, empirical explanation of the war onset correlation factors were achieved. The 
development and subsequent use of dyadic research techniques were instrumental in 
determining both the relational and behavioral aspects between conflict-laden states.  
This accomplishment led to Bremer’s next major study. 
Bremer’s second pivotal contribution was documented in the aptly titled 
“Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical 
Patterns”. Published in 1996, this article’s purpose was a review of the COW project's 
latest dataset and improvements therein.  Equally vital was that Stuart Bremer, along with 
fellow researchers Daniel Jones and David Singer, developed a clear, detailed 
understanding of what constitutes militarized disputes, thereby increasing correlational 
knowledge thereof.  Whereas Bremer’s other study examined key predictors and 
inferential statistics, this one instead focused on the catalysts to conflict.  Conflict and 
disputes come in numerous guises; therefore, Bremer bounded them within a military 
taxonomy.  His rationale, “States do not engage in militarized actions unless they 
perceive that the issues at stake are important.”  (Jones, et al., 1996, p. 170) So, the term 
militarized interstate disputes could be considered as a historical conflict case in which 
there is either a threat, display, or use of force by one state directly towards another 
member state.  The following provides more clarification.  First, a dispute is regarded as a 
sharp disagreement or clash of interests between two state entities.  Second, according to 
the COW lexicon, disputes come in three varieties. Threats are considered verbal 
indications of hostile intent, displays are a military demonstration, and force usage 
summarized by a military operation.  
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Lastly, another key category was added to the militarized interstate dispute 
typology.  When a MID escalated into open combat, resulting in 1,000 battle deaths, a 
threshold was crossed, signaling the conflict was now an interstate war (Jones et al., 
1996; Singer et al., 1972).  In sum, one should remember that military incidents form the 
building blocks for MIDs.  Bremer and his colleagues were indeed instrumental in either 
defining or classifying four foundational MID tenets that would have far-reaching 
implications in war onset and the steps-to-war theory. 
Equally relevant, and accredited to MIDs, was two new COW research areas.  The 
first one involved the examination of revisionist states and interstate war correlation.  
Revisionism, according to this artifact, is a government’s dissatisfaction with its 
circumstantial status quo in the international order and decided to engage in conflict to 
alter it (Lebow, 2010; Wright, 2015; Yoon, 2003).  To classify as a revisionist state in the 
COW framework, however, the state had to challenge by either: 1) making territorial 
claims, 2) attempting to overthrow a regime, or 3) declaring the intention of not abiding 
by either a target state or international order rules (Jones et al., 1996). 
Dispute outcome was the other focus area.  The correlation between conflict 
outcomes and war onset was an important topic, yet non-existent.  They established a 
sound technique to determine this relationship.  Bremer and company coded outcomes 
based on the challenges made against the status quo (Bremer, 1992; Jones et al., 1996).  
Although there a total of six categories, only a few are discussed.  First, victory is 
whenever a state secured a favorable change in the status quo by application of force.  
Yield is where one state capitulated by accepting concessions from the challenger prior to 
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military conflict.  Last, stalemate is characterized by an unchanged status quo.  (Jones et 
al., 1996). 
In short, the 1996’s Correlates of War MID dataset was instrumental in furthering 
peace research.  It was the first major update. Prior to this point, Singer and Small’s 
(1972) earlier version only identified war participants, start and end dates, fatality totals, 
and hostility levels.  Revisionist’s claims of territory, regime overthrow, or challenging 
the status quo effectively changed the paradigm in which MIDs could be evaluated.  
Likewise, outcome clarification was contributory.  By deriving what states won or lost, 
Bremer effectively filled a knowledge gap in how dispute behavior ultimately 
culminated.  Settlement methodology afforded critical operationalization of variables, 
thereby illuminating how negotiations, treaties, and ilk could impact MID outcomes, 
thereby advancing peace research.  Some pertinent information on the analytical methods 
used in this study will foster greater comprehension.  Bremer’s use of descriptive and 
inferential statistical techniques was more advanced than previous COW research.  
Bivariate & multivariate regression was improved, which resulted in five key findings. 
Using explanatory statistics, Bremer correlated that the frequency of conflicts and MIDs 
decreased as the number of states in the international system decreases.  This finding was 
justified using the Collapse of the Soviet Union as an example.  The conflict duration was 
equally revealing.  Weibull probability distribution showed that the longer a dispute 
continued, the lower its probability of termination.  Bremer expounded, “They have a 
feud-like quality such that the longer they last, the more difficult it is to bring them to a 
close” (Jones et al., 1996, p. 181). 
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Fatalities were the third finding.  Here, a bivariate survival analysis, a common 
statistical test in the medical field, revealed that two-thirds of all MIDs ended with no 
deaths (Jones et al., 1996; Bradburn, Clark, Love, & Altman, 2003).  That aside, there 
were noteworthy findings regarding conflicts characterized by battle deaths.  Using the 
power status framework, major-major and major-minor disputes were battle deaths were 
relatively low.  More interesting was the fact that minor-minor conflicts had the highest 
fatalities, which Bremer equated to the end of colonialism and the Cold War that fueled 
numerous civil wars (Jones et al., 1996). Fourth was the size of conflict.  A negative 
binomial regression illustrated that most disputes are one-on-one affairs between minor 
powers.  Again, this circumstance is indicative of the fall of the Soviet bloc and European 
imperialism (Jones et al., 1996). 
The fifth finding was just as relevant.  Escalation involved Singer’s taxonomy of 
escalation.  From lowest to highest, it is a threat, display of force, use of force, and full-
scale war (Sample, 1997).  Descriptive statistical tests revealed higher hostility levels 
between powers signified an increased probability of escalation (Jones et al., 1996).  
Meaning, most states adopted tit-for-tat strategies when dealing with issues of territory, 
policy, and regime differences (Carlson, 1995; Vasquez, 1987; Senese et al., 2003). 
The last key finding was dispute settlement and outcomes.  Here, predicted 
probabilities discerned when the conflict was between a major power and another major 
power, there was a significant correlation as to it ending in a negotiated settlement.  
Minor-minor clashes also resulted in the same.  However, when a major state faced a 
minor one the settlement ended with the latter accepting the former’s imposed will.  
Perhaps, the greatest insight that Bremer and his fellow researchers determined entailed 
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outcomes.  There were two salient points.  First is that most major powers were 
victorious in war; the second was that decisive outcomes were of the past (Jones et al., 
1996; Senese et al., 2003). 
To sum up Bremer’s above contributions, there are three pertinent improvements 
that advanced war study research.  Bremer’s main aim was to articulate new 
operationalized variables and techniques used to generate them.  Another improvement 
was the identification of new research topics. With over 2,000 data points, there were 
innumerable potential patterns in the COW militarized interstate dispute datasets. (Jones 
et al., 1996).  Key subjects, such as revisionism and dispute outcomes, were introduced to 
the discussion. What is important is that the peace research and war study fields had 
moved beyond war onset, fulfilling of Singer’s initial goal. Last was the methodology.  
Bremer showcased advanced statistics in both descriptive and inferential techniques.  For 
example, predicted probability was key to correlating dispute settlement with power 
status, as well as bivariate survival analysis regarding battle fatalities.  The overall impact 
was these bodies of work were instrumental in defining the connective tissue as to why 
states fight.   
The next four subsections inductively construct the steps-to-war theory.  The 
COW concepts of territory, rivalry, alliances, and arms races are first independently 
analyzed and then synthesized into the theoretical framework.  As with dyadic militarized 
disputes and Stuart Bremer, each concept is referenced in a historical manner by the key 
researcher. 
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Territory 
Territory was the first prominent steps-to-war subject area with roots in the COW 
project.  Since it had numerous researchers, it is best to examine it through a longitudinal, 
thematic lens versus the researcher-based one.  After compiling the war causal factors in 
their earlier work, Singer and Small discerned that territory was by far the most 
prominent (Singer et al., 1979).  This implication was only the precipice because both 
researchers surmised that further analysis was needed to unveil why it was so prevalent.  
This section syntheses several territorial taxonomies, thereby showcasing the importance 
of the war and peace studies field. 
John Vasquez (1995) furthered the territory dialogue with “Why Do Neighbors 
Fight? Proximity, Interaction, Or Territoriality.” His main premise was that the clustering 
of war among neighbors may be conceptually significant; however, there is a territorial 
aspect that must be accounted for.  Territoriality, a term fittingly coined by Singer’s 
former research assistant, is key to explaining that relationship.  According to Vasquez, 
there is a human tendency to occupy, and, if necessary, defend territory—in essence, the 
meaning of territoriality. In other words, two states that border another used aggressive 
displays to establish boundaries in areas where they meet (Vasquez, 1995; Senese & 
Vasquez, 2003).  This theory was in direct contrast to realism, which posited that nations 
fought to gain power and thereby assure their survival. 
Prior to territoriality, the two main factors were proximity and interaction.  The 
former is nothing more than the distance between states.  More pointedly, proximity 
correlated with opportunity. Meaning, if states were contiguous there was a higher 
probability of war.  On the other hand, interaction entailed relationships.  Here, Vasquez 
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stated, “As the number of interactions between states increases the number of 
disagreements is apt to increase.” (Vasquez, 1995, p. 280).  These interactions led to 
learned behavior on how to settle disputes.  Case in point, if a state had previously used 
war to settle a conflict, then there was a higher probability it would do so again.  
Contrarily, if negotiation or mediation was used, then the opposite would occur.  So then, 
territoriality concerned the motivation on how to handle territorial disputes. 
Research design was straightforward.  Vasquez used six propositions that were 
cross walked along three fronts: territoriality, proximity, and interaction.  For brevity’s 
sake, each proposition is not addressed (Vasquez, 1995; Senese et al., 2003).  It, however, 
is important to remember that a key premise is that humans engage in collective violence 
over territory not because of contiguity or relationships but from the learned behavior of 
trying to defend borders or acquire new territories.  And once those boundaries were fully 
accepted by belligerents, then peace would ensue.  If not, then violence conflict would 
surely continue.  To prove these propositions, a mix of descriptive probabilities and linear 
regression was used.  The key result was indeed interesting (Hensel & Mitchell, 2005, 
2015; Johnson &Toft, 2013; Vasquez, 1995). 
Vasquez statistically proved that war onset was avoided when there was an 
acknowledgment on how to resolve territorial disputes.  This finding answered the key 
hypothesis that states fight over territory and not changes in power, which debunked the 
realists’ claim of power-seeking (Vasquez, 1995).  Proximity (i.e., opportunity) and 
interaction were not the sole reasons that states fight but rather how they handled 
mitigation of territorial disputes.  What is important to remember is that Vasquez moved 
the correlate of war debate beyond borders into the dispute resolution.  The latter was 
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critical in the development of peace studies (Hensel et al., 2015; Senese et al., 2003, 
2008). 
In 2001, Vasquez again with “Mapping the Probability of War Analyzing the 
Possibility of Peace: The Role of Territorial Disputes” advanced the territory discussion. 
This scholarly article was rooted in criticism.  At the time, there was a consensus 
amongst international relations scholars that the territory correlate did not actually predict 
war onset. They gave three key deficiencies as to why not.  First, there were not many 
numerical cases of war. Vasquez acknowledged, “[W]ithin the MID data, there are 2034 
disputes but only 102 that escalate to war, and several of these disputes that result in the 
same war.” (Vasquez, 2001, p.147).  This relatively low-N dataset did not lend well to 
correlational analysis.   
Second, there were just too many independent variables that impacted what 
causes war.  Of note, this is a major critique afforded by traditional IR theorists who 
believed war could not be quantifiably studied (Singer, 1980). Last, war is not usually 
instantaneous, rather it is a long process, making it difficult to understand.  Vasquez 
(2001) begrudgingly acknowledged this shortcoming, stating correlational analysis does 
not do well with the longitudinal or stepwise processes.  However, taking all of these 
knowledge gaps into account, Vasquez countered with the notion that territorial disputes 
indeed increased the probability of war, which is different from correlation (Vasquez, 
2001; Senese et al., 2003, 2008). 
Research design was predicated on testing whether territorial disputes increased 
the likelihood of war.  To accomplish, Vasquez's research methodology entailed 
comparing conditional and base probabilities.  He stated, “By comparing the conditional 
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probability of territorial disputes escalating to war to the overall base probability, one can 
make a valid inference about whether territorial disputes increase the probability of war 
more than other types of dispute do.” (Vasquez, 2001, p. 150) Vasquez used the COW 
project’s MID dataset and a dyadic unit of measure to create a series of probability tables.  
The results supplemented his main hypothesis 
There were three key findings.  It was found that dyads dominated by territorial 
disputes had a relatively high probability of having fought one war.  In fact, there was a 
probability was 25% higher than the base (Vasquez, 2001).   Another interesting fact was 
that territorial disputes do not make war inevitable, which was shown by the low number 
of wars from states characterized by minimum territory-related issues.  Lastly, Vasquez 
controlled for major powers and regionalism in the context of territorial disputes.  What 
he found was that regions with a dominant state had fewer territory MIDs.  Meaning, 
major powers established or enforced the rules and norms that limit the number of 
territorial wars (Vasquez, 2001). 
In sum, this research had central far-ranging implications.  It addressed the 
academic criticism that plagued the COW project from its early days, which was there 
was no valid method to correlate war.  The shift to probability-based quantitative 
methods was indeed accurate and repeatable.  Equally important, Vasquez statistically 
tested how a regional power impacted the territorial conflict with its sphere of influence.  
This was a first and became the wellspring for other peace studies, especially the steps-
to-war. 
Walter (2003) introduced intractability into the territory discussion.  In 
“Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict”, she focused almost exclusively on 
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the intra-state conflict.  Until then, previous COW research was almost exclusively on the 
interstate war.  One should remember that Singer (1972), who was a product of his time, 
stressed the importance of determining why nations fought.  However, by the early-
2000s, characterized by the Chechnyan separatist movement, increased extremism in the 
Middle East-North Africa (MENA) regions, and other non-state actor violence, the 
geopolitical landscape had changed (Huth, 1998).  As such, Walter wanted to examine 
how governments acted in territorial disputes with non-state actors. 
The research design was simple and easy to follow, which afforded readers the 
ability to comprehend and synthesis territorial impacts in intrastate conflict. The research 
blueprint used both qualitative and quantitative methods.   Taking the results from the 
Center of International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) global survey, 
Walter compiled a robust dataset and operationalize several key variables.  They were the 
number of ethnopolitical groups, economic value, strategic value, psychological value, 
and balance of power.  Linear regression was used to test four interlocking hypotheses 
that primarily detailed a government’s willingness to accommodate demands for 
territorial autonomy (Walter, 2003). 
That said, there were three major findings. The first one is the number of ethnic 
groups.  If there was more than one revisionist subgroup, then the government did not 
accommodate.  In fact, Walter stated that these situations led to greater intensity because 
governmental leaders did not want to set a precedent of being weak.  Second are 
democracies.  Walter’s research delineated that democracies were more willing to 
accommodate or seek resolution over territorial issues.  Her rationale was that democratic 
leader was beholden to an electorate, thereby they could not act without impunity 
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(Walter, 2003; Hensel & Mitchell, 2005).  Military expenditure was the last finding.  
Here, a compromise was based on the monetary cost of war.  As costs increased, Walter 
(2003) statistically showed that governments were willing to accommodate the demands 
of non-state actors.  The primary reason was the continuation of war expenditures only 
made the state weaker and more susceptible to loss or forced into an undesired outcome. 
Although Walter’s work did not involve interstate conflict, it did further the 
advancement of territory in the war onset discussion.  More so, the simplistic, and yet 
elegant design was not cumbersome as several previous COW research studies.  Perhaps 
most importantly, Walter proclaimed that China with its many contiguous states should 
be significantly less willing to negotiate any territorial dispute with its neighbors or the 
various ethnic groups residing with the Yellow Kingdom.  This summation, according to 
her, should be further researched. 
Senese (2005) returned to the territorial debate when he released “Territory, 
Contiguity, and International Conflict assessing a New Joint Explanation.”  In 2005, he 
injected the concept of territoriality.  Hitherto, there were two territorial explanations for 
the onset of war.  Contiguity is the first.  It is nothing more than two states that are 
adjoined by a common border (Senese, 2005; Vasquez, 1995; Senese et al., 2003).  Since 
these entities were neighbors, then there was a greater possibility of disagreements.  The 
other explanation was territory.  The idea here was that domestic populations were more 
concerned with protecting the integrity of their land and willing to fight to do so (Sense, 
2005).  What Senese aimed to accomplish was to cumulatively examine both contiguity 
and territory and how they led to conflict escalation and war. 
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Before discussing the research design, it necessary to outlay two important 
concepts that were integral to Sense’s hypotheses formulation.  Star’s (1978) opportunity 
and willingness framework afforded plausibility on how states entered war.  Opportunity, 
which is dependent on geographical proximity, stipulated that closeness equated to 
numerous occasions to enter conflict.  Willingness, according to Starr, was the degree to 
which an interstate actor would pursue a prescribed policy (Senese, 2005; Starr, 1978).  
These constructs were amendable to sequential hypotheses.  The first test was dispute 
onset, whereby Senese questioned whether contiguity and territorial claims would lead to 
a dispute.  The next one entailed war onset.  Here, the researcher queried if proximity and 
geographic conflict would indeed lead to war. 
To remain aligned with the sequential nature of the abovementioned hypotheses, 
the research framework was stepwise.  Senese constructed a two-stage estimation 
procedure, which relied on a dyadic unit of measurement, as a primary means of testing 
his hypotheses.  The first stage used MID data to derive if a dyad had a territorial dispute 
and was contiguous, whereas the second included a test to determine if the dispute led to 
war.  The censored Probit technique produced expected probabilities, whereby a ranking 
of four predetermined excursions: 1) not contiguous, no territorial disagreement; 2) Not 
contiguous, territorial disagreement; 3) contiguous, no territorial disagreement; and 4) 
contiguous, territorial agreement) could occur (Senese, 2005). 
The findings were mixed.  Based on the presence or absence of contiguity and 
territorial claims, dyads that were contiguous and possessed land-based claims had higher 
a higher probability of conflict than those without.  This meant that bordering states with 
territorial issues entered a militarized interstate dispute on a greater frequency.  Senese 
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(2005) revealed that the second stage result was unexpected.  As support, he stated, “[I]t 
does not support the explanation’s notion that contiguity will have some positive impact 
on the likelihood of MIDs escalating to war.” (Senese, 2005, p. 777).  In simple terms, 
territorial MIDs escalating into full-scale combat was inconclusive. Why is this article 
relevant?  Senese clearly linked the territory discussion with MID and war onset.  This 
joint account is important because previous work was arguably cumbersome and complex 
(Senese, 2005; Senese & Vasquez, 2003).  Equally significant was highlighting war onset 
as it related to national resolve.  Research on a state’s willingness to enter war is not new; 
there have been numerous qualitative accounts thereof.  What Senese managed was a 
quantitative outlook on resolve as it pertained to war onset, especially contiguous and 
non-contiguous states.  Meaning, countries that do not border each other tend not to 
engage in territorial MIDs.  However, when they do, non-contiguous belligerents clearly 
signal their resolve through escalation.  This salient point does allow providence on Sino 
activity in the South China Sea. 
The last territory-related subject area encompassed a multifaceted typology of 
territorial linkages to militarized interstate disputes.  Gibler (2017) outlaid the 
classification of states involved in territorial disputes from 1816 to 2001.  He primarily 
differentiated between cases where territorial ownership was disputed and instances 
whereby the status quo distribution of land is acknowledged.  As a refresher, it is 
important to remember that MIDs are divided into four specific categories—territory, 
policy, regime, and others (Bremer, 1992). Gibler contended this division is important 
because a subnational number of studies, over 240 to be exact (Singer, 2002), have 
demonstrated that “territorial issues are more difficult to resolve, more likely to repeat, 
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more prone to fatalities, and more likely to cause wars than other types of issues” (Gibler, 
2017, p. 194). 
In “What They Fit For: Specific Territorial Issues in Militarized Interstate 
Dispute, 1816-2001”, Giber (2017) had two main goals.  First, he provided an extensive 
listing of the types of territorial issues that countries fight over, which he divided between 
location and uncertainty levels of ownership.  Homelands, islands, and colonies were 
examples.  Second, the scholar showcased which land-related issues were more serious 
than others.  The types of territorial issues in military disputes were expansive.  However, 
there were five subcategories that necessitate further analysis.  The first one was disputed 
ownership of a territory.  Gibler expounded that border areas, islands, colonies, and 
maritime areas constituted this conflict category.  Of significance, the delineation of sea-
based conflict was new to the COW project.  Second is the time-tested border issues, 
which was straightforward.  Opportunity-based territorial conflict was third.  It is 
characterized by revanchism, weak states, predatory states, and general.  Fourth is state 
system changes, which is comprised of new and disintegrating states.  Gibler’s last 
territorial conflict classification was border violations.  Land, maritime, and air 
personified this subset (Gibler, 2017).  To analyze the territorial issue distribution, a 
simple frequency technique was used.  There were three cases in which conflict incidents 
were binned: number of disputes, the number of fatal MIDs, and the number of wars.  As 
expected, disputed ownership, particularly over border areas, resulted in the highest 
percentage (21%) of fatalities.  What was unexpected, according to Gibler, was that 
island disputed resulted in the highest number of wars (Gibler, 2017). 
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The research design to test the seriousness of land-related issues was more 
sophisticated than the distribution type.  Gibler relied on dyadic analysis and multi-linear 
regression to examine five distinct outcome variables, which were purposefully aligned to 
the distribution list. The predictor variables were contiguity, democracy, defense pacts, 
and capability differentials.  The results were enlightening and because of its statistical 
significance across all outcome variables, contiguity, by far, was the best predictor of 
conflict.  In fact, Gibler correlated that territory related MIDs did escalate to fatal 
disputes and war.  Democracies had a negative effect on conflict onset.  Meaning, 
democratic government was less likely to enter an opportunity-based territorial conflict, 
which is consistent with most peace study literature. Capability mattered in opportunity 
cases; however, it did not impact any other cases. Defense pacts were not significant in 
any category (Gibler, 2017; Jones et al., 1996).  In sum, Gibler's major contribution to 
territorial disputes was the expansion of knowledge.  His subdivision of the territorial 
MID into numerous variables showed how ownership and opportunity were integral to 
the onset of violent conflict.  Furthermore, his use of state status—i.e., new or 
disintegrating was a fresh look at the international system as it pertains to territorial 
issues. 
Rivalry 
Rivalries are the second essential topic associated with the steps-to-war theory.  In 
the early-1990s, the term was conceptualized by COW stalwarts Gary Goertz and Paul 
Diehl.  At its crux, a rivalry is recurrent-conflict between states that significantly impact 
interstate-relationships and -behavior is primarily a negative manner (Goertz & Diehl, 
1993; Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006).  Although it comes in my forms, here, interstate 
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competitiveness is manifested in four dimensions: spatial, duration, competition severity, 
and repeated conflict (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014). For most states, rivalries are expensive 
in terms of economic and opportunity cost because of the need to increase military and 
other power capabilities.  More importantly, interstate enmities have been statistically 
linked to war onset.  Below is a 35-year account of the rival-war correlation research 
organized by key rivalry-war researchers.  It starts with enduring conflict in the spatial 
and positional domains, moves to strategic long-term competitions, and finally ends with 
rivalry maintenance and recurring issues (Goertz et al., 1993; Klein et al, 2006, Sarkees, 
2000). 
Goertz and Diehl (1993) sought to define and explore the concept of enduring 
rivalries. The latter was described as a competition between states that is comprised of 
various degrees of competitiveness, time, and spatial aspects. The contest is military-
oriented and geared towards either obtaining a tangible good, such as territory, or an 
intangible one akin to prestige.  Time, in this case, has a far-ranging temporal aspect 
(Goertz et al., 1993; Goertz et al., 2000; Wayman, 2000).  Goertz et al. (1993) posited it 
was greater than three to five years.  More so, enduring rivalries do not endure forever 
but have a beginning and end. With a few exceptions, the spatial attributes were mostly 
dyadic.  But the scholars were clear to point out that a good definition of rivalries should 
not have a limit on the number of belligerent and should account for multi-lateral 
interstate conflict. 
That said, this qualitative study was an exercise in comparing the operational 
definition of rivalry from various authors using a framework of time, dispute number, and 
termination comparison metrics. Prior to analyzing the results, it is necessary to identify 
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and provide a succinct overview of the four selected authors’ definitions. Wayman (1990) 
is the first.  He used a minimum of 11 years, two disputes, and termination of the rivalry 
of 10 years without disputes to operationalize rivalry.  Next, there was Diehl.  He defined 
rivalry as no minimum length of disputes, three disputes, and rivalry termination as 10 
years without conflict (Diehl, 1985). Then, there was Gochman and Maoz (1984) whose 
definition had no minimum length, included seven MIDs, and no time period for 
termination.  Finally, the COW project articulated rivalry as 25 years of conflict, a 
minimum of 5 disputes, and 10 years with no open hostility.  All in all, Goertz et al. 
(1993) clearly articulated the various rivalry definitions.  It is now time to examine their 
results and the findings were undeniably informative.  Based on the above criteria, there 
were numerous rivalry totals.  Wayman led the list with 276 dyads.  He was followed by 
Diehl whose tally was 148 rivalries.  Gochman and Maoz were third with 52 cases and 
followed by the COW project relatively low 30 enduring competitions (Gochman et al. 
1984; Goertz et al., 1993).  
Equally important was Goertz and Diehl's synopsis on these definitions and 
suitability for research.  According to them, Gochman and Maoz were the worst because 
of the lack of a temporal aspect and inability to delineate the start and finish of rivalries.  
Both Diehl and Wayman’s operational definitions were best suited for research where 
rivalries are the background material (Goertz et al., 1993).  Unsurprisingly, Goertz and 
Diehl (2003) proclaimed that the COW definition was for studies where enduring 
rivalries were the focus.  In sum, what is important to remember is that Goertz and Diehl 
(1993) closed knowledge gaps by clearly articulating what rivalry definitions were best 
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suited for requisite studies.  This effort was an attempt to lessen some of the criticism 
over rivalries in the context of war causation. 
Colaresi and Thompson (2002) further explored the rivalry debate with their 
analysis of how protracted conflict was relevant in crisis escalation.  It is important to 
remember that Colaresi's focus area was conflict escalation, whereas Thompson 
purported strategic rivalries.  When teamed together, the researchers argued for the idea 
of rivalry possessing fewer limitations than protracted conflict (Colaresi & Thompson, 
2002). There were two key tenets to the abovementioned supposition.  Strategic rivalry, 
which is the proclaimed enmity between countries, is one (Thompson, 2001).  Equally 
important was escalation.  When merged, the key hypothesis was that rivalry crises are 
more likely to become violent. 
To test this support, the research design was quantitative in nature.  Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld's (Colaresi et al., 2002) escalation model, which used to identify 16 
independent variables, to account for war.  After deriving several propositions, chi-square 
tests of independence were used to explore bivariate relationships.  The test results 
showcased that out of 204 identified rivalries, 94 of them were strategic, which is an 
astounding 67%.  More interestingly, there were two key findings.  The researchers 
determined a small number of dyads were responsible for a disproportionate amount of 
total conflict in the international system.  Second, a crisis between rival dyads as 
compared to non-rival crises was more prone to threats, militarized action, and ultimately 
war (Colaresi et al., 2002; Thompson, 2001).   
In the same way, Goertz, Jones, and Diehl (2005) posited that rivalries were 
maintained through the failure of realist strategies and conflict management techniques. 
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This initial exploration study focused on the former. Continuing, the research team 
believed that most repeated-conflict studies, which were common in COW research, were 
myopic in their persistence in identifying past influences.  Moreover, the scholars argued 
the time horizons for recurring-conflict studies were perhaps too broad and linear and 
therefore should be narrower (Goertz & Diehl, 2000).  Goertz et al. further expounded, 
“This is often theoretically unappealing because of the connection between conflict, 
sometimes more than a hundred years apart, is frequently tenuous.” (Goertz et al., 2005, 
p. 766) On top of these viewpoints, rivalry-specific studies were regarded as short-sighted 
because of the sole dependence on conflict initiation and outcomes to understanding 
rivalry continuation.  The research team posited that what between the endpoint was 
perhaps more important (Goertz et al., 2005). 
Goertz and his colleagues were not proponents of realism as a viable theory to 
examine rivalry maintenance.  Their rationale is nuanced. Since realist strategies often 
included coercive tactics and power politics, it made determining rivalry causality 
difficult.  Meaning, the issue becomes is rivalry a product of or accelerant for conflictual 
behavior between states (Goertz et al., 2000; Goertz et al., 2005).  As one can see, this 
conundrum does not facilitate valid and reliable research. Therefore, the academics 
adopted the punctuated equilibrium theory as an analytical framework to explore conflict 
maintenance. The theorem postulated that rivalries go through several stages, invoking 
that these competitions follow a path of dependence.  Goertz and the other scholars 
(Goertz et al., 2005, p. 763) categorized the path into four disparate steps; they were 
initiation (first two disputes), lock-in (third through fifth disputes), stasis (sixth dispute 
and beyond), and culmination.  
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When it came to research design to answer how are rivalries maintained, a two-
model quantitative construct was implemented.  Model I centered on the impact of 
previous disputes on rivalry maintenance, whereas Model II focused on life cycles. Data 
was accessed via the COW rivalry dataset, which at the time was a relatively new 
addition to the COW information catalog.  A total of 1,166 rivalries were identified for 
further testing. The statistical test applied was linear regression.  The outcome variable 
was dispute recurrence.  There were several maintenance predictor variables: stalemate, 
victory, severity, territory, and duration (Goertz et al., 2005).   
Taking the above-mentioned overview into account, there were a few pertinent 
outcomes.  Model I proved that stalemates in militarized hostilities are the most 
statistically significant indicator as to why rivalries are maintained. It was more than 
either victory, severity, or the other predictor variables. The rationale is that a stalemate 
signals the conflict strategies have not succeeded and thus disputants continue their 
rivalry. Equally pertinent was the fact that disputes mainly occur in rapid fashion, usually 
within two years.  Regarding Model II, it revealed that dispute outcomes mattered in the 
early stages in the rivalry, but quickly dissipated during the later stages.  What is most 
important was the only clear indicator in the late-stage rivalry maintenance was territory, 
which meant that states that fought over geography remained enemies. This result aligned 
with most war-study literature (Goertz et al., 2005).  
All in all, this study expanded rival-war analysis by investigating interstate 
conflict maintenance. To start, the use of the punctuated equilibrium theory was new and 
novel. As a reminder, one of the key criticisms of COW research was the lack of theory.  
This form of equilibrium theory stressed that hostile interstate relationships enter a stasis 
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phase after six or more MIDs, and it would take a political shock to culminate the rivalry 
(Goertz et al., 2005). Second, this study illuminated that indeed rivalry context mattered 
in predicting future disputes.  The predictor variables (victory, stalemate, dispute 
severity, territory, etc.) were critical indicators as to why nations continue to compete.  
The research team stated the only non-statistically significant predictor was a victory.  A 
fact that is believable because a state winning a military contest does not equate to the 
vanquished being pacified.  Last, this body of work successfully demonstrated that rivalry 
maintenance was not linear, which previous repeated-conflict research ascertained.  
Rather, Goertz and his colleagues statistically displaced that rivalry maintenance varied 
over the life cycle of the rivalry.  When these three findings are combined, the expansion 
of knowledge did improve the understanding of rivalry in the war studies context (Goertz 
et al, 2005). 
One last piece of rivalry literature concerned problem aggregation and militarized 
incidence. Dreyer (2010), a major proponent of strategic rivalries, believed issue 
accumulation increased the likelihood of militarized conflict. Hitherto, most research 
tended to examine and compare disputes in isolation (Bremer, 1992; Senese et al., 2005). 
Dreyer contended this technique was not valid became most issues between states 
aggregate over time.  In fact, he surmised that after an initial conflict, states would 
develop an image of “enemy” toward another as multiple issues transpired.  This effect 
eventually would lead to an enduring strategic rivalry, which Dreyer claimed must be 
studied (Dreyer, 2010). 
Another reason Dreyer wanted to explore strategic rivalry dynamic was both 
temporal and escalatory in nature. The academic was particularly partial to the notion of 
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the volcano model as an explanatory justification as to why strategic rivals go to war.  
The idea here is that as disputes occur over time they tend to escalate and spiral out of 
control.  As such, Dreyer argued that tempo was an essential element in issue conflict 
accumulation and war onset (Dreyer, 2010). 
Using the Issues Correlate of War (ICOW) database, Dreyer amassed four distinct 
issues that fuel strategic rivalry (Dreyer, 2010; Hensel & Mitchell, 2015).  Spatial issues 
involve territory, as mentioned is stable in the war-studies.  Positional issues aligned with 
realist claims that states seek power to maintain their security (Colaresi et al., 2005; 
Thompson, 1995). Third, is ideological.  The point here is that states compete in the best 
way to organize a global or regional system.  The Cold War is a prime example (Dreyer, 
2010; Thompson, 1999).  The last issue, which was added by Dreyer, is identity.  This 
contention is based on either ethnic, religious, or racial strife.  In all, there were 98 
instances of issue accumulation of strategic rivals (Dreyer, 2010). 
Dreyer’s research design was commensurate with other rivalry studies; he used 
linear regression to test premises. There were four hypotheses developed for statistical 
analysis via two models.  One excursion assessed issue accumulation, while the other 
addressed the tempo of escalation.  The key dependent variable was the occurrence of an 
interstate war. The independent variables were tenets of the ICOW database, which are 
spatial, positional, ideological, and identity.  Before covering the results, it is important to 
note that the timeframe was from 1816-2000, a substantial expansion from previous 
rivalry research (Dreyer, 2010). 
The study findings were varied.  With respect to issue accumulation, Dreyer 
derived, "Overall, moving from a single-issue conflict to the accumulation of two issues, 
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the probability of a militarized dispute changes from .091 to .198, an absolute difference 
of .107 and a 118% increase over the baseline." (Dreyer, 2010, p. 789). This result 
supported the notion that strategic rivals would often bear the burden of developing 
military capability and engaging in militarized conflict to overcome their respective 
opponents (Wayman, 2000). Another key discovery concerned rapidity, whereby most 
states become rivals within in the first year of a MID outcome.  In fact, the significance 
of long-term issue accumulation is that it demonstrated states become locked-in as they 
compete, using tit-for-tat power politics until war breaks out.  This result supported the 
volcano model in which a gradual increase in issue accumulation tended to increase the 
chances of interstate war (Dreyer, 2010). 
What is important to remember is that Dreyer's treatise expanded knowledge on 
issue accumulation and conflict escalation within a strategic rivalry.  The further 
development of existing issue typology could impact future research.  More so, Dreyer’s 
use of the volcano model supported Goertz et al. (2005) viewpoint.  Whereas the latter 
stipulated that it took six or more disputes for states to enter an enduring rivalry, Dreyer 
also empirically showed that salience of the issue extrapolated over a relatively long time 
period could lead to interstate armed conflict.  A fact that bolstered the steps-to-war 
argument that rivalry does increase the probability of war. 
Overall, the abovementioned context has delineated considerable gains in rivalry 
research.  Both Diehl and Goertz (2000) effectively categorized rivalry dimensions, 
advancing study techniques beyond dyadic MIDs.  Thompson and his colleagues’ body 
of work on strategic rivalries was pivotal in expanding the rival-war study field away 
from spatial and positional competitions to more conclusive content (Thompson, 1995, 
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1999, 2001).  Dreyer’s issues research successfully updated and solidified what exactly 
entailed a rivalry, effectively bringing the rivalry-war field of study into the modern era.  
Perhaps most importantly, the empirical work on rivalry has proven that it instrumental in 
bringing about war. 
Alliances 
Alliances have been a key component and an integral study area for steps-to-war 
research. More so, it is the third supporting premise of the STW theory. There remains 
debate on whether formal interstate agreements contribute or prevent war.  It is also 
worth mentioning that several scholars contend that alliance polarization promotes the 
commencement of hostilities amongst states (Gibler & Vasquez, 1998; Levy, 1981; 
Singer et al., 1972). This section examines some vital literature on alliances as it pertains 
to war causation.  As with other steps-to-war attributes, most alliance-war analyses have 
leaned toward qualitative investigations.  This circumstance is not the case here.  The 
four below-listed scholarly articles are indeed seminal, having created, corrected, or 
expanded knowledge with respect to treaties and military conflict. But what is more 
relevant is their empirical nature and advanced quantitative research methods.  Similar to 
other literature review sections, the first treatise is from a long-standing scholar in the 
COW project. 
One of the seminal alliance studies was performed by Jack Levy, an influential 
member of the COW project.  He desired to examine whether alliance formation 
contributed to peace or war with respect to Great Powers.  Up until Levy’s study, alliance 
literature was mixed.  There was a school that contended alliances promoted peace 
because of reduced uncertainty in the international system, thereby alleviating state 
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misperception and miscalculation.  The other scholar group believed alliances generated 
counter-alliances, which furthered mistrust and tensions between states, leading to arms 
races and ultimately war (Levy, 1981; Singer et al, 1972; Small & Singer, 1990).  With 
this mind, Levy argued recent empirical studies were rendered inconclusive.  A situation 
in which he wanted to rectify. 
Levy concentrated on relational theories the balance of power and power 
transition, to ascertain war causation.  He, therefore, focused on the Great Powers 
because they were the primary actors in most interstate wars.  As such, a succinct 
summary of what entails a Great Power is warranted here.  According to Levy, a Great 
Power is a state that played a major role in international security-related politics.  Key 
attributes are possession of a high-level of power capabilities; participation in the 
international system; recognition by that system as a Great Power. (Levy, 1981). 
To start, the research question queried whether high periods of alliance formation 
were followed by war.  The chronological aspect was an expansive 500 years.  Levy went 
further left in time to the 1500s to start his analysis, which was different from the 1815 
timestamp that was prevalent amongst war studies at the time. He advocated, “A more 
extended temporal domain would increase the number of cases and, by increasing the 
variation in underly international conditions, facilitate comparative historical analysis” 
(Levy, 1981, p. 585).  
With the COW dataset as the repository, Levy chose the occurrence of interstate 
war as the independent variable.  There were several dummy variables operationalized to 
broaden examination.  These war indicators were frequency, duration, extent, magnitude, 
severity, intensity, etc. all of which were transcribed from Singer's Handbook of War 
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(Levy, 1981; Singer et al., 1972). Although there were other war types, Great Power 
military action was deemed more statistically important. This conflict form was derived 
from historical accounts and COW's power capability index. The dependent variable was 
the international alliance formation.  It is necessary to mention the sole alliance type 
tested was defensive in character.  That said, the research design was correlation analysis 
(i.e., Kendall's tau b).  Here, Levy conducted a statistical analysis to test the relational 
strength between the independent variable and the prescribed dependent variables.  The 
results, at the time, were groundbreaking (Gibler & Sarkees, 2004; Levy, 1981). 
Levy’s study encompassed two key findings.  The first concerned the relationship 
between alliance and war.  According to him, nearly 80% of the great power treaty 
formation was followed by war.  This outcome was aligned with power transition 
theorists and those scholars that contended alliances destabilized the international system.  
Even more profound was Levy’s other finding that delineated alliance formation was 
associated with peace, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, rather than war.  These 
results were duplicitous.  Levy gave no formal justification as to why they were not 
conclusive, which would further “muddy” the alliance and war onset debate (Gibler et al., 
2004; Levy, 1981).  
Although arguably inconclusive, Levy’s study did have three salient 
accomplishments within the alliance-war study field.  First, it expanded the modern-day 
international state system from 1815 to the late-15th century.  This action added further 
historical context and increased the number of cases.  Second, Levy focused on the Great 
Powers.  This explicit emphasis was one of the first of its kind in empirical war causation 
research within the confines of dominant state interaction.  Last, according to Levy, his 
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work expanded research techniques from simple correlation analysis toward more 
advance descriptive forms that afforded greater refinement in alliance-war research 
(Levy, 1981). 
In 2000, the alliance-war research became more intricate and expansive when 
Leeds, Long, and Mitchell aimed to explore alliance reliability under a revised set of 
obligations. Upfront, this study is a replica of Alan Sabrosky's, an acolyte of the COW 
project movement during the early days, work on alliances wherein the premise was that 
alliance reliability is predicated on war performance opportunity.  Meaning, treaties were 
measured on whether the respective allies fought together in a war (Leeds, Long, & 
Mitchell, 2000; Sabrosky, 1980).   
For clarification's sake, it is necessary to offer a brief overview of this 
foundational study. Data collection and research design were straightforward. The COW 
dataset was the information bank used to obtain treaty data. Alliances were divided into 
three categories:  defensive, non-aggression, and entente.   Sabrosky coded each war 
participant as one who belonged to an alliance and subsequently fought in a war as either 
honored, violated, or abstained.  The overall results were 27% of the time allies fought 
for one another; neutrality was prevalent 61%, which left 12% of the identified cases as 
allies who fought against another.  More pointedly, the key takeaway from Sabrosky’s 
research was that alliance obligations were only met 24% of the time (Gibler, 2000; 
Sabrosky, 1980).  This discovery cast a long shadow on the alliance study, and to a 
greater extent, war causation research, for years. Leeds and his fellow researcher desired 
to illuminate and resolve Sabrosky’s unintentional research shortfalls. 
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Concerning alliances and war onset, Leeds et al. (2000) believed there was a gap 
between theory and empirical evidence.  Meaning, with only 24% treaty obligation 
completion rates, then why would any sane state leader enter an alliance with another 
country.  More so, Sabrosky's work did not account for the differences between neutrality 
and consultation, treating both the same (Leeds et al., 2000). Another shortfall was the 
assumption made that alliance requires a fight, thereby taking into consideration that war 
context matters. As such, Leeds and his colleagues deemed it necessary to redo 
Sabrosky’s seminal study (Gibler, 2000; Leeds et al., 2000). 
There were two major research modifications.  The first one necessitated a new 
alliance dataset.   Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) was created to 
improve information on alliance treaties.  To clarify, Leeds et al. (2000) defined alliance 
as a written agreement, signed by official representatives of at least two independent 
states, with three key tenets: 1) promise to aid an ally in military conflict; 2) remain 
neutral; 3) refrain from military conflict, or 4) consult one another before fighting. This 
construct was more detailed that Sabrosky’s defensive, neutral, and entente typology. 
After operationalization, there was also a case difference.  Or rather, the COW data 
repository included 146 recorded alliances between 1815 and 1944, whereas ATOP 
contained a more robust 213 cases (Leeds et al., 200). 
The second alteration involved adding context.  Leeds et al. (2000) argued there 
was a level of assistance with associated treaty conditions, which meant there were more 
attributes than COW’s three types of pacts. Therefore, they created five dummy variables 
of defense, offense, neutrality, nonaggression, or consultation to help examine treaty 
provision.  Alliance obligations were the other added framework.  They were 
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substantially more numerous in the updated study; however, there were some key ones.  
Specific adversaries, specified locations, and pertinent ongoing conflict are a few 
examples of different types of obligations that shape alliance formation (Leeds et al., 
2000). 
Keeping the previous research methodology constant, Leeds et al. (2000) 
discovered a sole, distinct finding from Sabrosky.  The addition and examination of 
obligation into the research technique revealed that 75% of alliance obligations were 
indeed met, which is a significant difference from 24%.  What is perhaps more important 
is that a key knowledge gap on alliance reliability was filled by delineating the relevance 
of treaty obligations.  By updating Sabrosky's work with a new alliance classification and 
more robust dataset, Leeds et al. (2000) corrected some spurious data within the COW 
dataset and help bring consensus that alliances do matter in war causation studies (Gibler 
et al., 2004; Kimball, 2006; Leeds et al., 2000). 
Leeds returned to alliance-war debate, in 2003, when he published his second 
study.  The main research aim was to examine the different types of alliance 
commitments and the probability of military conflict.  There were several factors as to 
why Leeds felt his study was relevant.  Since scholars could not establish a robust 
empirical relationship between alliances and war, the alliance-war political scientist 
believed this knowledge shortfall should be addressed (Leeds, 2003).  According to 
Leeds, there were two main reasons for this deficiency.  Alliance behavior is undeniably 
duplicitous, encouraging some states to embark on military conflict while deterring 
others.  The other flaw entailed the dichotomy between targets and challengers.  Targeted 
states with allies are mistakenly less willing to concede to challengers.  Challengers with 
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alliances are less easily deterred from war.  What is interesting is that both cases might be 
in the best interests of these states (Leeds, 2003). 
A key component of this study is how Leeds characterized alliances.  He 
contended,  they were "written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least 
two independent states, which include promises to aid a partner in the event of military 
conflict, to remain neutral in the event of a conflict, to refrain from a military conflict 
with one another, or to consult in the event of international crises that create a potential 
for military conflict." (Leeds, 2003, p. 429) This definition was reminiscent of his 
previous research with the addition of an international crisis segment—an attempt to 
stymy criticism. 
To accomplish the study objectives, there were three hypotheses. Here is a brief 
description of each.  The first one opined that challengers would not initiate conflict with 
a target if the latter had allies.  Conversely, Leeds tested if a challenger would start a 
military conflict with a target if they had offensive allies.  The last one, centered on 
neutrality interstate neutrality pledges, involved a case in which the challenger would 
remain neutral and not instigate conflict upon a target (Leeds, 2003). 
Hypotheses were assessed with two primary statistical tests. Inferential techniques 
used regression with MIDs as the outcome variables.  Power capability, democratic 
regime, contiguity, and alliances were the predictors.  On the other hand, descriptive 
tests, which primarily centered on the percentage differentiation in probability, measured 
states with dispute initiation against various alliance types.  Of significance, alliance and 
conflict data was pulled from the ATOP dataset (Leeds et al., 2000; Leeds, 2003). 
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For greater clarity, results are addressed by the statistical test.  There were two 
inferential findings.  First, strong challengers who possessed credible power capabilities 
and were contiguous with the target state are more likely to start a military conflict.  
Second, states with similar alliance types were less likely to initiate conflict amidst 
themselves or against others.  The tenet that states with a small number of capable allies 
often exist in a relatively stable geopolitical environment is arguably applicable in this 
case (Leeds, 2003). 
Differential test results were equally profound.  Leeds proved target states with 
defensive alliance agreements had a 28% lower probability of being attacked.  Another 
outcome illustrated that a challenger that was a signatory of an offensive alliance treaty 
had a 48% higher chance of starting a conflict with another country (Leeds, 2003).  
Perhaps the most illuminating finding was that challengers with neutrality agreements 
from outside states have a 58% higher probability of initiating a war.  This result 
coincides with the premise that states enter neutrality alliances to keep external states 
from interfering with the former's military and political aims against a target state (Leeds, 
2003). 
According to Leeds (2003), he achieved two key goals in this study.  He 
adequately expanded the knowledge on the theory of alliances beyond the normative 
deterrence models.  By that, the research showed that states were often encouraged to 
initiate conflict based on treaty obligation.  The other accomplishment was the provision 
of empirical support that alliances do indeed influence interstate behavior and 
relationships as it pertains to war onset. 
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In totality, it was made clear that alliances do contribute to war initiation.  What 
this section has illuminated is that treaty obligations and the level of agreement are 
integral to quantifying if, and when, a state enters a defense pact (Levy, 1981; Siverson & 
King, 1980).  From there, the literature also purported the clarification if warfare would 
soon follow alliance formations (Gibler & Vasquez, 1998; Gibler et al., 2004; Leeds, 
2000, 2003). More importantly, some of the validity issues associated with the earlier 
alliance-war research and spurious data were either reduced, clarified, or outright 
eliminated. 
Arms Races 
Arms races are the last key indicator of war onset addressed and premise of the 
steps-to-war theory.   In 1979, peace researcher Michael Wallace, an original member of 
the COW project, conducted a study on arms buildups.  The main research objective was 
to determine whether arms races affected the probability that serious dispute between 
Major Powers would occur, especially as it pertained to conflict escalation (Wallace, 
1979; Siverson & Diehl, 1989).  One of the first items, Wallace had to accomplish was 
defining an arms race, which was controversial at that time.  His definition was two-fold.  
According to Wallace (1979, 1982), a buildup amongst states involved an abnormal, 
simultaneous increase in expenditure on war materiel coupled with a competitive rivalry. 
From here, Wallace examined militarized disputes between major states from 1816 to 
1965, thereby creating an intricate index that encapsulated MIDs, arms buildups, and war.  
To answer the research question, a simplistic analysis design was used.  Wallace 
used 2x2 contingency tables to determine whether arms race escalated to war (i.e., 
dependent variable). The predictors (i.e., independent variables), ascertained from his 
67 
 
index, were domain, serious disputes, and war. What Wallace discovered was that 23 of 
the 26 disputes that escalated to war were preceded by arms races (Wallace, 1979; 
Sample, 1997).  In another context, there was an 82% chance that if an arms race was 
ongoing between two countries when a MID materialized, then they went war (Wallace, 
1979). 
There was much criticism on Wallace's findings because of its challenges to 
traditional assumptions about political relations between states.  Siverson and Diehl 
(1989) reported that Weede, a major political science scholar circa 1980, had two major 
objections.  First, Wallace’s sample did not account for the two World Wars, which 
overweighed arms buildups and escalation.  Second, the study did not account for 
unilateral buildups.  Meaning, some countries increased their military capability 
independent of rivalry and this is based on the need to protect their newfound prosperity.  
Weede contended that this circumstance was “roped” into Wallace’s index.  Last, there 
was a critique that Wallace's initial work was not theoretically based or used an accepted 
model to test. In short, there were serious concerns regarding the validity and reliability 
of Wallace’s initial work (Sample, 1997; Siverson et al., 1989). 
Despite these shortcomings, Wallace’s initial studies accomplished three things.  
It was the first serious empirical analysis on the impact of arms races and war causation.  
The stepwise examination on how countries’ military expenditures and hostile relations 
were indeed revolutionary, expanding the knowledge gap in war studies.  Second, and 
perhaps most interesting, Wallace’s treatise dominated the war and peace study field as it 
pertained to arms races for nearly 20 years.  It prompted near-constant debate and 
criticism from a host of scholars (Sample, 1997; Wallace, 1979, 1982).   
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In the late-1990s, Susan Sample (1997, 1998, 2002) forayed into the arms race 
debate. She resolved much of the debate with several studies.  One of her first goals was 
to end the Wallace logjam in arms buildup discourse.  She stressed, “Far too much time 
was spent arguing about minor methodological issues rather than resolving those and 
progressing naturally to the questions now addressed.” (Sample, 1998, p. 122).   
To this end, her first major study’s main research objective was to test whether 
ongoing military buildups increased the chances of a MID.  More importantly, the 
professor stressed the necessity to move beyond bivariate to multivariate analysis 
techniques. With slight modifications to the arms race definition in which acceleration 
and a ten-year year military growth period were interjected, Sample (1998) setup a 
multilinear regression.  The independent variables were territory, defense burden, nuclear 
weapons, and power transition, whereas the dependent one entailed escalation.  Of 
significance, both variable forms were dichotomous, rendering familiar outcomes. 
Research results were conventional.  First, countries involved in on-going arms 
races and disputes are more than twice as likely to escalate to higher conflict.  More so, 
the probability of a dispute escalating to war with the stepwise addition of territory, 
defense expenditures, and weapons of mass destruction, was 59%.  When power parity 
and transition are added, the percentage increased to 69% (Sample 1997b, 1998). More 
importantly, Sample did two key things for the advancement of knowledge.  Although 
dichotomous and therefore somewhat simple, the switch from bivariate to multivariate 
analysis incorporated other factors in which not only impacted the outcome variable but 
also relationships between predictors.  Another key accomplishment was finally 
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advancing the arms race debate beyond Wallace’s seminal 1979 article (Sample, 1997, 
1998). 
A few years later, Sample (2002) again enhanced upon earlier military buildup 
research in the context of the balance of power and deterrence theory, particularly in the 
post-World War era.  Sample’s (1997b, 2002) main aim was to identify different domains 
influenced by arms races and conflict escalation.  The former can be viewed as the 
dichotomy between major and minor states, including the combination of both.  Using a 
logit regression model to test numerous propositions, Sample’s key finding was that 
mutual arms races increased the escalation of war for both major (i.e., major-major) and 
minor (i.e., minor-minor) state disputes, but not for mixed conflict (i.e., Major-Minor).  
Aside from this monumental finding, Sample expanded the war study field.  Her 
examination of post-World War II escalation between interstate domains was path-
setting.  More pointedly, she contended the notions of balance of power and deterrence 
strategy were not limited to major states and hegemons but require a concerted 
recognition that minor states have a role in conflict escalation (Sample, 2002).   
In sum, Sample helped resolve much of the arms race controversy by conducting 
myriad tests, holding the military buildups constant, while simultaneously controlling for 
other key factors such as territory, nuclear weapons, and domain status.  He findings led 
to numerous scholars, in both international relations and war studies, to admit that arms 
races have a modest, positive, and significant association with conflict escalation (Sample 
1997a, 1997b; Colaresi et al., 2005; Rider, Findley, & Diehl, 2011). 
If Sample dominated the arms buildup dialogue in the 2000s, then Rider propelled 
it for the 2010s. Rider's first study dealt with arms race onset.  Particularly, he contended 
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states entered arms buildup over salient issues, which are rivalry, threat, and territorial 
competition (Rider, 2009).  This supposition is because arms races are costly endeavors, 
prone to escalation.  Rider argued the impacts were two-fold. Short term impacts are 
spent resources; the long term is economic decline. Gibler, Rider, and Hutchison (2005) 
defined arms race as an “interactive competition between two rival nations using their 
military.  This definition is what Gibler used to test his two prime hypotheses.  The first 
test sought to discern if heightened threat levels equated to greater probability for arms 
races.  Similarly, the second one contended territorial threat correlated to rivals entering a 
military buildup versus other disputes, such as policy and regime (Gibler et al., 2005; 
Rider, 2009). 
The research methodology was more intricate compared to earlier studies.  Rider 
developed a time-series cross-sectional design to determine if indeed arms race onset 
(i.e., outcome variable) was predicated on revisionist tendencies.  The latter is 
categorized as territory, policy, and regime, which are the predictor variable.  In addition, 
control variables such as contiguity, parity, joint democracy, and joint alliance were used 
to help alleviate confounding variables.  They were chosen because of their momentous 
influence within the international system.  For example, most states share a border and 
therefore contiguity is relevant.  Another case is that power capability amongst nations is 
a key attribute in interstate relations.  Both hypotheses arguably necessitated control 
variables, thereby preventing faulty results (Rider, 2009). 
Rider’s two models provided some insightful results.  The first one tested the 
threat hypothesis.  Through analysis, the researcher delineated that at least one MID 
experienced within the last five years is a positive and significant attribute for arms 
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buildup onset (Rider, 2009). The second model tested the territorial threat hypothesis.  As 
stated, states experiencing intimidations are more likely to engage in arms races.  
However, it is only one type of threat that produced one, territorial.  Rider explained, 
“This is because high costs of arms races, both immediate and potential, discourage states 
from using them as a tool of competition except in circumstances where the stakes are 
particularly salient.” (Rider, 2009, p. 700).  What is key to remember from this research 
is that military buildup was not assessed as an outcome condition, but rather as a 
precursor.  The importance, according to Rider, is that if one knew the onset conditions, 
then policy could be developed to prevent the actual occurrence of a multilateral arms 
buildup (Gibler et al., 2005; Rider, 2009). 
Rider’s next analysis dealt with arms races as they pertained to rivalry.  The main 
research aim was to see if military buildups are more prevalent in rivalries and are a 
consequence thereof (Rider, 2011).  Although this study was a replica of Wallace (1979) 
and Diehl's (1982) earlier work, it was more aggressive than his previous one because 
there were three propositions.  Rider (2011) sought to assess if arms races were more 
frequent in rivalries, followed by the timing of such buildups, and finally if that 
relationship with war onset is spurious. 
The research framework was advanced, characterized by curvilinear relationship 
and Probit regression analysis.  One of the first tasks was to define rivalry, which was 
characterized by Political Relevant Dyads (PRDs) that encapsulated states with divergent 
goals (Diehl, 1992).  The analysis proved insightful.  First, Rider demonstrated that arms 
races do occur more frequently in state-based competitions.  Second, he showed how 
military buildups usually happen in the middle and late stages of rivalry.  Lastly, 
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frequencies of arms races are especially higher in war dyads than non-war dyads.  More 
importantly, only when they occur in rivalry latter stages does the probability of war 
increased (Diehl, 1992; Rider, 2011; Wallace, 1979). 
In totality, these disparate studies; specifically, territory, rivalry, alliances, and 
arms races have expanded knowledge of why states go to war.  They provided strong 
theoretical and statistical evidence on who fights whom, and why, closing a critical 
knowledge gap.    Furthermore, the correlates of war were examined in a disaggregated 
manner.  Meaning, each one was primarily reviewed as a single factor versus the sum of 
parts.  For instance, Bremer (1992) and Vasquez (1995, 2001, 2008) posited that MIDs 
over territory and revisionism lead to war.  Diehl and Goertz (1993, 2006) believed 
rivalry were the omnipotent factor in why states fight.  Levy et al. contended that 
alliance-making increased the likelihood of interstate violence, whereas Sample (1997a, 
1997b, 2002) and Rider (2009) proclaimed that arms-races was the main reason.  Most IR 
and conflict scholars would agree that interstate war is not a single event but rather a 
cumulative pathway of counter-balancing activities and power politics that manage to 
spiral out of control (Singer, 1972; Senese et al., 2008).  That said, the next section 
discusses how the aggregation of interstate MIDs over territorial revisions, lead to rivalry 
and alliance-making amongst disputes, and the massive buildup of military capability, 
which culminates in war onset. can lead to war. were the critical enablers that would lead 
to the formulation of the steps-to-war theory. 
Steps-To-War Theory 
First and foremost, the steps-to-war theory's main aim was to study war to create a 
more peaceful world.  According to COW researchers, it fits neither into liberalism nor 
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realism, the two primary international categories.  The STW is not liberal in the sense 
that it does not consider international organizations and interstate cooperation as the 
panacea for world peace.  It should not be taken as a realist theory because STW does not 
adhere to principles of power and global anarchy.  In fact, Vasquez (2005) proclaimed his 
theory was essentially anti-realism.  That said, a brief historical overview is a must. 
If one had to make a historical assessment of the STW theory, it should be varied.  
Rooted in peace as it pertained to war causation, the theory was an outgrowth of the 
Correlates of War project.  Singer and Small initial forays into war studies should be 
characterized by correlation (Singer et al., 1972; Singer & Diehl, 1990).  What they 
wanted to achieve was to codify the correlates that led to the commencement of war.  
Both scholars, after numerous research projects, were able to derive several recurrent 
factors in which precluded war.  However, Singer admittedly concluded war correlation 
was not possible based on the scientific research method (Singer, 1979; Suzuki et al, 
2002; Vasquez, 1987).  Instead, the COW researcher settled on the term proximate, 
which meant that the correlates of war were not valid enough to be considered as a causal 
factor. 
Throughout the 1980s, empirical patterns emerged that COW researchers hoped 
would lead to theoretical proof of war causation.   For example, territory, militarized 
disputes, and alliances were heavily researched for validity (Diehl et al., 1988; Jones et 
al., 1996; Levy, 1981; Sabrosky, 1980).  Knowledge and comprehension were indeed 
increased.  However, because of the lack of sound quantitative and statistical techniques, 
the causes and paths to warfare remained elusive until the 1990s. 
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Bremer (1992) broke through the analytical logjam.  In 1992, he was the first to 
use dyadic analysis.  This approach had two revolutionary impacts on war theory.  First, 
the analysis was shifted from individual- to behavior-based, meaning relational.  To 
clarify, interstate dyads could be arranged to determine interaction, which then allowed 
researchers to adequately examine disputes—one of the major covariates (Bremer, 1992, 
Maoz et al., 2018).  Second, Bremer changed the research paradigm from correlation to 
probability.  Without much success with causation, his approach allowed COW scholars 
to explore the likelihood of war based on the factors.  Using inferential test methods, such 
as variance analysis and regression, researchers derived conditional probabilities of war 
onset centered on certain predictors (i.e., correlates of war).  This breakthrough led to the 
formulation of the STW theory. 
Vasquez is considered the founder of the STW theory.  His focus involved 
illuminating a path to war versus trying to find correlatory factors.  This subtle difference 
in the research approach had major implications. Vasquez combined the abovementioned 
empirical patterns and Bremer’s inferential statistics work to prove war had a path. In 
2005, and later in 2008, Vasquez, and his colleague Paul Senese, were finally able to 
breakthrough.  The net result was a rudimentary empirically based theory on how wars 
could start based on a set of conditions.  With this background information, it is time to 
examine the key tenets to the steps-to-war theory (Singer et al., 1990; Vasquez, 1987). 
Overarching Premises 
The STW premises were riddled with controversy, especially with the realist 
school of thought.  Realists believed since the geopolitical world was fundamentally 
unordered therefore a state must use power to guarantee security.  Power accumulation 
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resulted in an increase in economic and military capability, thereby allowing a state to 
become so powerful that potential adversaries would hesitate to attack.  More so, when 
all states within a regional possessed symmetric capability symmetry then a lasting peace 
would ensue (Waltz, 1997; Senese et al, 2008).  That said, the STW was counterfactual to 
this assertion. 
Vasquez argued that realism and power accumulation did not lead to peace but to 
war.  His STW theory was a testament to this argument; it was based on three premises.  
The first was the issues.  States are a collective group of individuals with myriad 
interests, which are at times divergent.  When one state contested the needs and wants of 
another, an issue ensues.  The point of contention could range from territory to 
government.  What is germane is that if these interests cannot be peacefully resolved then 
conflict increased (Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al, 2008; Vasquez, 2005). 
The second premise entailed disputes.  Unable to revolve their issues, states 
would engage in aggressive behavior towards another.  Vasquez codified this tit-for-tat 
interaction as a dyadic dispute.  These interstate conflicts were manifested by the issuing 
of threats, display, and use of force, and finally open warfare. To deal with the ordinal 
nature of these conflicts, a state used prescribed realism-based behaviors, which led to the 
last premise (Jones et al., 1996; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 1987). 
Power politics are the norms, rooted in realism, a state adhered to change the 
behavior of another country when both were involved in a militarized interstate dispute.  
According to Vasquez (1987, 2004, 2008), there were three.  Rivalry was dependent on 
the perception of threat, competition, and enmity between dyad members.  It was usually 
the first escalatory step countries after a dispute had transpired.  Next, states feeling 
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uneasy about their security situation would look to form alliances.  This political move 
would usually exacerbate the issue, increasing instability.  As the rivalry escalated and 
alliance-making became tenuous, threatened states embarked on a military buildup of war 
capability.  The overall endstate was a stepwise increase in the probability of war.  For 
clarity, the novelty of this STW concept requires another explanatory framework 
(Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al, 2008). 
Prior to explaining the steps-to-war theoretical principles, a comparison against 
realism would help increase understanding.  There are four main differences between the 
steps-to-war and realist schools of thought.  First, STW scholars claimed that power 
politics behavior leads to war versus peace.  The aggressive, escalatory effect of repeated 
interstate disputes and arm builds creates a security dilemma.  This conflict prescribed 
that when a state feels insecure, they increase their military capability, thereby making 
either their rival or neighbors feel insecure and increase their security posture.   The 
overall result is the increase in instability and a decrease in security, creating a volatile 
and uncertain environment (Kennedy, 1987; Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 
2004). 
On the other hand, realist subject matter experts deemed that power politics 
created either a preponderance or balance of power within the global and regional system 
that kept states in check.  For example, a realist would say the U.S.’s dominance and 
relative security within the international order is due to its preponderance of military 
capability.  It would be foolhardy for another country to challenge the U.S., according to 
realist logic (Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004). 
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Second, STW theorists considered the international system is not anarchic, rather 
it is controlled by dominant states who dictate the norms and rules.  Senese et al. (2008) 
contended that the international system is dominated by major powers.  The latter are 
mainly status quo countries that enjoy the benefits of the current system and therefore 
enact policies that promote it.  Conversely, Realists believed the global order is without 
higher authority.  This notion entailed power accumulation and real politick to acquire 
security (Kennedy, 1987; Senese et al, 2008). 
Third, steps-to-war enthusiasts contended war is a learned behavior that states 
enact to get what they want.  Realism proponent stressed war is the reflection of power 
and national capabilities that guaranteed survival of the state and its interests (Senese et 
al, 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004). Lastly, STW theory is explicitly and empirically based 
on territorial issues, while realism concerned almost entirely power and the manifestation 
thereof.  With this side-by-side analysis complete, a more detailed description of the 
steps-to-war theory is in order. 
Theoretical Description 
Upfront, the STW theory contended state-related issues (or revisions) were the 
catalyst for military conflict.   Although these revisions could be wide-ranging, three 
stood out.  For example, countries could disagree over a specific policy, such as either 
support for state-sponsored terrorism or currency manipulation.  Another common 
revision concerned regime-type where the form of government is the point of contention.  
The hostile discord between democratic Taiwan and communist China is one such 
example.  (Dreyer, 2010); Senese et al., 2008). 
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Last, and perhaps most important, are revisions based on territory. Vasquez’s 
research, which was aligned with other COW scholars, posited that land disputes were 
the most salient revisions that led to interstate violence (Frederic, Hensel, & Macaulay, 
2017; Gibler, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 1996).  STW research has also 
shown territory holds the highest instances of war outbreak than other issues.  Even more, 
territorial conflicts are for the most part likely to be reciprocated and more apt to have 
higher fatalities (Senese, 1996; Hensel & Mitchell, 2005). It is worth mentioning that 
policy issues occur with greater frequency than territorial ones; however, the former is 
not statistically likely to end in intestate warfare (Bremer, 1992; Frederick et al., 2017; 
Vasquez, 1992, 2004).   
For greater clarification, an example is warranted.  State A wants to change the 
status quo of its relationship and position with respect to State B.  There is an oil field 
situated along the interstate border. Of significance, both countries lay claim to the oil 
field. State A, however, has decided to act, which has led to conflict. To rehash, revisions 
are salient issues based on territory, policy, or regime, which states are willing to pursue 
actions to resolve.  It is, however, territorial revisions that sets the STW theory into 
motion and this is a foundational takeaway. 
Next in the path to war are militarized interstate disputes.  Since states could not 
amicably settle the territorial revision, they soon found themselves in greater turbulent 
circumstances, characterized by aggressive, escalatory interactions. Threat issuance and 
military force displays categorized the low end of the conflict spectrum.  When coupled 
with timing and salience magnitude, disputant states could intensify their actions to either 
use of military force or even open warfare.  Another example could perhaps afford better 
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comprehension.  Up until this point, the STW theory would posit that State A has a 
revision over a salient issue (i.e., territory) and therefore entered a militarized dispute 
with State B over it.  This situation forces each country to address the dispute in a certain 
way.  The realist purview of power politics was how most states chose to behave 
(Frederick et al., 2017; Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez, 2004).    
The interaction of power politics is the final premise of the steps-to-war theory.  
When interstate rivalry, alliance-making, and arms buildups are addressed in a 
disaggregated manner, they are classified as the correlates of war.  However, when 
aggregated into the STW framework, these three correlates embody the attributes of 
realpolitik (i.e., power politics).  This new paradigm has an additive quality that impacts 
war onset.  More so, this entire process is stepwise and escalatory, and each move 
enhances the chance that there will be bloodshed.  
Rivalry between states, according to Vasquez, is the first power politics move in 
the STW theory.  It is initially manifested after a single dispute over a territorial revision 
has occurred.   Gibler (2017) further contended territorial issues are based on either 
resource allocation, strategic locale, or symbolic means.  The most contentious disputes 
possessed more than one attribute (DIA, 2017; Senese et al., 2008).  Equally important is 
the tit-for-tat behavior and activity by the disputants.  For example, when State A acts on 
a territorial revision, State B feels compelled to react, which thereby increased the 
number of militarized interstate disputes.  The overall result is a dyadic relationship 
characterized by spiraling conflict (Owsiak, 2017). What is germane here is the power 
politics backbone is now formed, defined by an enduring, hostile relationship between 
two states (Goertz et al., 1993; Thompson, 2001).   
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Alliance-making is next in the sequence.  It occurred when a country feels 
sufficiently threatened or at risk, then it will seek an alliance with other governments.    
The act of joining a coalition caused the other state to feel more threatened and it 
responded in kind (Leeds, 2003).  For instance, State B is the target of State A’s 
territorial revision.  The former feels it is in a vulnerable position and allies itself with 
State C to bolster defenses.  State A, now feeling more threatened, partners itself with 
State D to alleviate the duress. Again, the net result is an increase in the likelihood of war 
because there are more than two potential belligerents, ever-increasing the volatility and 
complexity within the strategic environment. Of greater significance, if either one of the 
dyad members or its partners is a major power, then the chances of war increased even 
more.  One must remember that major powers have the national capability to wage war 
(Gibler, 2004; Kimball, 2006; Senese et al, 2008). 
Arms build-up is the last power politics move.  According to Vasquez (2008), 
because arms races show the highest level of commitment, therefore, is the most 
intractable behavior for both internal and external audiences.  Meaning, building up one’s 
military forces is a major endeavor, often consuming significant resources and time, 
which means the political elite and populace writ large must comply.  Also, entering an 
arms race with a rival further exacerbates the security dilemma for which they have no 
alternative but to increase their military capability and capacity.  Case in point, State A 
and State B are enduring rivals who have engaged in over eight militarized disputes over 
territory.  After making outside alliances, there remains a significant level of enmity and 
distrust between them.  To alleviate, both disputants began a massive arms build-up to 
deter one another, which renders an already tenuous situation into a fait accompli for war. 
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Taking the above in totality, Vasquez’s research supported the validity of his 
steps-to-war theory.  Using the COW dataset, which codified almost 2000 MIDs from 
1815 to 1965, the empirical findings reflected a stepwise increase in the predicted 
probability of interstate war.  Here is a succinct overview. Starting with a dispute over a 
revision, data showed territorial revisions (.15) had a higher possibility for war than the 
more numerous policy-based revisions (.09). Next, the research illustrated enduring 
rivalries increased the likelihood of war onset (.45) when combined with a territorial 
dispute (.15). Then, with the addition of alliances, characterized by outside partners and 
major powers, the findings indicated war likelihood (.65) further increased by nearly 20 
percent. The last power politics behavior of arms buildups depicted a 25 percent increase 
in the probability of interstate war onset (.90) when included (Colaresi et al., 2002; 
Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al. 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004).  What is key here is that the war 
probability increased with each subsequent realpolitik behavior, meaning the aggregation 
of the correlates of war had a positive correlation whether states went to war. 
After multiple runs and permutations of different paths, two conclusions became 
evident.  First, territorial issues, especially symbolic and strategic, had the highest 
percentage of war no matter the number of combinations.  Second, Senese et al. (2008) 
tested four alternative logic paths to war, it was the above-mentioned sequence that 
produced both additive and multiplicative results.  The former meant that each step 
magnified war onset probability.  The latter entailed the aggregation of power politics 
behavior also increased the probability of interstate warfare. Senese and Vasquez did, 
however, caution, “What is not crucial is not the sequence of the steps, but that they are 
mutually reinforcing.  Alliances may precede or follow military buildups…” (Senese et 
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al., 2008, p 23).  In short, one should remember the steps-to-war theory is grounded on 
the behavioral and relational impacts of when two states, who are initially involved in a 
territorial dispute, experience repeated conflict, form alliances and increase military 
capability, all of which intensifies the likelihood of war onset (Senese & Vasquez, 2005, 
2008). 
Critique of Steps-To-War Theory 
So far, this dissertation has mentioned several criticisms as to why the COW 
project and associated research were lacking in some areas.  Vasquez and the steps-to-
war theory also have their share of criticisms in which there are four.  Sampling bias is 
first.  In most statistical research, proper randomization is almost a proverb.  Since 
dispute dyads were selected based on time and their conflict-laden attributes, and not 
randomization, these samples could be viewed as biased. Some researcher’s fault the 
steps-to-war theory because of this circumstance (Singer, 1996; Vasquez, 1996; Senese et 
al., 2008). 
Another critique of steps-to-war is that it cannot be applied to qualitative studies, 
especially historical case studies.  This critique arose from those scholars, which outside 
of World War I, could not find other examples of interstate wars that followed the 
theory’s premise.  This gap was acknowledged and registered for future research within 
the COW network (Senese et al, 2008).  The third critique entailed the dyadic approach.  
Croco and Teo (2005) contended that steps-to-war heavy reliance on dichotomous 
continuous variables, such as MIDs and war onset, resulted in both conceptual and 
problems and loss of statistical information.  This shortfall is especially visible in the 
alliance “step”. Case in point, Croco and Teo stated, “We think both the statistical 
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inference and the inductive argument depicted above are in part driven by the assumption 
that bilateral interactions always underpin alliance formation, when the latter occurs both 
bilaterally and multilaterally” (Croco & Teo, 2005, p 8).  In short, by operationalizing 
sophisticated concepts, such as alliances and war, into simpler forms, led to distorted and 
invalid findings. 
Equally detrimental to the steps-to-war validity was the COW research cohort's 
inability to definitively proclaim issues and power politics (i.e., steps-to-war) were indeed 
causal factors for war onset.  In fact, most realist scholars’ criticism was based on this 
notion: since war is a human endeavor, making the premonitions of war too vast to 
quantitatively derive (Singer, 1996, Vasquez, 1996; Waltz, 1997.  Even more, this 
situation was exacerbated when from 1979 to early 2000, there was no testable theory for 
most COW research.  Many academics viewed this as a major shortfall in scientific 
research.  In fact, the only real attempt at proving STW theory came at the expense of 
realism. 
Sixth, and last, is steps-to-war loyalist perceived attacks on the balance of power 
theory, a realism cornerstone. Waltz (1997), the founder of the balance of power theory, 
response to Vasquez was scathing.  The former contended the latter conflated new and 
old forms of realism into one, which is not accurate or responsible.  One such example is 
that Waltz thought the balance of power was a byproduct versus Mearsheimer’s 
viewpoint that balance was the goal.  The realism professor, therefore, accused Vasquez 
of purposefully misrepresenting this key distinction to support his STW work.  In short, 
above are several acknowledge criticisms of the STW theory.  Individually, these 
critiques are perhaps valid and were addressed by Vasquez and other COW disciples.  
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That said, taken as a whole, this dissertation contends these criticisms are not enough to 
either stop or void research on the steps-to-war theory.  The rationale is straightforward:  
the search for peace in a world plagued by hostile Great Powers is a must. 
All in all, step-to-war is a novel and insightful theory to use in studying peace and 
war.  One should remember the theory contended war results from issues and disputes 
that are managed by the realist school of thought—power politics.  Territorial issues, by 
far the most common, festers into greater hostility.  According to Owsiak (2017), this 
circumstance caused recurring MIDs, which led to enduring rivalries.  When alliance-
making and arms races are added, a geopolitical environment riddled with volatility, 
uncertainty, and chaos is produce or war-prone.  More importantly, each part of the 
sequence; specifically, territorial dispute to rivalry to alliances to the procurement of 
weapons empirically increased the probability that there will be interstate warfare 
(Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez 1987, 1996). 
Conclusion 
All things considered, the empirical study of war for the purposes of peace is 
novel and steady expanding.  The four above-mentioned sections are a testament to this 
adage.  Wright and Richardson’s work opened the realm of the possible.  One of their 
signature achievements brought both biological and physical research techniques into the 
social disciplines.  Another contribution was the classification of wars based on empirical 
data.  Variables such us belligerent identification, battle frequency and deaths, and dyadic 
timelines were instrumental, influencing other pertinent peace scholars. 
Equally important was that the COW project and its founding researchers 
provided pertinent context on the correlates of war and the onset of war.  Content-wise, 
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Singer’s creation of the initial COW dataset forever changed the scientific study of war.  
By determining the correlates of war, a host of research topics were introduced into war 
study and peace research fields.  Empirically, ideas and techniques on dataset creation, 
dyadic analytics, and methodologies were explained.  Bremer’s use of dyads and the 
advanced statistical test was revolutionary.  Years later, Vasquez’s employment of 
stepwise logistic regression in testing the steps-to-war theory further expanded the peace 
research field.  
Another key section regarded the foundational COW studies, there are a few 
salient findings that should be remembered.  First, territorial issues are the most salient 
indicators of impending militarized interstate disputes and subsequent war.  Resources, 
strategic locations, and culture are some factors that outline territory-rooted conflict. 
Second, revisions are effective in determining why states embark on such risky endeavors 
such as war. Territory, policy, and regime preferences are indeed explanatory in dispute 
onset.  Third, because of their robust national capabilities, major powers are almost 
always involved in interstate war.  Their ability to procure arms and entangle other 
nations into their sphere of influence often increased volatility and uncertainty within 
dyads.  The last section formed the research backbone. The articulation of the steps-to-
war theory; this is the first of its kind an illuminated depiction of how interstate conflict 
and power politics increased the probability of war.  Going forward, it is imperative to 
remember the key premise is that territorial militarized disputes between states, lead to 
realism-based behavior, which often culminates in a higher chance of open warfare.   
Overall, the meticulous evaluation of five decades of literature, covered in four 
sections, was undeniably insightful. It explained previous research and the linkage 
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between them.  More so, the knowledge framework on the scientific study of war was 
clearly established, identifying the main COW research techniques and such.  However, 
the literary review did illuminate one crucial knowledge gap in the COW project and 
associated peace research. What is missing is a regional viewpoint in which a specific 
country could be scientifically analyzed based on its proclivity for war.  This dissertation 
should be viewed as an opportunity to address this shortfall.  For simplification, a better 
justification is perhaps warranted. If the literature review chapter is considered as the 
“who”, “what”, “when” and “where”, then the next chapter delineates the “how”. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Some scholars would argue there is a quantitative shortfall in the analytical study 
of conflict.  More specifically, the academic fields of international relations, peace 
research, and conflict resolution have not sufficiently investigated in what way 
regionalism, major powers, and real politick interact within a specific geographic locale.  
This dissertation will attempt to mitigate by quantitatively analyzing how interstate 
revisionism, armed disputes, and war correlates can conflate into a violent maelstrom.  It 
will do so by using large-n datasets, testable hypotheses, and advanced statistics.  To be 
clear, the methodological aim here is to properly outline the data management 
requirements, research processes, and propositional test that will afford a synthesis on the 
extent to which the COW covariates associate with the People’s Republic of China’s 
revisionist tendencies.  Prior to methodology delineation, it is necessary to consider 
scope. This chapter is structured into four subsections.  The fist is data management.  
Wherein is a thorough discussion on COW datasets and the computer software used to 
either create or manipulate them.  Equally important is that both variable 
operationalization and data collection are addressed therein. 
Second is domain analysis.  This dissertation is predicated on four domains, 
which form the analytical backbone for how data is accumulated and culled. Temporal 
and spatial aspects, as well as selected units of analysis are several topics that will guide 
how content is aggregated for analysis. The third section spells out the overall research 
design.  Methodology is the focus, whereby information on the overarching process is 
illuminated.  Important content, such as data collection, variable operationalization, 
hypothesis formulation, and analytical test section, are revealed in a linear sequence. 
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The last subsection, which is the cornerstone, overlays prescribed research 
questions onto the research design.  Each question, including the main and three key 
ones, are meticulously explored in a stepwise manner outlaid over the research design.  
The result is a properly outlined research process that should foster the quantitative 
analysis of three key questions. With the roadmap revealed, it now time to shape how this 
dissertation will seek to explore the correlates of war attributes and Sino revisionism. 
Overall Data Management 
One of the main utilities of the COW project is its extensive datasets.  Izmirlioglu 
(2017) reported that the 13 data repositories, which encompassed 395 variables, is a 
critical enabler in quantitative conflict research.  Furthermore, interstate topics extend 
from dispute geographic location, instances of threats and force displays, national 
material capabilities, trade flows, to alliances (Izmirlioglu, 2017; Sarkees, 2000). 
Each dataset has a common set of attributes.  The temporal range is from the post-
Napoleonic era to the late-2010s.  The data tabs are organized into subdivisions and 
shown in either text or comma-separated values (CSV) files, with accompanying 
information presented in PDF files.  The variables typified by either interval, categorical, 
dichotomous, or scale cover material such as population, belligerents, battle death, and so 
forth with each being displayed in a corresponding column.  The COW dataset has an 
astonishing 395 variables.  More importantly, this setup affords conflict resolution 
researchers the ability to manipulate and examine pertinent data to discern descriptive, 
correlatory, and explanatory scholarly work (Izmirlioglu, 2017; Maoz, Johnson, Kaplan, 
Ogunkoya, & Shreve, 2018). 
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Out of the 13 available COW datasets, this dissertation relies predominantly on 
three. National Material Capability (NMC) version 5.0 is the first.  This dataset codifies 
the six elements of national power.  According to Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), 
military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron/steel production, 
urban population, and total population are critical indicators for a state’s material 
capability, a mainstay in most international relations analysis.  It is also important to 
highlight that these indicators make up Singer’s Composite Index of Nation Capability 
(CINC). This statistical tool averages a country’s demographics, economic, ad military 
strength into a single numerical measure (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). 
The second dataset is Militarized Interstate Disputes version 4.3 (MID_v4.3).  As 
a reminder, MIDs are conflict incidents that were a threat, display, military force use, and 
open war by one state explicitly towards another state.  These historical datums range the 
full spectrum of conflict, from verbal threats to warfare. This repository is expansive 
containing information on over 2,000 disputes from 1816 to 2010, which are classified 
into four hostility levels.  Akin to other COW datasets, MID_v4.3 has various tabs and 
subsets.  For example, threat MIDs are further categorized as the warnings to either use 
of force, blockade, occupy territory, or even use nuclear weapons.  Displays of force 
MIDs are equally subdivided into alerts, mobilizations, and border violations.  Another 
hostility variable is the use of force.  It is subcategorized into military actions such as 
blockades, occupation, seizures, and raids.  The last MID is hostility, which is the 
declaration of war.  The above-mentioned afford basic context. Later in this section, there 
is a more robust explanation of MID_v4.3 variables as they relate to the dissertation’s 
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research questions.  Before continuing, it is important to note that MIDs allows complex 
phenomena, such as war, to be broken down into basic interactions that can be studied. 
Combining two datasets is a cumbersome and error-prone process.   According to 
Bennet and Stam (2007), studying international relations within a quantitative framework 
relies on the availability and comprehensive, pliable datasets.  Large-N statistical tests—
common in most numerical studies—often require computer code to manipulate data, a 
time-consuming process. The EUGene_v3.2 (the Expected Utility Generation and Data 
Management Program) software program, created by political scientists Scott Bennet and 
Allan Stam, is a step in the right direction.  The researchers stated, “EUGene serves as a 
tool to facilitate and simplify the process of margining and creating datasets in 
international relations, especially datasets created with the directed dyad as the unit of 
analysis” (Bennet & Stam, 2007, p. 3).  
EUGene_v3.2 often serves as a mainstay for conflict scholars because of its 
dyadic interaction qualities.  For example, the dyadic-year inquiry could include variables 
on the individual-, dyadic-, and system level.  Subject areas such as polity type, the 
balance of forces, and alliances have used dyad year as the unit of analysis (Bennet & 
Stam, 2007; Bremer, 1997; Levy, 1981; Maoz et al., 2018).   
Although there are myriad utility aspects, EUGene affords this dissertation three 
key qualities. First, it allows the construction of single datasets from different repositories 
and units of analysis.  More so, researchers can convert the data into a distinct unit of 
analysis.  This advantage is used to construct datasets applicable to the dissertation’s 
three secondary research questions. Second, the software reduces the need for manually 
writing code.  Again, this process is time-consuming and requires an advanced skillset in 
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database programming.  One must remember that the COW datasets have over 395 
variables available for a researcher (Izmirlioglu, 2017).  The ability to select pertinent 
dependent and independent variables is key. Last, EUGene facilitates the selection of data 
based on common criteria such as time period, domain, great power status, and region.  In 
sum, these functions allow a conflict researcher to properly frame and delimit data into 
functional variables (Bennet & Stam, 2007). 
Domain of Analysis 
To create a framework, this paper employs four key domains.  Most war studies 
examine states on the international level (Braumoeller, 2008; Buzan, 2012; Singer, 2002; 
Kim, 2002).  That said, a major dissertation aim is to examine state systematic interaction 
at the regional level. And since China is the focal point, it is, therefore, necessary to 
bound the dataset to the Asian continent.  As with most of the COW research, there is a 
temporal aspect.  For example, Singer et. al (1972) used 1815 to 1965, whereas Vasquez 
(2004) extended the timeframe out to 1992.  This dissertation contracts the time domain 
to 1949 and 2001.  The rationale is that Mao Zedong declared the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) into existence on this date (DIA, 2019).  The right lateral limit is 2010.  
This period was chosen because of data availability.  The most recent and comprehensive 
COW dataset on militarized disputes ended in 2001. 
With the timeframe set, it now necessary to explain the third domain.  This 
dissertation uses a dyadic interstate approach. More specifically, this spatial domain is 
based on non-directed disputes, whereby outcomes are defined by dispute interaction 
between two states.  This pairwise technique affords the opportunity to accurately test the 
behavior and interactions between country pairs (Senese et al., 2008).  As a reference 
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point, a directed dispute is codified by both an initiator country and target country, a 
divergent construct for the needs of this research.  As such, disputing dyads are simply 
referred to by country code.  For example, RUS and JPN are a dyad that fought a war in 
1905 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). The states used in the dyad generation are the 
international system members identified by the COW project (Small & Singer, 1982).  
The dyads are generated suing EUGene_v3.2, which a dataset generator that aggregates 
various databases into an applicable, user-friendly data repository.   
Unit of analysis is the fourth domain. There are three.  Dyad-dispute is the first. It 
is characterized by each observation representing a militarized dispute.  This unit of 
analysis is most prevalent in research that compares those MIDs that go to war from 
those that do not (Bremer, 1992; Senese et al, 2008). Dyad-year is used to analyze what a 
prescribed dyad does over a year’s timeframe.  An example is warranted for clarification.  
A dyad between the U.S. and China would have observations for every year they were in 
existence.  Of significance, dyadic years record when states are involved in a dispute and 
not. According to Senese et al. (2008), some datasets that use dyadic year as the unit of 
analysis can total upwards to 500,000 observations.  On the contrary, the true benefit of 
dyad-year is the ability to ascertain war and peace periods between the dyad and not the 
large N dataset (Diehl & Goertz, 2000; Senese et al, 2008; Sample, 2016).  
Last is dyad history.  This unit of analysis is comprehensive, representing one 
dyad per the history of the dyad.  The observations recorded are myriad, including 1) type 
and the total number of MIDs, 2) whether dyad has fought a war, 3) are the dyads 
engaged in a rivalry, etc.  Vasquez (2008) mastered this concept in his peace research.  In 
fact, dyadic history is the cornerstone of analysis within the STW theoretical and 
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investigative approaches.  Unlike the other two units of analyses, dyad-history is 
researcher-defined versus EUGene_v3.2 generated.  This fact means that considerable 
work is required to create the dyad.  To adequately quantify and then codify these dyads 
will require a significant amount of time.  However, the insight is indeed worth the effort.  
That said, it is now time to address some key design specifics.  
Overall Research Design 
The overall research design is predicated on the four key steps that are interwoven 
with each respective below-annotated research question.   Hypothesis or propositional 
discernment is the first step.  The subject material is deliberated to provide relevance and 
context.  The “what” and “why” are explained for each supposition.  As a refresher, the 
three supporting research questions are: 1) What is the probability of war onset based on 
associated militarized interstate disputes in Asia? 2)  What revision type causes the 
greatest propensity of war in Asia? And 3) What does the war onset covariates imply for 
chances of war in Asia?   
Normally, most doctoral dissertations have data collection as the next step in 
research design.  This paper primarily follows this construct but with one major caveat: 
collection is substituted with management.  The main reason is the multitude of tasks 
required to collect data from various COW datasets, operationalize them, and construct 
new datasets.  And since each sub-question has distinct data repository requirements, it is 
better to describe data collection within the management framework.   
What is important to remember is two salient points. First, the EUGene_v3.2 
dataset generator is mostly employed to derive a data repository for statistical testing or 
create a new user-made one.  Second, test variables are usually operationalized.  By that, 
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they are first defined as a concept and then transformed into either quantifiable or 
measured indicators prior to collecting data (Allen, 2017).  There is a key difference, 
however.  This dissertation uses established variables from the COW project; thus, the 
focus here is on explaining how the test variables where originally operationalized 
(Singer et al, 1972; Mitchell and Vasquez, 2014; Senese and Vasquez, 2008). 
Model articulation is the third step.  As with most COW research, models are 
either bivariate or multivariate constructs.  The first research question and its associated 
hypotheses will use the former. The second utilizes multiple covariates.  The last question 
is predicated on a comparative construct, facilitating the contrasting of China with other 
major powers. Variable setup is equally important in this step.  This task involves 
arranging the test variables into dependent and independent categories (Allen, 2017; 
Glazek, n.d., AMBOSS, n.d.).  Of significance, war onset is the most prevalent dependent 
variable in COW research and remains the case here.  (Mitchell et al., 2014).  The take-
away is that research models are heavily dependent on analytical tests. 
The last overall design stage entails determining the appropriate statistical test.  
Both inferential and descriptive techniques are used.  The former correlates or predicts, 
whereas the other measures and describes collected data.  Based on the test hypothesis 
and model design, the first two research questions (i.e., RQ1 and RQ2) will use either 
conditional probabilities, predicted probabilities, or logistic regression.  The last question 
is solely descriptive, concentrating on mode, median, and means.  Assumptions are also 
integral in statistical tests.  The goal is to ensure covariates are indeed valid, and the 
chosen test is the correct fit.   
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In short, the overall research design is straight forward.  With each respective 
question, there are four requisite events.  The hypothesis and data management are the 
first two.  Model design and statistical tests are the others.  The pertinent details like 
variable operationalization, dataset generation, and test procedures are addressed in 
greater detail within respective research questions. 
Research Questions 
Since the late-1990s, China has embarked on a set-piece revisionist strategy.  The 
DIA (2018) stated Sino aspirations are two-fold: 1) achieving great power status and 2) 
defense of national sovereignty and territorial sovereignty.  The CCP has stated that 
possessing a “world-class” military is the means to success. The strategic ways are 
myriad.  China uses its diplomatic and economic prowess to entice regional neighbors 
into accepting their hegemony.  On the information front, Sino acumen in discrediting 
rivals, which are mainly the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, on the international stage is 
noteworthy.  But most important of all and germane to this dissertation is the fact that 
China has shown a willingness to embark on militarized disputes short of war to achieve 
their national security aims. 
Chain of conflict is important in understanding what the Chinese are trying to 
strategically accomplish.  Revisionism is the prime catalyst.  As stated, the PRC wants to 
achieve great power status and reclaim near-aboard territory.  These goals are steeped in 
territory and policy revisionism.  The former is manifested by the “One China” policy, 
which entails the assimilation of Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Senkaku Island.  
The latter is characterized by challenging the status quo within the Asia-Pacific region, 
which involves Sino confrontation with other major powers on various issues. 
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Militarized disputes are the second link in the chain.  Here, China has 
implemented an aggressive use of its armed forces to coerce potential allies and rivals 
alike.  It has been documented that China has threatened, harassed, and in some cases, 
used violent force to alter the status quo.  In fact, the repeated threats and stand-offs with 
Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S. have been well documented in the press and international 
relations circles (DIA, 2019; OSD, 2018; The Asia Foundation, 2017). 
The correlates of war, or power politics, is the final link in the chain.  Singer et al. 
(1972) believed states used realist-based behaviors, such as militarized disputes, alliance 
making, and arms buildup, to both guarantee security and achieve geopolitical 
aspirations.  What makes the correlates germane is the combination of war causation 
factors (i.e., revisionism) and realpolitik behavior (i.e., power politics) under one 
“umbrella”, creating a ripe environment for scholarly study. 
Taking these conditions into account, this dissertation desires to explore the 
interaction of intestate revisionism and militarized disputes in the Asia-Pacific region as 
they relate to China’s national security strategy. That said, the main research question is: 
Main: What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist 
strategy in Asia? 
Good research should include various aspects that bolster and validate 
comprehension and analysis.  Arguably, a more clarifying way to explain this decree is a 
“three-legged stool” analogy.  The main research question has been framed in the context 
of revisionism, militarized disputes, and the correlates of war.  It is, therefore, only 
logical to examine these “legs” of inquiry in a paradoxical manner, meaning the research 
is disparate yet reinforcing.  This construct equates to three key research questions that 
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when independently analyzed should answer the pertinent question of whether correlates 
of war and China’s current strategy could possibly lead to conflict.  Hereafter, the 
methodology section delineates the study design and quantitative statistical tests deemed 
necessary to explore this bold proposition. 
RQ1: What is the probability of war onset based on associated militarized interstate 
disputes in Asia? 
Militarize interstates disputes are complex.  On one hand, threats and use of 
military forces often have an escalatory effect on conflict.  Case in point, the British and 
German interactions during the 1930s, prior to World War II.  The two countries engaged 
in massive displays of military prowess, which was filmed and distributed across the 
globe.  After a tumultuous period of volatility, the maritime power and continental 
hegemon force display ended in perhaps the most catastrophic war in human history 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).  On the other hand, there is an argument, when done 
properly, threats and military use can serve as an effective deterrent.   The Soviet 
conciliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis is one such example. When the latter emplaced 
nuclear ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba, the United States began a serious of 
military force displays to discourage the behavior.  After much escalation, the Soviets 
acquiesced from the pressure of a full-scale U.S. troop mobilization, along with a naval 
blockade (Huth, 1998).  As shown, military disputes can lead to either peace or war.  
However, COW researchers are ardent opponents of the latter, instead, they contend that 
MIDs are primary factors in war initiation (Bremer, 1992; Singer, 1979). That said, the 
aim here is to see if their supposition holds true in Asia. 
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An in-depth review of peace and war study literature has revealed there is a 
shortfall of quantitative analysis using COW research principles on the Asian continent 
(Hensel, 1994; Kim, 2002). This section will help change this circumstance by exploring 
MID impacts on war probability. Bivariate and univariate analysis will illuminate the 
factors and impacts of interstate behavior. on perceived security threats.  More so, this 
question is one leg of the hypothetical three-legged stool on which depicts Sino strategic 
behavior in the sphere of influence.  (Sample, 2016; Singer, 1972).   
Data Management  
Of the three main questions, this one is simplest with respect to design.  There are 
several subparts to data collection and management.  This first entails the unit of analysis.  
Dyadic dispute within the context of MIDs is what this question is attempting to measure.  
Therefore, this unit is selected in the user-generated dataset list.  Next is the creation of a 
dataset that accounts for the geographic and temporal domains.  The EUGene_v3.2, using 
COW MID_v4.3 data, will provide an appropriate baseline for research design (Bennet & 
Stan, 2007).  Of significance, there are four researcher-defined variables added to each 
dyad that will assist statistical analysis.  Below is an overview of each variable: 
• WAR_ONSET is a binary variable.  It is operationalized by cwhost_5.  If 
hostility is annotated within a dyad, then “1” is coded, replicating the war has 
commenced.  To cross-check validity, each EUGene_v3.2 war dyad is 
compared to the COW War Data_v4.0 data.  The later has a complete list of 
interstate wars since 1816 (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). 
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• NO_WAR is a dichotomous variable, which is also operationalized by 
cwhost_5.  For all dyads that do not have cwhost_5, a “0” is entered into the 
dataset.  This number represents that no war has occurred from MIDs. 
• VIO_CON is a dichotomous variable.  It measures the occurrence of military 
use within a dyad that has escalated to violence.  It is operationalized by 
cwhost_4 and coded “1”. 
• NO_VIO is a binary variable and the antheses of VIO_CON.  It represents 
that no violence has occurred.  It is operationalized by observing that the 
absence of cwhost_4 within an interstate dyad.  In sum, if there is no use of 
military force, then “1” is coded for that respective dyad. 
Equally important are several other pertinent researcher-defined variables.  These 
indicators are primarily operationalized by tallying subsets of cwhost.  These count 
variables are key to descriptive research techniques.  A description of each is listed 
below. 
• TOT_NUM_MID is a discrete variable.  It is operationalized by counting the 
total number of MIDs, which are ascertained by tallying cwhost_1 through 
cwhost_5. 
• TOT_NUM_WAR accounts for the total number of interstate dyadic wars.  It 
is measured by counting the number of cwhost_5 within each dyad.  
• TOT_DYAD_YEARS is a continuous variable.  It is derived in two steps.  
First, the duration of each dispute is totaled.  The EUGene variable dyaddur, 
which measures dispute duration in days, is used in the calculation.  Then, 
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durations days are divided by 365, effectively operationalizing the dyad into 
years. 
The combination of the EUGene generated dataset and new operationalized variables are 
critical to hypotheses testing, which leads to the second subpart. 
H1: Threats (cwhost_2) impacts the chances of war onset. 
There are three hypotheses associated with this research question.  Below 
annotated is an articulation of each one.  Hypothesis 1investigates war probability as an 
outcome from issued threats. Declaration of hostile intent by a challenger is intended to 
serve as a warning to the target state.  Threats have an escalatory effect on interstate 
dyads.  This dissertation contends that threats do impact the probability of war on the 
Asian continent.  To this end, Hypothesis 1 (H1) tests if threats enhance the possibility of 
war.   
As mentioned, each proposition outlays the variable arrangement as it pertains to 
the measurement.  Glazek (n.d.), in his quantitative framework, contended that hypothesis 
statement format should assign independent variables as the subject and dependent 
variables as the object.  An example is warranted to help illustrate his point.  Looking at 
H1’s format from above, the independent variable is cwhost_ 2, which is at the beginning 
of the statement.  The dependent variable, WAR_ONSET, is near the end.  The 
independent variable indicates issued threats between the dyad, whereas the dependent 
variable measures the likelihood of war onset based on those threats.    The EUGene_v3.2 
dataset generates the number of threats MIDs, whereas the researcher-defined variable 
WAR_ONSET ascertains war commencement. 
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H2: Force display (cwhost_3) impacts the chance of war. 
Hypothesis 2 inserts interstate force displays into the research discourse. The 
display of force, as of late, is common within the Asiatic region, particularly in the East 
and South China Seas (DIA, 2019).  Depending on the state, force displays could be 
perceived as either an act of deterrence or aggression.  Regardless, the net effect often 
increases miscalculation between states, setting off a conflict spiral.  Hypothesis 2 (H2) 
aims to test if displays of force influence the likelihood of interstate war in Asia. 
Bivariate analyses dictate two key variables. WAR_ONSET, the dependent 
variable, indicates the presence of interstate hostilities.  Cwhost_3 is the covariate 
variable, representing the instances of force displays amongst Asian countries.  The 
dependent variable is researcher-generated, while the independent (cwhost_3) is defined 
by EUGene_v3.2 
H3: Use of force (cwhost_4) impacts the probability of war. 
Hypothesis 3 is characterized by dyadic use of force as it influences war. The 
highest MID short of war is the use of force.  Here, states employ their armed forces to 
either blockade, seize territory, or even conduct raids to achieve their political aims.  
Unlike the threats and force displays, force use could result in battle deaths, an 
occurrence that has the propensity to lead to tit-for-tat military engagements (Maoz, et al., 
2018).  That said, Hypothesis 3 (H3) examines if the use of force between Asians states 
effect war onset. 
The last hypothesis is aligned with Glazek’s decision matrix for the quantitative 
analysis framework.  Meaning, the bivariate setup is akin to the previous suppositions: 
dependent variable (WAR_ONSET) and independent variable (cwhost_4).  In totality, 
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these three hypotheses should illustrate the relationship between militarized interstate 
disputes and war onset within the dyad.   
Research Design 
Delineating the research model is the third subpart.  To determine if MIDs do 
indeed influence war necessitates three essential tasks.  In a similar study, Bremer (1992) 
used foundational likelihoods on whether war would ensue based on the number of 
MIDs.  This portion of the model follows his methodology. The base probability of war 
onset applies the ratio between TOT_NUM_WAR and TOT_DYAD_YEAR.  This 
quotient should provide an understanding of the prospect of war as it relates to total 
dispute dyad-years. 
Next, the model derives the percentage of war onset based on the number of 
MIDs that have transpired.  This fraction involves TOT_NUM_WAR divided by 
TOT_NUM_MID.  It is worth mentioning this measurement differs from probability, 
mainly because of the denominator.  One uses time, whereas the other frequency of 
incidence.  Both numbers provide greater insight on how MIDs impact war’s 
commencement.  Of note, this technique differs from Bremer.  He did not use MIDs per 
se instead of focusing on land contiguity, government type, and power domain on a 
global.  The focus here is strictly on the military interstate disputes on the Asiatic 
continent (Bremer, 1992; Mitchell et al., 2014). 
Lastly, this final step examines the occurrence of war against the multitude of 
MIDs that have occurred in Asia.  Bivariate comparison affords the opportunity to 
determine what specific MID escalates to interstate war.  Important to this assessment is 
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determining the total number of threats, force displays, and use of force from 1949 
onward.   
Statistical Test 
Illuminating the statistical test needed to fulfill the abovementioned research 
design is the final area.  Since this dissertation question relies on univariate and bivariate 
analysis, the primary research techniques are both descriptive and inferential analysis.  
For univariate analysis, it is addressed in the first two tasks of the research design where 
a simple descriptive test function that determines mean, mode, and standard deviation is 
conducted. These results should help scope magnitude and frequencies. Regarding 
bivariate relationships or Task 2 in research design, IBM SPSS’s crosstab function will 
assist in determining conditional probabilities, which are the chances an event occurs 
given that another event has transpired.  In other words, what are the chances of war 
given a military dispute between two Asian states has occurred?  
According to Field (2013), crosstabs are vital because they summarize 
information about bivariate relationships.  Crosstabs are characterized by rows and 
columns.  Test setup protocol entails dependent variables entered as rows and 
independent variables as columns.  This dissertation follows that sequence.  For 
clarification, H1 variables will be entered as follows.  WAR_ONSET is checked as the 
dependent variable and cwhost_2 as the independent variable in IBM SPSS’s call-down 
box.  This procedure is enacted for each supposition, equating to a total of three times.  
The results are illustrated in a table matrix. 
Equally relevant is a discussion on why crosstabs are appropriate to build 
foundational knowledge.  First, it is a method that conveys percentages and probabilities 
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in a relatively straightforward manner.  Second, crosstab caters to discrete, categorical 
variables, usually measured on nominal or ordinals scales.  The variables used in this 
research question fit that assumption.  Third, initial assessments predict that the dispute 
dyads range upwards to 1,200 cases, which perhaps prove troublesome for certain 
descriptive methods like scattergrams.  The crosstab table is a better way of viewing the 
test results.  Finally, IBM SPSS has a Z score and Chi-Square test functionality.  Z-scores 
help determine deviation from the mean, especially outliers, which helps with test 
synthesis.  Chi-Square delineates statistical impacts that support proving hypotheses.  It 
worth mentioning that descriptive statistics are usually not enough to properly prove a 
hypothesis, which is why inferential statistics are so important (Field, 2013). 
To address Task 3 in the research design, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is the 
most effective statistical procedure.  It is used to quantify the differences between two or 
more groups by comparing means (Sawyer, n.d.).  One group, as an example, is dyads 
that experience war, and the other is those experiences MIDs.  Simply put, the ANOVA 
here is essentially a point-biserial inferential test.  Like many impact analyses, there is a 
dependent and independent variable set up.  WAR_ONSET is the dependent variable and 
relatively straightforward, whereas MIDs are represented by cwhost.  Since cwhost are 
categorical variables identified by non-ordinal numbers, it is necessary to transform them 
into distinct nominal variables, a major ANOVA assumption.  IBM SPSS allows a 
researcher to accomplish this task by reassigning text to numeric values.  That said, the 
ANOVA factors used in hypotheses testing are NONE, THREAT, DISPLAY, and USE, 
which are the transformed categorical variables from cwhost.  The Post Hoc results will 
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explain the statistical power of the measurement, size of effect, and sample size (Field, 
2013; Sawyer, n.d.). 
In short, there are a few items to remember regarding this research question.  Its 
main aim is to identify how states respond to an issue, militarized interstate disputes.  
COW researchers contend that evaluating MIDs is perhaps the best way to illustrate those 
behaviors (Bremer, 1992; Maoz et al, 2018).  This above-mentioned material attempts to 
follow this mindset by testing MIDs and if they escalate to war.  Data is collected and 
managed with the EUGene_v3.2 dataset generator, which allows variable 
operationalization to test the prescribed hypothesis.  More so, albeit with some 
modifications, the research design basically follows Bremer’s dyadic analysis circa 1992.  
The main difference is that this research explores only four pertinent MIDs (i.e., threat, 
force display, use of force, and hostility) and refrains from other covariates such as 
democracies and contiguity. Equally relevant is that both descriptive and inferential 
testing techniques are employed.  Crosstabs afford basic knowledge on MIDs and war 
onset with respect to scope and frequency. Point-biserial testing should facilitate the 
linkage of state behavior in the initial phases of war onset.  The research totality is that 
one essential part of Sino revisionism as it pertains to the correlates of war is analyzed for 
validity. 
RQ2: What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia? 
Revisionism is the second metaphorical research leg in this dissertation.  It is an 
important topic in both peace research and war studies because of its implications.  When 
states are dissatisfied with the status quo in their circumstance, and if they have the 
means to do so, they will attempt to alter it (DiCicco, 2017; Geller, 2000).  That said, this 
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research question’s objective is to analyze the impacts and relationships of interstate 
revisionisms in Asia.  It is the logical sequence to evaluating how war correlates associate 
with Sino revisionist strategy.   
Before moving on, there are a few preliminary details that should be mentioned. 
Not only is territory salient in MID initiation, but it has also proved most volatile and 
quite prevalent in revisionism (Braithwaite & Lemke, 2018; Senese, 2005; Vasquez & 
Henehan, 2001). According to COW, there are four types of revision and most research 
contend territory is the number one factor in wars (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2008; Senese & 
Vasquez, 2008).  First, territory is a proven motivator for which nations choose to impact 
the current geopolitical environment.  It is considered the most common covariate of war 
onset and therefore is categorized by itself.  Territory is represented by cwrev = 1 in most 
COW datasets. 
Second, policy concerned disagreements on one or more salient issues.  China's 
belief that Taiwan is essentially part of the PRC is one example (Fravel, 2010).  
EUGene_v3.2 indicate policy revision as “cwrev = 2”. Third, regime entailed 
governments.  This revision is the removal of a target’s governing body. The U.S. 
disposal of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party is an instance (Kaplan, 
2013).  Regime is signaled by “cwrev = 3” in the databases. Last, other is a catchall. It 
represented revisions that cannot be binned in either territory, policy, or regime.  It is 
codified as “cwrev = 4”.  Of note, this category is rare.  With revisionism explored, it is 
now appropriate to discuss major powers. 
There is a belief that major powers are more prone to war—simply because they 
can (Corbetta & Dixon, 2004; Sample, 2002).  Research Question 2 explores this 
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supposition, a key method is investigating a state’s national capability index and domain 
status against the onset of war.  Lastly, Small and Singer (1982) strongly believed this 
measurement was a key factor in war initiation.  Even though capability studies within 
the COW framework has gradually subsided over the last few decades, this dissertation 
will once again bring it to the forefront.  With the overview complete, it is now time to 
examine RQ2’s second section. 
Data Management 
Data management is perhaps more complex than the previous research question.  
There are two key subsegments entailed in this section, with the first being data 
collection. It is perhaps best to cover comparable collection methods from RQ1 and then 
migrate to those attributes that differ.  The unit of analysis, which is a dyadic dispute, 
remains the same in this question. Also, utilizing EUGene_v3.2, a similar dataset is 
created that allocates for country codes, interstate disputes, national capabilities, power 
status, and politically relevant dyads.  To clarify, these COW-defined, software-generated 
factors are identical to those housed in RQ1.   
Continuing, the differences are most prevalent in researcher-defined variables. As 
a reminder, revision is the central theme in this research question.  Since the COW 
dataset has only one variable that measures revisions, it is necessary to create more to 
adequately address the study question.  That said, there are two requisite lots to further 
define state-based revisionism. One batch is power domain-oriented; the other pertains to 
national capability percentiles.  Starting with the power domain, it is a dichotomous 
variable (i.e., POW_COM) that measures interstate dyad power status.  There are three 
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levels to POW_DOM that are essential for hypothesis testing.  A succinct overview is 
provided below: 
• MAJ-MAJ is a dichotomous, discrete variable.  It represents that a dyad is 
comprised of two major powers. This discrete factor is operationalized by 
sorting the EUGene_v3.2 generated dyads for ones that are comprised of two 
major powers.  Once the criteria are met, a “1” is coded. 
• MAJ-MIN is a binary variable that signifies that a dispute dyad contains one 
major and one minor power, a “1” represents this case.  It is discrete and 
ascertained by separating software-generated dyads for this criterion.   
• MIN-MIN is a discrete variable.  Dyads that contain no major powers are 
classified as minor minor. A “1” is coded to represent this measurement. 
National capability is the other researcher-defined group.  Since it involves 
capability and quartiles, it is appropriately titled CAP_QUAR.  Unlike POW_COM, this 
categorical variable is ordinal, numerically ranging from 1 to 4.  Here is a brief synopsis 
of each one: 
• CAP_QUAR_1 is a discrete variable.  It symbolizes that the dyad has one 
state with a capability inside the first quartile.  This factor is operationalized 
by performing a descriptive statistics function on capindex (N = 193).  IBM 
SPSS provides 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, and 95 percentiles.   Taking these figures into 
account, the top quartile (0 to 25%) will equate to “1”. 
• CAP_QUAR_2 is an ordinal variable.  It is operationalized by the second 
quartile in the national composite index (25% to 50%) and thereby codes as a 
“2”. 
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• CAP_QUAR_3 is a discrete variable.  It includes dyads who fall into the third 
quartile (50% to 75%) on the national composite index scale.  A “3” represent 
this level of measurement. 
• CAPI_QUAR_4 is an ordinal variable.  It measures the bottom (75% to 
100%) of the composite index and subsequently coded as a “4”. 
These two researcher-defined variable groups are important for several reasons.  
First and foremost, they are essential to hypothesis testing.  Most correlatory statistical 
techniques require categorical variables that are nominal or ordinal.  Second, the binary 
nature of these variables affords transformation.  Meaning, numerical values can be 
recoded to reflect text.  This feature is critical to ANOVA and crosstab analysis.  Since 
data collection is explained, it is now appropriate to address the next subarea in the 
framework. 
Delineation of the hypotheses is the other data management section.  For 
clarification, this question has two propositions and two hypotheses, totaling four testable 
suppositions.  It is important to remember that there is a subtle difference between them 
both.  Hypotheses are, as a rule, testable and measurable and thereby subject to 
falsification. Whereas a proposition is not, instead it suggests a linkage between two 
concepts that cannot be adequately proven (Glazek, n.d.; Mourougan & Sethuraman, 
2017).  Following each discussion on test suppositions, both dependent and independent 
variables are outlaid to foreshadow suitable statistical tests, which are revealed in the next 
section. Continuing, since interstate war remains a rarity in human history and its 
volatility does not lend itself to adequate quantification, a considerable amount of war 
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onset research remains in the propositional realm.  This shortfall was identified decades 
earlier by Singer and his colleagues (Singer & Diehl, 1990; Vasquez, 1987, 1993). 
P1: Territorial revision has the highest probability of violent conflict 
Territory is unique in that it appears both steps to war covariates and revision 
type.  A fact that arguably supports the saliency of this issue as a harbinger to war.  Asia, 
like many other global regions, has its share of territorial disputes.  China’s dispute with 
Taiwan over unification and Pakistan and India's longstanding violent clashes over the 
Hindu Kush territory are a few examples.  More so, it well documented by many leading 
war study scholars that territorial disputes possess the necessary conditions for interstate 
disputes to escalate to violent conflict (Rasler & Thompson, 2006; Vasquez, J. & 
Henehan, M., 2001).  
Since wars in Asia are characterized as low (N =13), perhaps a more thorough 
examination entails military use of force as an analysis factor (Sarkees & Wayman, 
2010).  Of significance, most COW research focuses on war onset, which is perhaps 
shortsighted.  Instead, an intermediate step that explores violence short of war is required. 
As such, this dissertation proposes that territory is more violence-prone than policy, 
regime, and other revisions on the Asian continent. 
Proposition 1 variable arrangement is nuanced.  The dependent variable is 
VIO_CON, which is a researcher-defined dichotomous variable.  To use in the statistical 
test, it is transformed into a categorical variable (VIO_CON = Violent Conflict).  The 
independent variables commensurate with cwrew_1 through cwrev_4, reflecting COW’s 
four revision types.  Because these revision variables are discrete, they require 
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transformation. For clarification, the process is cwrev_1 = Territory, cwrev_2 = Policy, 
cwrev_3 = Regime, and cwrev_4 = Other. 
P2: Territorial revision has the highest probability of war 
War and revisionism go together.  Vasquez (2009) contended interstate war is 
learned behavior.  For instance, through the course of history, states have realized that a 
costly, but viable method of guaranteeing their security and achieving strategic goals 
entails warfare.  These goals often take the form of revisions.  Through some initial 
analysis with the EUGene-generated dataset, policy (N = 476) is the highest.  Despite this 
fact, steps-to-war theory and peace researcher has proven that territory, not policy 
revisions create the conditions for war (Bremer, 1992; Diehl, 2000; Fravel, 2017; Yoon, 
2003).  Even though the study findings were on the global domain, this dissertation offers 
that territorial revisions do in fact lead to war on the Asian continent.  And that, Asia, is 
aligned with previous research. 
Proposition 2 variable structure has similarities with its counterpart.  The 
independent factors remain the same.  Cwrev is transformed into categorical variables 
that represent the revision type.  The dependent variable is WAR_ONSET.  These 
adjustments could be used in either descriptive or inferential statistical tests.   
H4: National capability has no impact on war onset  
Equally important is that economic prosperity has increased national capability in 
all Asian subregions for nearly twenty years (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, April 2019).  An occurrence that has boosted military spending and 
expanded the industrial base in China, Japan, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and 
numerous other countries.  Reviewing the COW National Material Capabilities dataset, it 
112 
 
is not surprising that 15 out of the top 25 countries were in Asia. (DIA, 2019; Singer et 
al., 1972).  Within this context, this dissertation paper contends that national capability 
does impact war initiation. 
Hypothesis 4 variable construct leans towards correlation.  WAR_ONSET, the 
dependent variable, is a categorical variable.  The independent factor is researcher-
defined.  CAP_QUAR is an ordinal-scale variable, operationalized by a numerical range 
from 1 to 4, with one being the highest.  Each sub-level represents dyad national 
composite index scores categorized into quartiles.  Since CAP_QUAR is ordinal, a 
variable transformation using IBM SPSS is in order.  The respective numbers are 
substituted with CAP_QUAR_1, CAP_QUAR_2, CAP_QUAR_3, and CAP_QUAR_4. 
H5: Dyad classification has impacts on war onset 
Keeping within the same thread, power domains are essential indicators in IR 
studies.  There have been numerous studies that reflect that major powers are more likely 
to engage in war than other nations.  Sample (2002) contended that arms build-ups were 
unique to major powers.  Chiba et a. (2012) argued that major powers had the means to 
operate as foreign policy activists in both international and regional context.  Starr (1978) 
claimed that major powers often possessed the willingness to exploit opportunities that 
enhanced their security.  If these claims are true, then dyads that incorporate major 
powers should be more war-prone than others on the Asian continent.   Consequently, 
this paper hypothesizes that dyad classification does impact war onset. 
Hypothesis 5 variable setup is straightforward.  Since the aim here is 
determination if war occurs, WAR_ONSET is the applicable dependent variable.  It is 
dichotomous and categorical in the level of measurement. Following suit, the 
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independent factor is POW_DOM.  This researcher-defined variable is nominally 
quantified as MAJ-MAJ, MAJ-MIN, and MIN-MIN.  Both WAR_ONSET and 
POW_DOM are categorical, which should steer testing towards correlational analysis. 
In most national security circles, there is the cliché-ish Ends-Ways-Means mantra.  
Ends equate to strategic objectives, ways are the methods, and means involves 
capabilities.  Arguably, the most relevant attribute is the latter.  The rationale is that 
having a preponderance in ability and resources is preferable than not.  Before the COW 
project, Singer’s main contribution to war study research was his in-depth analysis of 
national capabilities and war-making.  He posited that national capability equated to 
opportunity.  Meaning, countries with relatively strong economies and defense forces 
could indeed impose their will on others (Small & Singer, 1982, Singer et al., 1972, 
Singer et al, 1982).   
P3: Major powers with territorial issues are more prone to war  
Major powers are predominantly involved in interstate wars than most.  More 
interestingly, territory is a constant factor in a nation’s strategic calculus whether to ware 
war or not.  Asia is home to share of global violence.  In fact, The Asia Foundation 
(2017) promulgated that conflict and violence are prevalent in every country in Asia.  
The hangover from European colonialism, the Cold War, and old interstate rivalries when 
coupled with territorial volatility is a recipe for war onset.  The Asian continent contains 
nearly 8 major powers (Chiba, Machain, & Reed, 2012).  Each with their revisionist 
ideals of territorial adjustments centered on what they believe is rightfully theirs.  So, this 
dissertation proposes that major power with territorial revisionist beliefs are more war 
prong.  
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Proposition 3 variables need modification.  The dependent variable is 
WAR_ONSET, indicating its namesake within a dyad. The primary independent 
variables are majpower and cwrev.  Both are categorical with numeric identifiers.  Given 
that P2 hints at relational statistics, cwrev will have to be altered into dummy variables. 
Altogether, Research Question 2’s data management is somewhat substantive.  
There was a total of two hypotheses and three propositions delineated for the test.  The 
former will examine revisionism, low-end conflict, and war onset, whereas the 
propositions explore major powers and national capability. Equally important was the 
EUGene_v3.2 generated dataset where key covariates were identified.  More so, this 
section meticulously discussed researcher-defined variables and their criticality to 
facilitating analytical rigor.  Operationalization of national capability, for example, into 
quartiles is novel and should provide some interesting findings.  To achieve that end, the 
research methodology must be sound. 
Research Design 
An optimal way to discuss research design is a bifurcation into revisionism and 
major powers subject areas.  The former is comprised of two tasks that explore violence 
and war onset as they pertain to revisionism.  Proposition 1, or task one, entails revision 
type and dyadic violence.  Task two, or Proposition 2, investigates how dyadic 
revisionism corresponds to war onset.  To test these suggestions, bivariate analysis is 
perhaps the best technique.  The rationale is that this method depicts all revision types 
while affording the flexibility to compare them to multiple outcomes.  Frequency 
distribution, measures of dispersion, and the central tendency will set the foundation for 
revisionism as it pertains to Asia. 
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The other part of the research design is delineating relational aspects between 
Asiatic major powers and territorial revisionism as they apply to conflict onset.  There are 
three prescribed sequences needed. The first subsequence (i.e., Hypothesis 4) is to 
determine if the national capability is an important determinant of warfare.  The second 
subsequence (i.e., Hypothesis 5) also involves connectivity.  Ascertaining what dyads are 
war-prone is critical to proving that major powers are more likely to wage war, which 
previous research has proved (Fravel, 2007; Fravel, 2010; Lebow, 2010).  Equally 
relevant is that both H4 and H5 aim to show impacts, which is necessary for determining 
the power domain. The last subsequence is fusing major powers involvement with 
territorial revisionism.  Here, Proposition 3 is the focus. What is important to recall is that 
these research steps showcase a vital linkage to the Sino-revisionism argument.   
In brief, RQ2’s research design is straightforward.  It is a two-step process.  The 
first sequence looks to examine Asian countries’ revisionist tendencies as they relate to 
both military violence short of war and full-scale interstate war.  Bivariate analysis was 
deemed best suited to achieve this goal.  The second sequence includes major powers, the 
concept of national capabilities, and territorial revisionism.  Likewise, this step relies on 
bivariate analysis in which there are several available techniques are discussed in the next 
section. 
Statistical Test  
Revisionism relies on both descriptive univariate and bivariate tests.  Prior to 
examining Proposition 1 and 2 for correlation, univariate analysis on revision types will 
occur.   Descriptive, univariate tests afford relative and cumulative frequency 
distributions on territory, policy, and regime revisions, whereby numerical totals and 
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percentages are denoted.  More importantly, the main purpose of this test is to outlay 
some foundational knowledge on revisionism on the Asian continent, which is critical to 
deriving the implications for China’s strategy. 
Proposition 1 and 2 are also subjected to bivariate analysis that further induces on 
how important territory is to violence and war.  The central technique here is crosstab 
analysis, a rudimentary form of bivariate inquiry.  That said, some particulars on 
crosstabs are in order.  First, this technique is used to test significance as well as 
showcase the central tendency.  Crosstabs are used to aggregate and display the 
distribution of two more variables (Field, 2013).  Within this research question, there are 
two crosstab tables.  The first illustrates violence onset against how many dyadic 
revisions are observed, as well as percentages, which will be displayed in a matrix table.  
Second, crosstabs have a simple setup.  Dependent variables are assigned to 
columns, and independent variables are aligned with rows.  For example, P1’s setup is as 
follows: violent conflict (VIO_CON) and no violent conflict (NO_VIO) are annotated on 
the top of the table and revisions (Territory, Policy, Regime, and Other) across the left 
side.  In a similar manner, P2 will have war onset (WAR_ONSET) and no war 
(NO_WAR) as columns and revision categories depicted as rows.  Each proposition will 
then be displayed in a 2X4 contingency table (Field, 2013).   
Third, crosstabs require categorical variables. Or rather, they must pass two 
assumptions.  The first is that test variables are either ordinal or nominal.  The second is 
that variables must consist of two or more categorical, independent groups (Field, 2013). 
Since both P1 and P2 test variables are labeled as discrete in the dataset, IBM SPSS is 
used to transform them into the requisite categorical format (Field, 2013). 
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Last, there are two tests that will afford synthesis on crosstab results.  For the 
scope portion, Z scores are utilized to conceptualize the difference between the observed 
revision and the mean. where revision types lie in the greater distribution.  The main 
assumptions are: 1) Data is continuous and 2) Data aligns with the normal distribution.  
In short, Z scores afford conceptualization of the difference between the observed 
revisions and overall mean.   
For the magnitude aspect, Pearson chi-square is the most common form of test 
that answers whether a crosstab result is statistically significant.  More so, Pearson chi-
square indicates the strength of that association. The parametric test delineates the 
association between war (or violence) and revision type.  There are four key assumptions: 
1) Randomness, 2) Large N dataset, 3) Observations are independent, and 4) 
Observations have the same distribution. Of significance, this research dataset met all 
assumptions. The results are depicted in a table format, annotating value, and 
significance. 
In sum, testing revision type involves both descriptive univariate and bivariate.  
By design, both tests are kept to a rudimentary level to provide a solid foundational 
knowledge base. Frequency distribution and crosstabs will outlay how violence and war 
are associated with dyadic revision on Asia.  Now, it is time to ascertain how respective 
nations interact with these findings. 
To address major powers, statistical testing is more comprehensive.  As stated, the 
research design specifies that investigating whether national capability has any impact on 
war onset is sequence one.  Inferential statistical methods, especially hypothesis testing, 
is the preferred method here.  The main reason concerns the fact that there has been 
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considerable work on national capabilities impact on war onset to constitute it as bona 
fide theory.  Arguably, this classification is a rarity in most war studies (Senese et al., 
2008; Singer, 1972; Singer, 1979). 
Hypothesis 4 is determining the impact of national capabilities on warfare.  Here 
is how the dissertation attempts to achieve this goal.  First, a point-biserial is the 
preferred technique here.  The analysis of variance between war and capabilities reveals 
if any significant difference exists between war and capability.  By examining the delta, a 
synthesis could be made if the hypothesis holds true (Fields, 2013; Murphy, n.d.).   
Second, H4’s setup mirrors crosstabs.  The columns are marked by war 
(WAR_ONSET, NO_WAR) and rows depict dyad capability quartiles (CAPI_1, 
CAPI_2, CAPI_3, CAPI_4).  Whereas the rows are dependent variables, the latter 
comprises of independent variables. Of note, independent variables are called factors in 
ANOVA testing.  So, this test is a four-factor analysis (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.). 
Third, the crosstabs' assumptions are straightforward.  The first two are that 
datasets are random and large N.  Observations between the onset of war and capabilities 
are equally important.  What this means is that the amount of data dispersion needs to be 
comparable and independent between the groups.  The last assumption is that capability 
quartiles are indeed independent (Fields, 2013; Murphy, n.d.). 
Last, crosstabs results are checked by Pearson chi-square.  Murphy (n.d.) stated 
that chi-square is used to infer whether the relationships between groups (i.e., war onset 
and capabilities) are significant.  The procedure used in statistical hypothesis testing, 
where the Null equates to no correlations and alternative implies there is an association.  
For clarification, the Null hypothesis is rejected when p < 0.05 and the Alternative is 
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accepted.  Regarding this test, the aim is to determine if war onset is associated with 
greater national capability.  The post hoc power analysis should reveal the statistical 
power, the extent of the effect, and sample size (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.).  With dyadic 
capability in Asia addressed, it is time to analyze power domains. 
Hypothesis 5 is tested with binary logistic regions.  First, the aim here is to derive 
if Asian dyads that go to war are associated with the three categorical power domains.  
Second, the testing arrangement is three-fold.  The outcome variable is WAR_ONSET.  
The independent factors are dyad type (i.e., MAJ-MAJ, MAJ-MIN, MIN-MIN).   
Third, H5 assumptions entail five key assumptions.  The outcome variable must 
be continuous and dichotomous are the first two parameters.  Next, the dataset should 
contain no outliers.  The final two assumptions require the continuous variable is both 
normally distributed and of equal variance.  It is worth mentioning that after the initial 
analysis that H5 variables meet the assumption requirements.  Last, null hypothesis 
testing and post hoc tests remain in effect.  In particular, the research wants to evaluate 
the magnitude that dyad power domains have on war commencement. This three-
covariate test should reflect those specified parameters (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.). 
Proposition 3 is the last item of inquiry for this research question.  That said, the 
following details are key to how P3 is examined.  First, the statistical test used is 
regression.  The latter is a common technique in STW research where an outcome 
variable is predicted based on one or more predictor variables (Field, 2013; Schroeder, 
Sjoquist, & Stephan, 2017).   
Second, the regression setup is somewhat nuanced.  The outcome variable is war 
onset (i.e., WAR_ONSET).  The predictors are major power (i.e., majpower) and revision 
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types (i.e., cwrev).  Since there are several predictors, a simple test that can analysis 
multiple independent variables is necessary. Based on COW research, the more 
opportune approach to regression is logit techniques (Bremer, 1992; Mitchell & Vasquez, 
2014; Senese et al., 2008).    
Logit regression requires a reference group when categorical variables are divided 
into a series of dummy variables. In IBM SPSS, this method is contingent on 
dichotomous or binary variables.  Although majpower is binary, cwrev is categorical, an 
assumption that logit does not support.  As such, cwrev is transformed into dummy 
variables, whereby the numerical values are assigned to the level of categorical variables.  
For example, cwrev = “2” equates to a policy revision in the EUGene generated dataset.  
To create a dummy variable, cwrev = “2” is transformed into a “1” and all other variables 
are coded as a “0”.  This construct allows the statistical package to perform a logit 
regression a total of four times, which equates to the number of COW revision types. 
(Field, 2013).   
It is also important to note that each regression is subject to four independent 
runs.   For example, in the first run, the variables are major power and territory, and the 
second is major power and rivalry, continuing until the last revision is regressed.  One 
must remember the aim here is a simple bivariate analysis that identifies if war ensues 
based on major power status and their respective revisions. 
Equally pertinent is the assumption of logit regression.  There are four key 
assumptions that apply here (Field, 2013).  First, the dependent or outcome variable must 
be binary.  The dataset and model framework ensure this requirement.  Second, 
observations must be independent of another.  The COW datasets use the dyad construct 
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which is indeed independent.  Third, the predictor variable should be linearly related to 
the log odds—i.e., the log of odds of an event occurring. Last, logistic regression implies 
a large sample size.  After preliminary sort of the COW datasets using EUGene_v4.3, 
dispute dyads range upwards of 800 in the Asian geographic region.  This number is well 
within logistical criteria (Bennet et al., 2000; Field, 2013; Glazek, n.d., Grace-Martin, 
n.d.). 
Last, the logit regression test used is Walds.  The statistic determines whether a 
predictor variable is significant in relation to the outcome.  Like many regression tests, 
Wald statistics use null hypothesis testing.  If the number is p > .05 or greater, then the 
predictor is summarily rejected.  All post hoc information is presented by IBM SPSS in a 
simple matrix table (Field, 2013; Schroeder et al., 2017). 
In any event, Research Question 2 is a critical component to COW covariate and 
Sino strategy discussion.  The main goal here was to quantitatively derive what revision 
type causes the greatest propensity for a war on the Asian continent, which can be 
summarized into two subject areas.  Revisionism on the Asian continent has not been 
adequately studied to claim the STW theory is indeed valid here.  So, this dissertation 
used propositions to both describe and infer how war and violence are impacted by a 
nation’s revisionist ideas.  The chosen test method is bivariate crosstabs.  Major powers 
are the other subject area.  Here, the research methods were to show a correlation 
between state national capability and power domains with respect to dyadic violent 
conflict and interstate war.  Analysis of variance and regression are the statistical tests 
that will provide insight. When these quantitative aspects of Asian regional armed 
disputes are considered in totality, a greater understanding of China should be attained. 
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RQ3: What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia? 
Research Question 3 is the last leg of the research stool. The purpose of this 
question is to test war onset in the Asian spatial domain with the Steps-To-War theory.  
This is accomplished in a two-fold effort.  The first involves investigating the entire 
Asian continent writ large, which includes war-torn areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The second is a more detailed look entails East Asia with its major powers, such as 
China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.  With some minor adjustments, 
the research design replicates Paul Senese and John Vasquez’s STW model and 
regression techniques (Senese et al, 2008; Vasquez, 2009).  As mentioned, there has been 
no research on war onset on the Asian continent using the COW dataset and research 
techniques (Senese et al. 2008, Mitchell et al., 2014).  Below is a major attempt to 
address this knowledge gap. 
Data Management 
Research Question 3 data management is the most complex of all dissertation 
questions. It is a three-part effort.  The first involves observation.  Unlike RQ1 and RQ2, 
where the dyadic-dispute measurement was appropriate, it is insufficient here.  The main 
reason is the lack of a long-range outlook in which MIDs and intergovernmental 
interaction are encapsulated.  Furthermore, since this research is primarily based on 
retrodiction rather than prediction, a historical purview is indeed necessary.  A dyad 
history is the more valid unit of analysis.  That said, the issue becomes COW databases 
do not account for dyad histories (Senese & Vasquez, 2008). 
Equally, there is a high degree of data manipulation to create a suitable dataset. 
COW dataset utility caters to dyad analysis with respect to dispute event and year, which 
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does not support this proposition’s unit of analysis.  As such, a dataset must be created 
that accounts for dyad history.  This task is accomplished in two steps.  First, EUGene 
software generates a base dataset from MID_v4.3 and Formal Alliances_v4.1, forming a 
data collection backbone. Initial analysis indicates a total of 13 researcher-defined 
variables are requisite for this new dataset.  Here is succinct synopsis: 
• TOT_NUM_MID is an integer variable, measuring the total number of MIDs 
that have occurred within a dyad.  This number is achieved by counting (Diehl 
& Goertz, 2000; Senese & Vasquez, 2008, 70).  The variable is essential in the 
determination of rivalry. 
• TOT_NUM_TERRIT_MID is an interval variable.  It accounts for the total 
number of territorial MIDs within a dyad and denoted by merely counting.   
• TERRIT_OCCUR is a binary variable.  It uses cwhost_1 to delineate if a 
dyadic territorial militarized interstate dispute occurred, which is coded as a 
“1”.  This predictor is a primary input into the STW model. 
• RIV_CLASS is a categorical variable meant to annotate rivalry typology.  
Like other variables in this dataset, it requires a few intermittent steps.  First, 
dyads are divided into 20-year time blocks.  Second, within each block, the 
total number is of MIDs is accounted for and classified based on 1 = Isolated, 
2 = Proto, 3 = Enduring.  Diehl and Goetz (2000) interstate rivalry typology 
are used here, where isolated rivalry is two or fewer MIDs, proto is two to six, 
and enduring is greater than six disputes.  In sum, this variable is a numerical, 
categorical variable that can be transformed into a test if the need arises. 
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• END_RIV is a binary variable.  This number explains whether a dyadic 
enduring rivalry is present.  It uses RIV_CLASS and codes a “1” if an 
enduring rivalry is present.  This covariate is the second key predictor in the 
STW model. 
• ALLIED_PATTERNS is an ordinal variable that represents a state’s alliance 
status.  To ascertain this variable requires three events. Using COW Formal 
Alliance_v4.1, the dyad variable type is identified.  Next, the alliances are 
recoded as follows: 0 = None; 1 = Allied to each other; 2 = One outside; 3 = 
Both outside; and 4 = Allied to each other but with outside (Senese & 
Vasquez, 2008, 68).  Finally, the dyad alliance patterns are tallied.  The total 
effect is a numerical, categoric variable that can be transformed using IBM 
SPSS. 
• HR_ALLY is a dichotomous variable, which stands for a high-risk ally. It is 
based on two parameters.  First, ALLIED_PATTERNS is used.  The criteria 
here is that both belligerents are allied to other states.  The second parameter 
entails majpow, which infers this ally possesses the high national material 
capability and the willingness to act.  If there is a “3”, then HR_ALLY is 
coded as “1”.  This covariate is one of the primary predictors in the STW 
model. 
• ARMS_RACE is also a dichotomous variable.  It represents if an arms race 
between two countries has occurred.  As with other complex variables in 
COW, it needs further operationalization.  Using Sample’s (2002) data and 
coding technique, there is a two-step process or rather criteria.  The first task 
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is to ascertain the military build-up of personnel within a dispute dyad.  This 
entails counting the increase in armed force size.  If an increase is present, the 
first criteria are met. The second task is based on military spending. Similar to 
army growth, it is a comparison of a state’s defense budget at the beginning of 
the decade to that of the end.  If the budget increased, then the second 
criterion is achieved.  When both criteria are present, a “1” is entered into the 
dataset, annotating that an arms race did occur.   
All of the above are key covariates to the STW model.  With data collection and 
management now addressed, it is time to outlay the dissertation’s seminal arguments. 
P4: War onset on the Asian continent is congruent with COW power politics 
behavior 
Asia has a history of conflict. 
Colonial aftereffects, religious intolerance, territorial disputes, political 
differences, and economic disparity are several factors (Asia Foundation, 2017).  Asian 
states, like Europe and Africa, deal with these issues in power politics fashion, which 
entails conflict escalation, alliance building, and military buildups. It is also worth noting 
that region location more than the international system arguably dictates interstate 
behavior (Buzan, Weaver, & Wilde,1998; Buzan & Weaver, 2012). China, as a member 
state within Asia, embodies these above-mentioned attributes and behavior. With closer 
examination, both are closely related to COW politics behavior of territory, rivalry, 
alliance making, and military buildup (Senese & Vasquez, 2008).  This statement is 
qualitative conjecture, which does not meet the rigor need for in-depth analysis.  To that 
end, here is the first proposition that attempts to placate this analytical shortfall: 
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Proposition 4 variable arrangement must cater to congruency.  The outcome 
variable is WAR_ONSET, which represents war onset on the Asian continent.  There is a 
total of four predictor variables: 1) Territory_Rev (cwrevt11 = 1), 2) END_RIV, 3) 
HR_ALLY, and 4) ARMS_RACE.  Of significance, unlike the other research questions, 
this proposition relies solely on researcher-defined variables. 
Research Design (P4) 
Model design is next in the propositional framework.  As a reminder, this outline 
follows suite with STW’s four models.  Previous research has shown this combination 
was indeed additive.  What this research question is trying to determine is if these four 
critical steps hold true in Asia.  That said, it is time to replicate Senese and Vasquez’s 
theory. The first model is a base comparison of dyads with territorial disputes versus 
other revision types (Senese et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2014)).  This step is necessary 
for logit regression research tests.  The independent variable, which is the same for all 
four models, is war onset.  It is represented by WAR_ONSET.  The dependent variable is 
Territory_Rev.  As a reminder, the purpose of this model is to establish a baseline 
probability of war onset based on territorial disputes against other interstate disputes.  
This design steps closely follow Senese and Vasquez’s research methodology (Senese et 
al., 2008). 
Model 2 involves alliances.  Unlike Senese et al. (2008), this segment only tests 
for relevant alliances where both states having outside partnerships.  The outcome 
variable is WAR_ONSET.  The predictor covariate is HR_ALLY.  The research goal 
here is to look at the effect of alliance configuration within a dyad and the probability of 
war. 
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Model 3 pertains to rivalry.  This research is altered from the original design.  
Senese et al. (2008) used several categorical variables that were scaled to explain rivalry, 
essentially ranging from an isolated event to multiple incidents.  This dissertation refrains 
from using that methodology instead of concentrating on dyads that have an enduring 
quality.  That said, the dependent variable is WAR_ONSET, whereas the independent 
variable is END_RIV.  The chief aim is to examine the impacts of enduring rivalry on the 
possibility of war onset on the Asian continent. 
Model 4 is the last step in the process, addressing how war initiation is influenced 
by interstate arms build-ups.  The researcher-defined operationalization of arms races 
combines the effects of war materiel increase and defense spending into a single 
dichotomous variable.  So, in this model, the dependent variable remains WAR_ONSET 
and the independent variable is ARMS_RACE.  Of significance, this model was the most 
difficult to construct and should provide some useful insight into the steps to war on the 
Asian continent. 
In short, it is important to account for a few things.  First, the testing of the STW 
theory is a replica of Senese and Vasquez’s research design (2008) Their design hinges 
on dichotomous variables, stepwise regression, and additive.  Second, these models are 
additive, which means as each one is added the probability of war should increase.  
Lastly, Vasquez stressed that the STW is not necessarily about the steps, but the 
cumulative addition of power politics behavior within the dyad annotated here by each 
model (Senese et al., 2008; Vasquez et al. 2001).  That said, it is time to discuss 
numerical tests. 
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Statistical Test (P4) 
As a result of this research design’s complexity and the simplicity of the variable 
measurement, a multivariate inferential approach is a necessity.  Logit regression, both 
predicted probabilities and odds ratios, is the main technique.  Logistic analysis is 
specifically designed for dichotomous variables.  Within this dataset, each covariate has 
been operationalized into a binary number, where “1” equals yes, and “0” equates to no.  
According to Grace-Martin (n.d.), logistic or logit regressions estimate the probability an 
outcome falls into one of those two possible categories.  For example, logistic regression 
is common in politics where pollsters want to determine if a candidate will win an 
election.  Meaning, “yes” the candidate wins the vote and “no” they lose. In this 
dissertation, whether war occurs or not is the primary research aim and logit regression 
affords valuable insight (Field, 2013; Senese et al, 2008). 
Continuing, odds ratios are useful exploratory research.  It is the estimation of 
occurrence given an independent, categorical variable and quantification of the strength 
of association between outcome and predictors.  The odds ratio is commonly reported as 
a magnitude. For clarification, an example is warranted here.  Say after running a logit 
regression that territory is assigned an odds ratio of 7.32, it would mean that Territorial 
MID is seven times more likely to end in war compared to the baseline model, which was 
Policy MID.  What is key to remember is that logit testing will be repeated four times to 
account for each step in the war onset process. 
Equally pertinent is the assumption of logit regression.  There are four key 
assumptions that apply here.  First, the dependent or outcome variable must be binary.  
The dataset and model framework ensure this requirement.  Second, observations must be 
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independent of another.  The COW datasets use the dyad construct which is indeed 
independent.  Third, the predictor variable should be linearly related to the log odds—i.e., 
the log of odds of an event occurring. Last, logistic regression implies a large sample 
size.  After preliminary sort of the COW datasets using EUGene_v4.3, dispute dyads 
range upwards of 800 in the Asian geographic region.  This number is well within 
logistical criteria (Bennet et al., 2000; Glazek, n.d., Grace-Martin, n.d.) 
To summarize, Proposition 4 main purpose is to test if war onset in Asia is 
congruent with COW power politics.  The latter entails territorial disputes, alliance, 
rivalry, and arms races.  Each covariate is modeled as a step to war.  Where Model 1 and 
2 examine how revision type and alliance making impact war, and the other two models 
explore dyadic rivalry and arms buildup.  Logit regression is used in a stepwise manner to 
investigate if the addition of one covariate does, in fact, increase the probability of war.  
P5: East and Southeast Asia subregions are more prone to conflict than Asia write 
large 
East and Southeast Asia is a hotbed for conflict.  As stated, there are five major 
powers, including the United States that are active in the subregion.  More so, nearly 
every power there has an active territorial dispute.  For instance, South Korea is at odds 
with the Democratic Republic of Korea, which is commonly known as North Korea, over 
peninsula unification.  The Peoples’ Republic of China is hostile towards the Government 
of Japan concerning the Senkaku Islands.  Also, the latter is greatly concerned with 
Taiwan’s independence and the “One China” policy.  Equally relevant in East Asia is 
alliances.  The U.S. has a signed defense pact with South Korea, Japan, and the 
Philippines.  China has defense and trade agreements with North Korea.   
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Perhaps most dangerous is the fact there are multiple ongoing arms races.  It is 
well-known that the U.S. and China are actively increasing their military capability and 
capacity.  However, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have also increased 
military spending.  In fact, defense spending per GDP has risen above the normal 3% 
threshold.  Taking all these attributes into account, Proposition 5 contends: 
Proposition 5 variable arrangement is like Proposition 4.  The variable 
arrangement still caters towards congruency.  The outcome variable is WAR_ONSET 
and the four outcome variables are: 1) Territory_Rev (cwrevt11 = 1), 2) END_RIV, 3) 
HR_ALLY, and 4) ARMS_RACE.   
Data Management (P5) 
With most of the explanation provided in the previous proposition discussion, 
there is no need to go into detail.  Therefore, data management is by exception.  One of 
the first changes is spatial domains.  Proposition 5 concerns the 15 countries that make up 
the subregions of East and Southeast Asia.  Another adjustment entails the EUGene_v3.2 
dataset and the researcher-defined variables.  This proposition requires one more 
researcher variable to operationalize.  Here is a succinct explanation: 
• ASIA_SUB is a numerical, categorical variable.  It describes what Asian 
subregions that a dyad belongs to, according to the COW dataset.  Of note, the 
Middle East, although technically part of Asia, is its own category.  The 
COW-defined subregions are southeast, south, east, central, and Oceania.  
Within IBM SPSS, the categories are coded as (1 = Southeast, 2 = South, 3 = 
East, 4 = Central, 5 = Oceania).  Of note, this variable arrangement affords 
transformation into dummy variables, key enablers in logit regression.  
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This additional variable setup is indeed critical.  It allows for a relatively seamless 
comparison between East and Southeast Asia and the entire Asian continent.  This task is 
done by filtering the prescribed subregions from the EUGene_v3.2 dataset.  The 
cumulative effect is fundamental in this research framework. 
Research Design (P5) 
Research design leverages the existing work on the previous research questions.  
Proposition 5’s framework is a straightforward three-step process.  The first step involves 
establishing a foundation baseline of conflict with the East and Southeast subregions.  
Here, the research will explore both MIDs and revision types as they relate to military 
violence and war onset. 
The second step involves using the four STW models and the modified subregion 
dataset to determine war probability.   As before, Senese and Vasquez’s research 
techniques are used. 
The final step is a simple comparison between Proposition 4 and 5 statistical 
results.  The goal is to build a mental and statistical model that allows a quantitative-
based inference whether the subregions that China routinely uses power politics is indeed 
ripe for warfare. 
Statistical Test (P5) 
To gain some insight, Proposition 5 is subject to both descriptive and inferential 
tests.  Crosstabs are used in univariate analysis, determining central tendencies, scope, 
and magnitudes.  As with the other test questions, the bivariate analysis will examine war 
onset as it pertains to both militarized interstate disputes and revisions.  For MIDs, the 
rows are marked by WAR_ONSET and NO_WAR and columns by cwhost 1 through 
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cwhost 4.  The crosstab on revision uses the same variable arrangement but substituting 
the cwrev 1 through cwrev 4 as independent variables.  The net effect is a solid 
understanding of observed and expected counts and strength of association between the 
war onset and the prescribed correlates of war (Field, 2013; Murphy, n.d.). 
Inferential analysis is a replication of the logistic regression used to test the steps 
to war in the previous proposition.  It entails regressing war probability against the 
additive effects of territorial dispute, alliance, rivalry, and an arms race.  As a reminder, 
assumptions and tests for fit remain the same from earlier analysis. 
In sum, Proposition 5 is perhaps the most illuminating supposition of this 
dissertation.  It narrows in on the Asian subregions that have the greatest propensity for 
conflict with regards to the Peoples Republic of China.  The overall research framework 
was efficient. Data management leveraged the EUGene dataset and another researcher-
defined determinant.  Equally pertinent was research design and the applicable statistical 
tests.  The three-step sequence, which included both propositions, was invaluable in 
establishing a testable conflict model.  The total outcome is a thorough process in which 
key findings can indeed be ascertained. 
Conclusion 
All-in-all, this chapter is arguably the most vital to this dissertation based on two 
key reasons. Because this research is quantitative, which is not frequent in peace research 
and conflict resolution fields, there is a considerable amount of energy expended on 
outlaying the data requirement, hypotheses formulation, and statistical test.  The net 
result is a comprehensive, research roadmap, which should lead to insightful and 
impactful results. 
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Another reason for this chapter’s importance pertains to Sino revisionism and war 
causal attributes, which were covered in three supporting research questions.  The first 
goal was to illustrate the relationship between war onset and militarized disputes.  Central 
tendencies and variance analysis are used to both describe and infer facets of that 
interaction.  The second question’s aim is to ascertain how Asiatic revisionism correlates 
to interstate military violence and warfare.  Bivariate analysis will be instrumental in 
assessing the concept of major powers, national capability, and power domains as they 
correspond to war.  Last, and the centerpiece of this research is exploring war onset as it 
corresponds to the steps to war theory.  Stepwise, logistic regression is imperative in 
testing if Asia is congruent with the other COW research.  The totality of these questions 
is illuminated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Findings 
Quantitative research in which analyzes and evaluates pertinent factors 
concerning interstate war and violence are essential to the conflict resolution field.  The 
empirical study of war onset, and its applicable attributes, on the Asian continent could 
provide newfound synthesis on how best to avoid regional conflict, particularly with the 
Peoples Republic of China. In addition to three supporting research questions, this 
dissertation chapter showcased the results from main questions: What is the relationship 
between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist strategy in Asia?  
Scope 
Prior to continuing, a brief review of data management activities is in order. A 
researcher-defined dataset was constructed using applicable Correlations of War data 
depositories and the EUGeneve_v3.2 dataset generator.  Within temporal confines from 
1949 to 2001, a total of 460 dispute dyads were identified within the Asian subregion.  
Next, each case was modified to create a dyadic-dispute history that included militarized 
disputes, revision type, national material capability, as well as other vital COW-defined 
war correlates. 
Using descriptive analysis, which primarily focused on central tendencies and 
frequencies, and various inferential statistical tests, three supporting research questions 
were used to address how the correlates of war are linked to Sino revisionism in Asia.  
The questions had an inductive quality that once answered formulated synthesis and 
provided insight on the next research inquiry.  The culmination was an objective 
inference on whether China was susceptible to war given the current geopolitical climate. 
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To answer the main research question, Chapter 4’s framework was both inductive 
and straightforward.  The discussion layout was predicated on each respective supporting 
research question.  What is the probability of war onset based on associated MIDs in 
Asia?  Research Question 1(RQ 1) contained three hypotheses.  They were instrumental 
in deriving non-directional impacts that militarized interstate disputes had on war onset.  
One should recall that MIDs are the cornerstone of any empirical COW peace research on 
war. 
What revision type caused the greatest propensity of war in Asia? Research 
Question 2 (RQ 2) addressed two hypotheses and three propositions.  In most realist 
thought, state revisionism often led to interstate war, a supposition that was necessary to 
explore within the context of Asia.  Equally, the inferential statistical tests illuminated the 
direction and magnitude that revision-type had on armed conflict. 
What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia?  Research 
Question 3 (RQ 3) objectively linked MIDs and revisionism to the Steps-To-War theory.  
The purpose here was to arrive at a scholarly consensus on whether the empirical data 
afforded insight and context on how a country’s needs and wants and associated 
escalatory techniques used to achieve them could possibly end on a path to war. 
Before discussing the findings from RQ 1, it also required to address how each 
question is answered. There are four topic areas. The first portion involves the 
restatement of either hypothesis or proposition.  As a benefit, the rationale and how the 
test parameters fit into the larger analytical picture is also reviewed. Second is the 
descriptive analysis results.  Central tendencies and dispersion attributes are the focus, 
here. 
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The third subsection outlays inferential findings. For this to occur, a review of the 
variables and prescribed statistical tests are necessary.   Last is synthesis, which is 
essentially an inference on the applicability of this research as it pertains to war onset, 
Sino revisionism, and the correlates of war. 
Supporting Research Questions 
Context is critical in any correlatory endeavor.  As such, there are three 
supporting research questions that are framed in an inductive manner that when examined 
should offer better synthesis and understanding.  The first question aimed to establish the 
relationship between militarized disputes and war onset.  The second looked to examine 
the relevance of revisionism on the Asia continent.  The last supporting research question 
involved the testing of the steps-to-war theory.  Annotated below are those questions, 
associated hypothesis/propositions, and key findings. 
RQ1: What is the probability of war onset based on associated MID in Asia? 
Research Question 1’s purpose was to determine the influence that militarized 
interstate disputes had on war onset in Asia.  More relevant is the fact that MIDs 
provided context on how turbulent and conflict-prone a region could be. MIDs are 
considered ordinal, meaning threats are the lowest intensity, whereas hostility is the 
highest. Since war onset is essentially hostility, any meaningful testing of war onset 
versus interstate hostility would be erroneous because the correlation is one hundred 
percent. Therefore, the category is not included in the analysis.  One last point to consider 
concerned directionality. The below-annotated hypotheses test only for the association 
and not whether variable relationships are positive or negative.  By design, this inductive 
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approach established foundational correlations, which is necessary for addressing the 
other research questions. 
 
Figure 3. Asian MID Chart. 
Upfront, there were several findings from IBM SPSS descriptive analysis that 
afforded solid essential knowledge. First, there was a total of 460 interstate disputes in 
the data sample. Equally relevant was that the Asian MID average (M = 3.74, SD = .554) 
was within one standard deviation of the global metric (M=3.66, SD = .599).  For clarity, 
the rest of the descriptive results are addressed in the appropriate hypotheses, which are 
below listed. 
H1: Threats MID impact the chances of war. Hypothesis 1 concerned the 
chances of war based on the frequency of threats issued by a state.  This analysis was 
non-directional, meaning it was agnostic to whether impacts were positive or negative.  
To continue, there are two main descriptive analysis takeaways from this hypothesis.  
Threats (N=12) have the lowest frequency amongst all militarized interstate disputes 
within Asia.  The second point is that between Asia and other regions threats are the 
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lowest percentagewise with the former (3%) slightly lower than the latter (4.8%).  In 
short, since 1949, Asian threat MIDs occurrences are mostly congruent with that of the 
international order.  
The inferential statistical test results were nuanced.  To ascertain H1, a point-
biserial correlation was performed.  The dependent variable was war onset; the 
independent was threat based MIDs. As a reminder, this statistical test works best with a 
dichotomous dependent variable that correlates with either other nominal or scale 
variables.  There was no significant correlation between war onset and threat MIDs (r = -
.029, N = 460, p = .535).  Of consequence, this finding was not expected.  Based on 
Vasquez (1996, 2001, 2008) and Singer (1972, 1981), threats were determined to 
correlate with war commencement.  The analysis here showed a tentative implication 
regarding the utility of threats. Because of the low frequency and no significant statistical 
correlation, it is conceivable that most Asian states do not bother to make threats since 
they are ignored.   As such, Hypothesis 1 is rejected because threat MIDs were shown not 
to impact war onset in Asia. 
H2: Force display impacts the chance of war. Hypothesis 2 sought to derive if 
Asian countries' displays of force impacted the chances of war.  To start, there are several 
central limit descriptives that should be examined. First, results indicated Asian force 
displays (24%) are aligned with international cases (27%).  This metric is a percentage of 
the total number.  Second, states utilized force displays (N = 112) nearly ten times that of 
threats (N = 12).  Again, the data supported threats are either ignored or simply not used.  
The inferential results were unforeseen. A point-biserial correlation was executed.  
As depicted in Table 1, the dependent variable was war initiation, whereas force display 
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was the independent one.  There was a statistically significant correlation between war 
onset and display of force (r = -.099, N = 460, p = .033). Previous COW research showed 
a positive correlation between the variables (Sample, 2016; Senese et al., 2005, 2008, 
Singer et al, 1990).  However, further examination presented a slightly negative 
correlation, which meant wars decreased when force displays occurred.  In sum, 
Hypothesis 2 is accepted because statistics displayed that force displays indicated a 
decrease in war chances on the Asian continent. 
Table 1 
War Onset & MIDs Correlations 
 
H3: Use of force impacts the probability of war. Hypothesis 3, which is last 
under RQ1, concerned interstate use of military force and war probability.  That said, 
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there are three key descriptive test findings.  Force use MIDs were the highest incidence 
(N = 324) out of all Asian interstate disputes, making it 3 times more frequent than 
displays of force and 27 that of threats. Another descriptive result was the alignment 
between Asian states and international tendencies during the same timeframe.  Data 
showed that Asian MIDs (70%) paralleled global trends (67%). 
Again, inferential discoveries were not expected. A third point-biserial correlation 
was conducted with force use as the MID type and dependent variable. There was a 
statistically significant correlation between war onset and use of force (r = -.273, N = 
460, p = .000).  This dyadic finding was converse to most COW research, which posited 
a positive relationship between force use and war onset.  Here, the correlation is negative.  
That said, Hypothesis 3 is accepted because the research illustrated that force use 
impacted war onset. 
With the abnormal findings, it was determined that more analysis is indeed 
required.  Violent conflict between states is one step short of war.  It worth remembering 
that the COW project classified war as a military conflict where there are more than 
1,000 battle deaths (Singer et al., 1972).  Any number short of that metric was rendered 
into the violent conflict category, which bared the question: Does the occurrence of MIDs 
relate to the inducement of violent conflict?  If properly answered, then this application 
would either dispel or support the above findings. 
Separate point-biserial correlations were performed on each militarized interstate 
dispute category.   To accomplish, some modifications were necessary. The independent 
variable was changed from war onset to violent conflict.  The dependent variables were 
taken from the three above-mentioned hypotheses.  The first retest involved threat MIDs. 
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There was a statistically significant correlation between violent conflict and threats issued 
(r = -.272, N = 460, p = .000).  Of significance, this finding was different because of the 
previous result (r = -.029, N = 460, p = .535) indicated no correlation between war onset 
and threats.  Another interesting result was the correlation coefficient increased three-fold 
(r = -.029 to r = -.272).  
Force display was the second MID, which also had illuminating findings. The 
point-biserial correlation test showed there was a statistically significant association 
between interstate violent clashes and displays of force (r = -.933, N = 460, p = .000).  
Table 2 depicted the net result, which was the strengthening of the negative correlation 
between the dependent and independent variables.  The war onset magnitude (r = -.099) 
directionally increased when violent conflict (r = -.272) was substituted, further 
cementing the notion that MIDs do not positively impact martial conflict within Asia. 
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Table 2 
Violent Conflict & MIDs Correlations 
 
The last MID reanalyzed was use of force.  After performing the inferential test, it 
was determined there was a statistically significant correlation between violent conflict 
and the use of force (r = .926, N = 460, p = .01).  There are two illuminating implications: 
both deal with the correlation coefficient.  First, there was a polarity switch. When war 
onset (r = -.273) was exchanged with violent conflict (r = .926) as the dichotomous 
dependent variable, the factor reversed from a negative to positive.  Second, the 
coefficient size substantially increased.  The order of magnitude increased by four, nearly 
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approaching a perfect correlation (r = 1.0) between violence conflict occurrence and 
militarized force use.  This finding makes sense because violent conflict is predicated on 
the military use of force, just not to the magnitude of a full-blown war. 
What is the probability of war onset based on associated MID in Asia? At the 
question’s surface, Asia was aligned with most COW research.  Descriptive results 
mirrored those on the international scale. Central tendencies and dispersion were all 
within one standard deviation. Based on counts, there were 3.3 wars anticipated from 
force displays (N = 110).  Equally relevant was that 9.9 interstate wars were expected as 
an outcome from force use (N = 324).  These descriptives had further implications. 
Inferentially, Asia was not aligned with COW research concerning the impact of 
MIDs on interstate war. This research exposed a primarily negative correlation. Mitchell 
et al. (2014) and Senese et al. (2008), both proved that MIDs had a positive correlation 
and influence on how wars started. More so, exchanging war onset for violent conflict 
only increased the correlation coefficient magnitude.  The use of military force had an 
outwardly strong correlation to interstate low-intensity conflict on the Asian continent. 
In total, Asia is perhaps war-weary, which explain the low frequency of interstate 
conflict.  Most of the Asiatic wars were a byproduct of the post-WW II rollback of 
colonialism and subsequent Cold War.  Wars are expensive and appear to be avoided by 
state actors (Bremer, 1992; Singer, 2001).  If force use and display are employed within a 
militarized dispute, then the odds of war are unlikely.  For instance, without MIDs 
present, there is a four percent chance of war, which is statistically higher than with 
MIDs.  This elastic metric could mean that wars within Asia are either spontaneous or 
lacking in escalation. It is therefore conceivable that force displays and use, coupled with 
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adept diplomacy, have afforded Asian states the ability to obtain their strategic goals 
without full-scale interstate war. What is important to remember is that perhaps MIDs are 
not a good indicator of war, rather they are a better gauge for the likelihood of low-
intensity conflict. 
RQ2: What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia? 
Building on the knowledge obtained from the MID analysis, the purpose here was 
to ascertain how revisions impact war onset.  Revisions are a key step on the path to war.  
They often represent the vital issue in which states are willing to resolve with the contest 
of arms. Whereas RQ 1 analysis was non-directional, RQ2 sought to employ both 
direction and magnitude.  The rationale is that some revisions are more salient than others 
(Senese et al, 2008; Vasquez, 2001).   
Another factor to highlight was that this research question incorporated an 
escalatory aspect.  The first proposition is used to determine if armed interstate violence 
occurred.  This step is important because violence is often a precursor to full-scale war.  
The next proposition ascertained how territorial revision correlated to war.  From here, 
the question of national material capability and major powers are entered into the 
discussion.  Prior to revealing the results, it is necessary to provide some basic descriptive 
findings on Asian revisionism. 
From 1949 to 2001, Asia (N = 460) had over 400 revisions that corresponded with 
interstate militarized disputes.  Compared with global numbers (N = 1683), Asian 
disputes accounted for nearly one fourth (24%).  The central tendencies were aligned 
with Asia (M = 1.33, SD = 1.00) within one standard deviation of the international mean 
(M = 1.46, SD = .989).   
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To refresh, there were five revision categories that recorded 460 militarized 
disputes.  Figure 4, situated below, depicted a useful descriptive breakout.  Territorial 
revisions (31%) totaled 144 dyads. Policy (36%) was 164 disputes. Regime revisions 
(6%) added up to 28 dyad-disputes. The lowest frequency was revisions categorized as 
other (3%) in which there were14 disputes.  Perhaps most interesting was that 110 
revisions were considered not applicable, which was nearly one-fourth (24%) of the data 
sample.  Meaning, COW researchers were unable to operationalize some revisions to 
specific disputes based on their predetermined criteria (Levy, 1981; Senese et al, 2008).  
Taking this limitation into account, this dissertation examined territory, policy, and 
regime revisions.   
P1: Territorial revision has the highest probability of violent conflict 
Proposition 1’s purpose determined if territorial revisions were indeed the highest 
probability of ending in military violence between states.  The COW scholars and STW 
theorists contended that territory was the most salient issue in war.  This research 
intended to examine this notion in an escalatory manner.  Meaning, there is first a test to 
see if territorial disputes (i.e., independent variable) end in violence (i.e., dependent 
variable), which occurs in this proposition.  
Descriptive statistics proved insightful. There were 144 revisions (31%) that 
involved territory and 338 disputes (73%) classified as violent conflict.  Both metrics 
were calculated from a total of 460 dispute cases in Asia.  Regarding territorial 
revisionism, nearly a third (28%) ended with interstate violence, whereas another third 
(39%) did not.  This means that more cases than not, violence was avoided.  The highest 
revision frequency was policy.  At 164 disputes, there were 20 more policy revisions than 
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territory.  Equally informative were the policy revisions that ended in armed violent 
conflict.  Concerning the latter, conflict was almost equal between violence (36%) and no 
violence (35%).   
To determine P1’s inferential attributes, three empirical test runs were deemed 
necessary.  A crosstab was performed with violent conflict as the dependent variable and 
territorial revision as the independent. The relationship between violent conflict and 
territorial revision was statistically significant chi-square (1,460) = 4.025, p = .045.  More 
so, the odds of violent conflict were .642 times larger when a revision over territory is 
present. 
Policy revision was next.  Exchanging policy for territory, another crosstab was 
completed.  The association between violent conflict and policy revision was not 
significant chi-square (1,460) = .109, p =.742.  Revision was the last dependent variable 
tested.  The crosstab resulted in a relationship between violent conflict and regime 
revision is statistically significant chi-square (1, 460) = 8.058, p = .005. The odds of 
violent conflict were 11.02 higher when regime revisions are present. 
 
Figure 4. Asian Revisionism. 
147 
 
Proposition 1 revealed three salient items. First, territorial revisions indicated a 
decrease in violent conflict.  The odds ratio (.645) is less than 1, which means a negative 
correlation.  This finding was divergent from accepted COW thought on the power 
politics behavior of most states (Hensel et al., 2004; Senese et al., 2008, Vasquez, 1987).  
In fact, nearly all studies used in this dissertation posited that territorial revisions were 
both a strong predictor and positive correlation to interstate violence. 
Second, policy-related revisions were not statistically significant.  One must 
remember that at the international level policy revisions were indeed relevant to the onset 
of war, and thereby the enduement of violence.  This contrast posited that Asia was not 
congruent with the other continental regions and previous peace research. (Singer, 1990; 
Vasquez, et al., 2010).  With policy having a very high-frequency rate, it should have 
been more statistically significant. 
Third, the discovery that regime revisions had the highest likelihood of military 
violence short of war was not expected.  The fact that the p-value and odds ratio were 
uncharacteristically strong was unforeseen. As stated, the Steps-To-War theory and other 
various COW peace research clearly stated that territory was the leading harbinger to 
violence (Moaz et al., 2018; Senese et al, 2003, 2008).  In this incident, the research 
implied that regime change was strongly related to Asiatic militarized violence. 
P2: Territorial revision has the highest probability of war 
Proposition 2’s goal was to ascertain the direction and likelihood that territorial 
revisions had on war onset.  Upfront, Asia, compared to other regions, fought the highest 
number of wars (N = 14) from 1949 to 2001 time.  It is also worth mentioning that 14 is 
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considered a relatively low occurrence compared to the 187 total wars since the 
Napoleonic Era.   
Like Proposition 1, crosstabs were the statistical test of choice. The independent 
variables remained revision type, while the onset of war replaced violent conflict. A 
crosstab was completed with unanticipated findings. The relationship between war onset 
and territorial revision were not significant chi-square (1,460) = .05, p = .823.  The 
second crosstab proved equally interesting. The relationship between war onset and 
policy revision were not significant chi-square (1, 460) = 1.296, p = .255.  The last 
crosstab inferential finding was unequally foreseen. The relationship between war onset 
and regime revision were not statistically significant chi-square (1, N =460) = .028, p 
=.867. 
Regarding Proposition 2’s palpable finding, there were no relationships 
whatsoever between revisions and war.  All the crosstab results—territory, policy, 
regime—were statistically not significant with relatively high p-values, indicating the 
contradictory nature of the findings. More so, when combined with P1 results, the notion 
of territorial issues being the catalyst for war is further undermined.  One should 
remember that crosstabs showed that Asia behaved differently from the previous COW 
suppositions when it came to MIDs and territory, a fact that needed further examination. 
H4: National capability has no impact on war onset. Hypothesis 4’s aim was 
the discernment of how socio-economic and military might influence state behavior in the 
context of war onset.  To elucidate, the descriptives were informative.  Below is Figure f, 
which affords a graphical comprehension of the data. The dark blue bar represented 
MIDs (N=446) partitioned by national capability that did not end in war.  The orange bar 
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represented MIDs (N = 12) that led to war.  The chart showed two points of note.  One is 
that Asian states, which were relatively poor, as depicted in the first quartile, had a 
relatively high MID rate (N = 132) that led to war (N =7).  The other point is that high 
capability states, which were mainly major powers, were equally prone to war (N = 7).  
The third quartile accounted for nearly half (N = 211) of the total MIDs (N = 460). 
 
Figure 5. NMC Quartiles and Wars Fought. 
The inferential test was equally illuminating.  A crosstab was performed between national 
military capability and war onset.  The former is a scale measurement and the 
independent variable. The latter was the dependent variable.  The test revealed a 
relationship between war onset and national capability that was statistically significant 
chi-square (2, 460) = 6.010, p = .050.   
Asia, again, proved unique in terms of militarized conflict.  The data showed that 
an equal number of wars were fought between both minor and major powers, suggesting 
the need for further investigation.  The Asian continent contained major-major, major-
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minor, and minor-minor interstate disputes through the prescribed time.  To reiterate, 
major powers are in the third quartile.  China, Japan, Russia, and the United States fell 
into this category.   Most rising and medium-capability countries were in the second 
quartile.  Vietnam and Thailand are such examples. The poorest, in terms of national 
military capability, were categorized in the first quartile.  The Philippines, circa the 1970s 
and 80s, resided in this percentage group. Singer (1972) and Black (2008) proclaimed 
because wars required economic resources they were usually fought by more capable 
states.  This premise is perhaps true but needed further evidential support. 
From a monetary standpoint, it is conceivable that the Cold-War did have an 
impact on war onset.  Both the Korean War (1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1956-1975) 
fell under the third and first quartile categories.  Russia, China, and the United States, 
which are all high on the NMC index, poured war material and other resources into these 
policy armed conflicts.  South Korea and Vietnam were minor powers who fought 
exhausting wars that were by-proxies for great power competition and ideology.  The 
latter were economic powerhouses that could fund and support numerous wars, which 
arguably increased the correlatory factor of national capability. 
Another point is that the data suggested wars of colonialism were at hand.  During 
the 1950s, Vietnam fought a bitter war to dislodge a colonizer from its territory.  The 
First Indochina war pitted Vietnam against France.  One was a minor power that had just 
help defeat the Japanese empire in WWII.  The other was a declining major power, which 
had been conquered by Germany in WWII.  This was another example of a first quartile 
situation. 
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The last point concerned the fallout from major power wars.  Vasquez et al. 
(2010) claimed that after major power conflict there is a period of numerous smaller 
wars, which he equated to state-building wars.  These types were considered minor-minor 
conflicts.  The research data showed that the preponderance of the 1st quartile MIDs was 
subject to this premise.  Laos and Cambodia are clear examples. 
In short, Hypothesis 4 is rejected.  Both descriptive and inferential tests showed a 
strong correlation between Asian countries’ economic wealth and their propensity for 
war.  More so, the above-mentioned synthesis provided examples of how national 
material capacity did matter in the number and type of wars fought. 
H5: Dyad classification has impacts on war onset. Hypothesis 5’s purpose was 
the examination if dyad classification influenced war.  Figure 6 portrayed descriptives.  
As a reminder, most IR theorists divide state power domains into two broad categories: 
major and minor (Lake, 2003; Lebow, 2010).  Major powers are established, resource-
rich, and often activist in the international order.  Minor powers are less capable, 
resource-constrained, and often restricted to their respective regions.  This research 
organized Asian states that participated in militarized disputes into three groups.  Major-
major dyads (N = 30) were the lowest.  Major-minor (N = 204) and minor-minor (N = 
246), combined, were considerably more (94%).  What was profound was the sheer 
number of dyads that included minor powers, which is later addressed. 
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Figure 6. Power Dyads & MIDs (1949-2001). 
The inferential test results were not anticipated.  A binary logistic regression 
model was used to determine the relationship between power dyads and war onset.  The 
dyads were the predictor variables, and war onset was the outcome variable.  The 
research method entailed three independent model runs with the predictor variable 
exchanged on each one. Here are the results. 
The first regression model was not statistically significant chi-square (1, 460) = 
1.919, p = .166), with a -2LL of 123.432.  War onset equation was equal to -3.392 + -
17.88 (maj-maj MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yes, 0 = No. War onset chances decreased 
by 17.811 for each MID.  As such, a dyad comprised of major powers was not a 
significant predictor of war onset. The second regression model was not statistically 
significant chi-square (1, 460) = .950, p = .330), with a -2LL of 124.4.  War onset 
equation was equal to -3.199 + -.531(maj-min MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yes, 0 = No.  
War onset decreased by .531 for each MID.  In short, dyads comprised of one major 
power, and one minor power were not significant predictors of war initiation. 
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Table 3  
War Onset & Maj-Min Dyad Regression Results 
 
The last regression model was also not statistically significant, chi-square (1, 460) = .950, 
p = .330), with a -2LL of 124.4.  War onset equation was equal to -3.199 + -.531(min-
min MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yes, 0 = No.  War onset decreased by .531 for each 
MID.  In totality, Asian power dyads—i.e., major-major, major-minor, minor-minor—
were not significant predictors of war onset.  Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was summarily 
rejected. 
As with previous abnormal findings, the lack of correlation between power dyads 
and war onset required further analysis.  Using the same regression model, a new series 
of binary logistics tests were implemented.  Since war onset was inconclusive, the 
research leaned toward violent conflict as an outcome variable. 
The first regression model was not statistically significant, chi-square (1,460) = 
1.591, p = .207, with a -2LL of 530.577.  Violent equation was equal to .547 + .509(maj-
maj MID), dyad was coded as 1 = Yeas, 0 = No. Violent conflict increased by .509 for 
each MID.  That said, based on p = .207, there remained no relation between major-major 
power dyads and militarized interstate violence. The second regression run was 
statistically significant, chi-square (1,460) = 5.432, p =.021, with a -2LL of 526.827. 
Violent conflict equation was equal to 1.250 + -.490(maj-min MID), dyad was coded as 1 
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= Yes, 0 = No. Violent conflict decreased by .490 for each MID, which was supported by 
a -.707 in IBM SPSS correlation matrix. 
Table 4 
Violent Conflict & Min-Min Dyad Regression Results 
 
Regarding violent interstate conflict, the last regression model was statistically 
significant, chi-square (1,460) = 5.432, p = .021 with -2LL of 526.827. Violent conflict 
equation was equal to .760 + .490(min-min MID), dyad was coded as 1 =Yeas, 0 = No.  
Violent conflict increased by .490 for each additional MID. 
Hypothesis 5 has three takeaways.  COW literature and research purported power 
domains were an integral part of whether a state waged war or not (Rummel, 1977, 
Sample, 2016).  However, this scholarly work provided several alternatives. The notion 
of minor powers not waging war because of their low material capability is inconclusive.  
Descriptive analysis showed that Asian minor powers were indeed very active with 
respect to militarized disputes.  From 1949 to 2001, the minor powers were involved in 
almost all disputes (94%) in Asia.  Yet, there was no clear correlation if their status was 
related to war. 
Equally relevant was that war onset in Asia was agnostic to power domains.  
Based on the high number of major-minor MIDs, there perhaps should have been a 
correlation.  As mentioned, this finding aligned with neither COW nor STW research 
(Bremer, 1992; Senese et al., 2008 Singer, 2001; Vasquez, 1997).  More so, all three 
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power dyads resulted in relatively high p-values (i.e., p = .166, p = .330, p = .330), which 
further supported that a state’s domain classification would not necessarily correlate and 
thus lead to war.  
Table 5 
Violent Conflict & Maj-Min Dyad Regression Results 
 
Lastly, as with earlier MID-related hypotheses, violent conflict and power 
domains were correlatory in Asia.  Major-minor and minor-minor dyads were statistically 
significant.  Historical context afforded some tentative answers.  Asian major-minor 
dyads should have had a positive correlation because of the descriptives results and the 
numerous policy wars fought.  However, neither the correlation matrix nor regression 
results (See Table 5) did not support this finding instead there was a negative correlation.  
This could perhaps be connected that the relationship between the major and minor 
power in the dyad is one of de-escalation because the minor power acquiesced to the 
more powerful state. As for the increase in violent conflict associated with minor-minor 
dyads, a tentative answer is that low NMC countries tended to avoid conflict with larger 
neighbors, but more than willing to fight a near-peer in capability.  Again, martial 
contests and war are costly endeavors, and states usually do not partake unless they are 
certain of the outcome. 
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P3: Major powers with territorial issues are more prone to war 
Proposition 3’s purpose was to determine if a conflict dyad that contained a major 
power would be suspectable to war when a territorial revision was added.  Since this test 
necessitates directional and step-increase aspects, a stepwise binary logistical regression 
model was created.  The latter encapsulated two steps.  Step 1 is the first case.  The 
predictor is a major power, and the outcome variable is war onset.  As a reminder, both 
variables are dichotomous.  In Step 2, major power is swapped for territorial revision, 
which is also binary.  It is important to remember that this model had an additive 
property, whereby the first step results influenced the second. 
Table 6 
Stage 1 War Onset Regression Results 
 
That said, the two-stage model results were illuminating.  The base model of war 
onset and major power was not significant, chi-square (1,460) = 2.710, p = .100, with a -
2LL of 122.641.  War onset equation was equal to -3.863 + .910 (majpower), dyad was 
coded as Yes = 1 and No = 0.  War onset increased by .910 with each additional MID.  
Although this positive correlation between war and major power was deemed not 
statistically significant, it is reasonable to ascertain since p = .096 is comparatively close 
to p = .05 that there is some correlatory effect. 
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Table 7 
Stage 2 War Onset Regression Results 
 
Stage 2 of the model of war onset based on major power and territorial revision 
was also not statistically significant, chi-square (2, 460) = 2.723, p = .256, with a -2LL of 
122.627.  War onset equation was equal to -3.863 + .906(majpower) + .069 (territory 
revision MID).  What is germane here is that the model summary p-values increased 
between the stages from p =.100 to p =.256 and both slope coefficients were not 
significant.  These combined facts meant the model became more questionable when the 
territorial revision was added.  In sum, the regression finding indicated there was not a 
relationship between war onset, major power, and territory that could effectively meet the 
criteria to accept Proposition 3.  That said, violent conflict has thus far explained a great 
deal concerning Asia and COW power politics. 
Table 8 
Stage 1 Violent Conflict Regression Results 
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Keeping within the concept of violent conflict exploration in comparison to war 
onset, the above stepwise regression model was again used.  The base model of violent 
conflict and major powers was statistically significant, chi-square (1,460) = 4.430, p = 
.035.  Violent conflict equation was equal to 1.170 + -.476(majpower), with a -2LL of 
527.739.  More importantly, there was a negative correlation between violent conflict and 
major powers.  Meaning, major powers had a de-escalatory influence on the propensity of 
violence. 
Stage 2 was equally profound.  The second stage of the violent conflict based on 
major powers and territory-based issues model was statistically significant chi-square (2, 
460) = 9.010, p = .011, with a -2LL of 523.158.  Violent conflict equation is equal to .861 
+ -.515 (majpower) + .598 (territory_rev).  One important item to note is that territory is 
additive.  For clarity, as violent conflict decreased with the addition of major powers, 
territorial revisions caused it to increase. 
Table 9 
Stage 2 Violent Conflict Regression Results 
 
Proposition 3 contained three salient points. Upfront, outcomes based on power 
domains combined with territory could not be statistically correlated to war.  This finding 
is within the same thread as Research Questions 1 and 2, which also outlaid the 
divergence. Equally important was once again violent conflict was strongly related to 
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major powers and territorial revision.  From the former’s perspective, high capability 
states within a dyad decreased the possibility of violent disputes.   
In Asia, unlike pre-WW II Europe, most major-minor dyads do not lead to 
violence.  Instead, it would appear when major powers are involved with lessor countries, 
there is a propensity for settlement and thereby de-escalation.  Lastly, the research 
reflected territorial revisions were escalatory in nature.  There was a strong positive 
correlation that major power presence and territorial revisionism do increase the 
likelihood of violent armed conflict short of war. Although Proposition 3 could not 
unanimously be accepted because of the lack of significance concerning war onset, there 
should remain a strong acknowledgment that MID and revisionism do play an integral 
part in the violence on the Asia continent (Kim, 2002; Singer et al, 1987; Kaplan, 2013). 
What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia?  Upfront, the 
answer to the research question was overwhelmingly nuanced. War in Asia could not be 
correlated with any revisions.  Not only were they not statistically relevant, there were so 
on a large scale:  territory (p = .823), policy (p = .255), and regime (p = .826).  This 
finding dictated that research should explore other related areas. 
Violent conflict is common in Asia and empirically pertinent.  Territory and 
regime were the two revisions that were statistically significant.  Crosstabs were used to 
determine these findings.  Regime was the highest.  In fact, it was 11.82 more likely to 
lead to military violence between Asian states.  This revelation could have possible 
implications as to whether Asian conflict followed the steps-to-war path. 
Another point is that a country’s national military capability was a greater 
indicator of war onset.  In fact, national capability (p = .05) was statistically significant 
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compared to all revisions.  More so, there was an equal tendency for war between major 
and minor powers.  This discovery implied that minor powers, not only fought in major 
power wars but also against one another. 
Of greater significance, the data and statistical tests did not support power 
domains and war onset.  With Asia, despite the strong relationship between military 
capability and war onset, this research only supported violent interstate conflict.  Asiatic 
dyads that contained major power were not more violence-prone, instead, their presence 
decreased the chances.  Conversely, minor-minor dyads were positively related to 
violence onset. 
Lastly, Asian militarized disputes that contained territorial revisions and major 
power do not increase the chances of war.  There was statistical evidence to prove that 
they did.  On the other hand, when violence was the dependent variable, there was 
empirical support.  Despite major power presence dampening effect on violence, the 
addition of a territorial dispute did increase the chances of interstate violence.   
In sum, there is not a statistical relationship between COW-defined revisions and 
the propensity of war in Asia.  But there is a relatively strong positive correlation 
between the outbreak of interstate violence and regime-based revisions and high national 
capability.  Since territory was not deemed significant, there perhaps were some 
repercussions that would be made apparent in the next section. 
RQ3: What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia 
Research Question 3, this dissertation’s pinnacle inquest examined if the Steps-
To-War theory held true for Asia.  Vasquez’s theory was based on a very robust sample.  
As with most COW studies, the temporal domain is from 1815 to 2001and dispute cases 
161 
 
pertain to the international order.  In short, previous research accounted for disputes in 
Europe, Middle East, Africa, and other regions within a two-century timeframe.  
Conversely, this dissertation was scoped to a specific region, Asia, and epoch—China’s 
founding in 1949 and thereafter. With these parameters, the below content illuminated the 
relationship between war initiation and the applicable attributes in which the Steps-To 
War theorist contended was necessary. 
P4: War onset on the Asian continent is congruent with COW power politics 
behavior 
Proposition 4 analyzed whether war onset on the Asian continent was congruent 
with COW power politics behavior.  More importantly, this research methodology and 
test are a direct replica of Senese and Vasquez's (2008) steps-to-war theoretical treatise 
that codified how the correlates of war (i.e., power politics) increased war likelihood 
between states.  To elucidate, in the research design, war onset was the outcome variable.  
Senese et al. (2008) empirical aim were to determine the direction and magnitude of war 
probabilities based on the addition of predictor variables.  The first phase involved the 
occurrence of a militarized interstate dispute grounded on a territorial revision.  The 
second stage involved an enduring rivalry between disputants.  The third rung was 
alliance creation, which was the rivals’ effort to counter one another.  Finally, there was 
the arms buildup between belligerents.  The final effect, according to Vasquez, was an 
increase in the probability of war commencement. What is important is that the correlates 
are synonymous with the predictor variables, which leads to the statistical model. 
To test P4, a four-stage model, using binary logistic regression, was created.  The 
base model, or Stage 1, pertained to Asian territorial revisions.  Next, rivalry was added 
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into the regression.  This stepwise approach continued until all power politics predictors 
were adequately accounted for.  The variables are dichotomous, with Yes = 1 and No = 0.  
Simply put, if a specific power politic behavior were present in the dyad, it was 
empirically analyzed in the inferential test. 
The stepwise regression model on war onset and COW power politics was not 
statistically significant.  For emphasis, here is the stage-by-stage empirical synopsis. The 
base model was not significant, chi-square (1, 460) = .045, p = .831.  War onset was 
equal to -3.339 + .127 (Territory_Rev), p = .539 with a -2LL of 124.894. Stage 2 model, 
comprised of territory and rivalry, was not significant, chi-square (2, 460) = .644, p = 
.725.  War onset was equal to -3.445 + .160(Territory_Rev), p = .790 + -.490(END_RIV, 
p = .458, with a -2LL of 124.625. 
Table 10 
Stage 4 War Onset & Steps-To-War Regression Results 
 
Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, and high-risk alliance, 
was not significant, chi-square (3,460) = .692, p = .875.  War onset equation was -3.500 + 
.172(Territory_Rev), p =.776 + -.507 (END_RIV), p = .603 + .122 (HR_ALLY), p =.825, 
with a -2LL of 124.596. Stage 4 model, which incorporated all COW power politic 
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variables, was not significant, chi-square (4,460) = 1.455, p = .635.  War onset equation 
was -3.838 + .158(Territory_Rev), p =.794 + -.294(END_RIV), p = .680 + 
.115(HR_ALLY), p = .836 + .518(ARMS_RACE), p = .391, with a -2LL of 123.833. 
By now, the above-listed findings were anticipated.  Previous hypotheses and 
propositions testing illuminated there were neither meaningful statistical nor correlatory 
relationships between war onset and Asiatic interstate power politics.  Table 10 outlaid 
the stepwise regression model and is a testament to these affirmations.  In short, 
Proposition 4 should be considered invalid as COW power politics pertain to the Asian 
continent.  
Furthermore, Asia is not aligned with the Steps-To-War theory.  This summation 
is based on the consistently high p-values and relatively low -2LL numbers on each 
model stage.  That said, it was undeniably necessary to examine what would be the 
outcome if war onset was exchanged for interstate violent conflict. 
Using the same stepwise model, regression was again conducted with violent 
conflict as the outcome variable.  The predictors—territory, enduring rivalry, high-risk 
alliance, and arms race—also remained the same.  Overall, the regression model on 
violent conflict and Asian states' power politics was statistically significant.  Here is a 
more detailed report. The base model was significant, chi-square (1,460) = 3.529, p = 
.060.  Violent conflict equation was .746 + .421(Territory_Rev), p = .058, with a -2LL of 
525.978. 
Stage 2 was statistically significant, chi-square (2, 460) = 6.115, p = .047.  
Equation was equal to .843 + .452(Territory_Rev), p = .044 + -.368 (END_RIV), p 
=.105, with a -2LL of 523.393. Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, 
164 
 
and high-risk alliance, was significant, chi-square (3,460) = 29.067, p = .000.  Violent 
conflict equated to -3.500 + .551(Territory_Rev), p =.018 + -.511 (END_RIV), p = .030 
+ 1.109(HR_ALLY), p =.000, with a -2LL of 500.441. 
Table 11 
Stage 4 Violent Conflict & Steps-To-War Regression Results 
 
Stage 4 model, which included all COW power politics variables, was significant, 
chi-square (4,460) = 29.413, p = .000.  Violent conflict equation was .510 + .558 
(Territory_Rev), p =.016 + -.574 (END_RIV), p = .027 + 1.117 (HR_ALLY), p = .000 + 
-.141 (ARMS_RACE), p = .557, with a -2LL of 500.094. 
By large, violent conflict is a better indicator of how COW power politics interact 
on the Asian continent.  Below is a detailed explanation. Territory was a significant 
predictor in violent interstate conflict.  It had a positive relationship with violent conflict.  
This meant that as territorial revisions increased, so did the propensity for violent 
interstate conflict.  Equally important was at each stage the p-value decreased, signaling 
the relationship between violence and territory revision got stronger.  This was also the 
case with the regression coefficient, which went from .421 to .558.  
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Enduring rivalry also had a substantial influence. There was an unanticipated 
negative relationship between the outcome and the predictor variable.  From Stage 2 to 4, 
the magnitude of the correlation increased, the regression coefficient went from -.368 to -
.574.  In parallel, the significance level increased by sixty percent from p = .105 to p = 
.027.   What these comparatives revealed was as the additive properties of the steps-to-
war correlates were manifested the presence of an enduring rivalry within a dyad became 
statistically significant. As one recalled, COW research showed that rivalries, particularly 
long-lasting ones, did increase the propensity for war, and thereby violence (Mitchell et 
al., 2014; Senese et al., 2008).  Regarding Asia, this supposition was not wholly 
congruent because rivalries became relevant at Stage 3 in the regression model with the 
addition of a major power ally. 
Having a high-risk ally was empirically significant.  In fact, it was the strongest 
predictor out of the four. There was an overwhelmingly positive relationship between 
violent conflict and dyads having a strong ally.  The latter is characterized by major 
power status and possessing a high NMC index score.  The regression coefficient was 
also the largest compared to the other power politic variables.  
Arms races were not significant.  Although perhaps more relevant than war onset, 
the relationship between violent conflict and military buildups remained statistically not 
significant (p = .557).  In Asia, this research showed that military competition of 
capabilities did not necessarily increase the likelihood of violence. 
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P5: East and Southeast Asia subregions are more prone to conflict than Asia writ 
large 
Proposition 5’s purpose and methodology are a direct replication of Proposition 4.  
It analyzed whether war onset within the East and Southeast Asian subregions were 
consistent with COW covariates and the Steps-To-War theory.  To clarify, Proposition 5 
is divided into two subregions, which are examined in order of significance.  East Asia is 
first, followed by the southeastern states. Starting with the former, the stepwise 
regression model on war onset and COW power politics was not statistically significant.  
To test P5, the four-stage model binary logistic regression was again used. Below is the 
stage-by-stage empirical synopsis of East Asia. Stage 1 model was not significant, chi-
square (1, 215) = 1.361, p = .243.  War onset was equal to -3.807 + .902 (Territory_Rev), 
p = .246 with a -2LL is 60.355. 
Stage 2 model, comprised of territory and rivalry, was not significant, chi-square 
(2, 215) = 5.315, p = .070.  War onset was equal to -3.486 + .847(Territory_Rev), p = 
.279 + -18.047(END_RIV), p = .997, with a -2LL of 56.401. 
Table 12 
Stage 4 War Onset & Steps-To-War Regression Results 
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Stage 3 model, which added high-risk alliance, was not significant, chi-square (3, 
215) = 7.658, p = .054.  War onset equation was -3.733 + .609 (Territory_Rev), p = .451 
+ -18.182(END_RIV), p = .997+ .1.310 (HR_ALLY), p =.109, with a -2LL of 54.058. 
Stage 4 model, which incorporated all COW power politic variables, was not 
significant, chi-square (4, 215) = 8.301, p = .081.  War onset equation was -3.517 + 
.593(Territory_Rev), p = .465 + -17.890(END_RIV), p = .997+ 1.395(HR_ALLY), p = 
.093+ -.674(ARMS_RACE), p = .440, with a -2LL of 53.415.  In short, East Asia does 
not align with the Steps-To-War theory.  War onset did not significantly correlate to 
power politics behavior. 
Continuing with East Asia, the step binary regression model on violent conflict 
and COW power politics was statistically significant.  The base model was not 
significant, chi-square (1, 215) = 1.361, p = .243.  War onset was equal to 1.079 + -
.347(Territory_Rev), p = .266 with a -2LL of 253.366. Stage 2 model, comprised of 
territory and rivalry, was not significant, chi-square (2, 215) = 1.373, p = .503.  Violent 
conflict was equal to 1.116 + -.354(Territory_Rev), p = .258 + -.135(END_RIV), p = 
.699, with a -2LL of 253.218. 
Table 13 
Stage 4 Violent Conflict & Steps-To-War Regression Results 
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Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, and high-risk alliance, 
was significant, chi-square (3, 215) = 15.685, p = .001.  Violence equation was .953+ -
.465 (Territory_Rev), p = .151+ -.292 (END_RIV), p = .422 + 1.918 (HR_ALLY), p = 
.002, with a -2LL of 238.906. 
Stage 4 model, which incorporated all COW power politic variables, was 
significant, chi-square (4, 215) = 17.253, p = .002.  War onset equation was .798 + -.487 
(Territory_Rev), p = .135 + -.534 (END_RIV), p = .200 + 1.932 (HR_ALLY), p = .002+ 
.448 (ARMS_RACE), p = .215, with a -2LL of 237.338.  For further clarification, Table 
13, located above, illustrated the Stage 4 research findings. In all, what is important to 
remember is East Asian dyads that possessed high-risk alliances were prone to violent 
conflict. 
Proposition 5’s other subregion was Southeast Asia.  Overall, the regression 
model on war onset and Southeast Asian states' power politics was not statistically 
significant.  Here is a more detail. The base model was not significant, chi-square (1, 
131) = 2.844, p =.092.  War onset equation was -2.793 + -18.410 (Territory_Rev), p = 
.998, with a -2LL of 45.879. 
Stage 2 was not statistically significant, chi-square (2, 131) = 2.872, p = .238.  
War onset equaled -2.741 + -18.414 (Territory_Rev), p = .998 + -.150 (END_RIV), p = 
.867, with a -2LL of 45.850. Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, 
and high-risk alliance, was not significant, chi-square (3, 131) = 2.909, p = .406.  War 
equated to -2.782 + -18.434 (Territory_Rev), p = .998+ -.198(END_RIV), p = .831+ .181 
(HR_ALLY), p = .846, with a -2LL of 45.813. 
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Table 14 
Stage 4 War Onset & Steps-To-War Regression Results 
 
Stage 4 model, which the results are outlaid in Table 14, was not significant, chi-
square (4,131) = 3.315, p = .506.  War onset equation was -2.617+ -18.417 
(Territory_Rev), p = .998 + -.001 (END_RIV), p = .999 + .184 (HR_ALLY), p = .845 + -
.587 (ARMS_RACE), p = .533, with a -2LL of 45.407.  In sum, there is not statistical 
correlation with war onset and the power politics associated with SE Asia. 
When violent conflict replaced war onset, there were several key changes within 
Southeast Asia. Overall, the stepwise regression model on violent conflict and COW 
power politics was statistically significant.  For emphasis, here is the by-stage empirical 
outline. The base model was significant, chi-square (1, 131) = 5.809, p =.016.  Violent 
conflict was equal to .999 + -1.073 (Territory_Rev), p = .016 with a -2LL of 158.551. 
Stage 2 model, which added enduring rivalry, was significant, chi-square (2, 131) = 
7.178, p = .028.  Violent conflict equated to .836 + -1.070 (Territory_Rev), p = .017 + 
.472 (END_RIV), p = .248, with a -2LL of 157.182. 
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Table 15 
Stage 4 Violent Conflict & Steps-To-War Regression Results 
 
Stage 3 model, which included territory, enduring rivalry, and high-risk alliance, 
was significant, chi-square (3, 131) = 9.619, p = .022.  Violent conflict was .705 + -1.169 
(Territory_Rev), p = .011 + .319 (END_RIV), p = .457 + .694 (HR_ALLY), p = .127, 
with a -2LL of 154.741.  Stage 4 model, above depicted in Table 15, was significant, chi-
square (4,131) = 11.218, p = .024.  Violent conflict equation was .896 + -1.163 
(Territory_Rev), p = .012 + .515 (END_RIV), p = .261+ .664 (HR_ALLY),  p = .145 + -
.526 (ARMS_RACE), p = .208, with a -2LL of 153.143. 
In sum, the above-listed findings were anticipated and indeed nuanced.  
Proposition 5 should be considered invalid as correlates of war pertaining to war onset in 
the East and Southeast Asian subregions. Moreover, these subregions are not aligned with 
the Steps-To-War theory.  This summation is based on the consistently high p-values and 
relatively low -2LL numbers on each model stage.   On the other hand, the research did 
show that both subregions were marginally aligned when interstate violence was 
substituted for war.   
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Although not as numerous as greater Asia, there were two covariates that did 
stand out.  In East Asia, dyads that contained a high-risk ally (p = 002) were 6.9 times 
more susceptible to violence than those with territorial revisions, rivalry MIDs, and arms 
races.  This finding could be interpreted as major powers are balancing and 
counterbalancing one another in the East China Sea region.  Descriptive analyses, which 
are below discussed, reflect Japan, China, Russia, and the United States were undeniably 
active during the 1949-2001 timeframe. 
Regarding Southeast Asia, the research outlined that territory was omnipotent.  
However, the correlation was divergent, meaning territorial revision had a negative 
impact on interstate violence onset.  For disclosure's sake, this metric was deemed 
erroneous.  There was no supporting evidence that explained how and why territorial 
related disputes decreased interstate conflict (Mitchell et al., 2014; Senese et al., 2008; 
Vasquez, 1993).  Finally, the key takeaway here is empirical research illuminated that 
East and Southeast Asian subregions were marginally aligned with the Steps-To-War 
theory. 
What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia?  In totality, 
Research Question 3 was empirically the most thought-provoking of three supporting 
questions. First, there is a utility in proceeding with the Steps-To-War theory as an 
analytical framework.  Despite not be able to assess war onset, the theory did allow 
application and evaluation of violent conflict within Asian dyads. Equally pertinent, most 
COW peace research is on a global scale and negated regionality.  In fact, this knowledge 
gap is a key criticism from other IR theorists and scholars, a shortfall this dissertation 
addressed.   
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Second, Asia was not war-prone but has a high incidence of interstate violence.  
The data and research have outlaid this summation.  As a result, it was determined that 
addressing the main research question should reflect violent conflict as it pertained to 
China.  It materialized as more applicable.  To clarify, the research shifted to Sino 
interstate violence versus war onset. 
Third, the Steps-To-War model required modification.  As one could recall, 
military arms buildup was determined to be not significant; therefore, it was removed 
from the model.  The revised violent conflict equation is now .510 + .558 (Territory_Rev) 
+ -.574 (END_RIV) + 1.117 (HR_ALLY).  What this modification did was render the 
four-stage regression model to a three-stage process. 
Fourth, the research reflected that Asian subregions were less influential with 
regards to interstate war and violence.  The examination of 346 dispute dyads only 
afforded two inferences (i.e., high-risk alliances and territorial revisions) concerning East 
and Southeast Asia—and one was deemed erroneous.  Despite lack of quantitative 
evidence, there remained strong qualitative support that Sino aggression does play a 
factor in the subregions’ volatility. 
Last, China and its power politics behavior would be examined through a more 
relevant empirical prism. Culturally, economically, militarily, and politically China is 
more attuned with Asia than arguably the international order.  Whereas interstate war was 
more common worldwide, especially in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) regions, 
this is not the case in Asia.  Low-intensity conflict, where battle casualties remain below 
1,000, best characterized the power politics behavior in the Middle Kingdom.  Therefore, 
the research should reflect these idiosyncrasies. 
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Main Research Question 
What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist 
strategy in Asia? To answer this question, it perhaps best to do so in two parts.  
Retrodiction is empirical analysis primarily based on historical data.  So far, this 
construct has been the preponderance herein, where the inductive investigation of war 
and its correlates has been paramount.  Prediction is another analysis technique.  It is 
forecasting future events based on either quantitative or qualitative methods.  Although 
this dissertation is overwhelming quantitative, there is a subjective element involved 
when current Sino strategic implications are addressed.  Furthermore, within each 
analysis category, there are two topic areas.  The first delineated the Chinese grand 
strategy, whereas the second focused on the empirical relationship with correlates of war. 
The latter is centered on China, but also greater Asia and its associated state actors and 
critical subregions.  
Retrodiction 
Prior to disclosing research findings, it necessary to provide historical context on 
the Chinese grand strategy.  Like most major powers, China has a national security plan 
that is published for both domestic and foreign consumption.  The first “Five-Year” plan 
was presented in 1953 and thereafter has been a bellwether.  Although there were 
numerous Sino national goals during the 50-year period this dissertation analyzed, 
research outlaid four that were both enduring and correlatory to the main research 
question.  
The first goal was to promote internal stability.  Centuries of perceived 
humiliation by Western major powers, a costly world war, and a protracted revolution led 
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the Chinese elite to determined that domestic harmony was first and foremost. For this, 
the CCP strengthened communist ideals and eradicated internal socio-political entities not 
aligned.  Simply put, the Sino government sought to have a monopoly on power and 
violence within the Middle Kingdom (Friedberg, 2011; Goddard, 2018).   
The second national aim was first the development of agriculture and then 
economic capacity.  With the highest population on the planet, the Government of China 
had to acquire the means to feed their people and make them productive.  Economic 
development focused on infrastructure, technology, manufacturing, and building a 
defense industry.  The latter was imperative to the last two security aspirations. 
The third objective entailed the near-abroad.   Pacifying borders and removal of 
neighboring regimes deemed as a threat were the CCP’s two main methods.  The means 
were a robust economy and a credible military. 
The last, and perhaps most important, historical goal was to increase China’s 
domain status and position in the international order.  Again, economic and martial might 
were the necessary conditions (Renshon, 2016). So, from 1949 to 2001, the above-
mentioned national security goals outlined the overall Sino grand strategy.  The below-
annotated research findings provide empirical context on how China’s numerous five-
year plans overlapped with the correlates of war and interstate power politics. 
Regarding historical analysis, there are some implied considerations that required 
further commentary.  Using IBM SPSS’s descriptive and inferential results as a guideline, 
research findings and associated implications are therein addressed in sequence. Asiatic 
militarized disputes and revisions provided an informative framework for the descriptive 
analysis discussion, whereby the Steps-To-War theory afforded an inferential aspect. 
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China, from 1949 to 2001, had a total of 61 dispute dyads.  The militarized 
interstate disputes (M = 3.82, SD = .646) were negatively skewed towards the left, which 
meant that threats (N =3), force display (N = 10), and use of force (N =43) were more 
common than interstate war (N = 5).  Also, the data reflected a leptokurtic distribution 
(Kurtosis = 1.841), which indicated a small number of outliers.  Force-related MIDs, 
which were relatively high, could be interpreted as the PRC favored force displays (16%) 
and use of arms (70%) in most of their interstate disputes.  It is also conceivable that 
China has been quite successful with these strong-arm tactics, which is why they are 
repeatedly used. 
 
 
Figure 7. MID comparison (1949-2001). 
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Multi-faceted comparisons were useful in deriving further findings.  Upfront, Sino 
conflict activities were aligned with Asia.  Figure 7 (left side) provides an informative 
synthesis.  However, when compared to other regional major powers, China’s use of 
military force was notedly higher.  A possible explanation was that the other major 
powers, Japan, South Korea, United States, etc. were beyond prudent in military force 
usages because of their democratic government and their populace. Since the CCP is 
totalitarian, there were arguably fewer constraints to dampen the Sino proclivity for 
aggressive power politics behavior.  Figure 7 (right side) depicts this synopsis.  
Equally profound are the differences within other key Asian subregions.  As 
mentioned, East and Southeast Asia are the subregions where the most interstate dispute 
has occurred.  China, on average, accounted for one-fifth (17%) of the force-associated 
MIDs.  If one considered East Asia’s volatility, with 141 use of force MIDs, this result’s 
weightiness was even more relevant.  In short, it should be comprehended that China 
does not resort to war often.  Instead, the descriptives revealed the Chinese Government 
used the PLA in an aggressive manner in many of its interstate disputes, regardless of 
whether the opponent was a major or minor power. 
Sino revisions (M = 1.16, SD = .934) were another aspect that brought greater 
synthesis. Descriptive testing revealed a positive, right-skewed dataset. Non-quantifiable 
(N = 13) and territorial (N = 32) revisions were more prevalent than policy (N = 11) and 
regime (N = 3).  Akin with MIDs, the dataset echoed a leptokurtic distribution (Kurtosis 
= 1.506), which signaled limited outliers.  Analysis, with respect to the Peoples Republic 
of China, revealed that territory (52%) was the highest COW-defined revision type.  This 
metric could be interpreted that China is indeed concerned with its near abroad.  During 
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the 1949 to 2001 epoch, Sino conflicts with Vietnam, India, Japan, and Taiwan were 
exuberantly frequent and should also be considered as proof.  That said, a regional 
comparison is nonetheless warranted. 
 
 
Figure 8. Revision Comparison. 
When compared to other regional major powers, China accounted for nearly two-
thirds (67%) of the territorial revisions (N = 36).  Equally informative was Sino policy 
revisions made up a third (35%) of major power totals.  Taken in the aggregate, this 
analysis supported the hypothesis that territory is more salient compared to other 
revisions.  It appeared that other Asiatic major powers, including the U.S., were more 
anxious over policy issues.  Nevertheless, there is a key caveat to remember going 
forward.  Although territory is indeed important, research revealed that regime, not 
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territorial disputes led to violence. This paradox should be comprehended that China for 
all its military action over territory, only entered armed conflicts with other states when 
the Communist Party felt it was threatened.   
In East Asia, characterized by the high presence of major powers and associated 
bi-lateral alliance networks, revision comparison was nuanced. These states were most 
active over territorial issues, with Sino involvement in 24 of the 77 dyadic disputes, 
nearly a third (31%).  Policy-wise, the PRC accounted for also a third (37%) of East 
Asia’s cases (N = 63).  What is important to remember is that China was equally 
concerned with territorial and policy issues (See Figure 7).  
Regarding Southeast Asia, with its high quantity of minor powers, Sino 
disagreements were mainly over territory.  China (N = 24) accounted for practically all 
territorial revisions (88%) in Southeast Asia (N = 27).  What this data revealed was 
Chinese geopolitical objectives were disparate between East and Southeast Asia.  This 
implied that the CCP was willing to risk violent conflict over land-based disputes because 
SE Asian states lacked the national material capability to withstand the onslaught.  
Further north, Sino ambitions appeared more pliant.  South Korea and Japan, with the 
U.S. as their respective allies, increased the cost of war, and thereby potentially restrained 
Sino political aims and aggression.  In totality, the analysis depicted that a territorial 
revision coupled with a force related MIDs showed a decrease in violent conflict.  
Meaning, China's ardent power politics use either intimidated or compelled target states 
to concede, thereby decreasing military conflict.   
Inferentially, retrodiction also provided several key findings concerning Chinese 
strategy and the correlates of war. Earlier analysis revealed the STW theory was not 
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applicable to war onset on the Asian continent, which by default included China.  As a 
result, Vasquez’s propositions were summarily rejected.  The revised STW framework, 
which was researcher-defined, substituted violent conflict as the outcome variable. 
Because dyads with arms buildups were not statistically significant (p = .557), they were 
also removed from the regression equation.  The revised equation was violent conflict 
equated to .510 + .558 (Territory_Rev), p =.016 + -.574 (END_RIV), p = .027 + 1.117 
(HR_ALLY), p = .000.  That said, it is necessary to provide an overview of Sino war 
correlates (i.e., power politics). 
Out of 61 militarized dispute cases, China had 32 characterized as territorial 
revisions, 52 possessed an enduring rivalry, and 26 included a high-risk ally.  More so, 
nearly three-quarters (N = 48) of Sino disputes ended in violent conflict.  There are four 
takeaways here.  First, territorial revisions had an additive effect on the probability of 
violence between China and other Asiatic states.  In other words, territory was indeed a 
gateway to interstate conflict.  Second, if the dyad history contained an enduring rivalry 
between countries, then the chances of conflict were lowered.  It could be considered that 
China’s multiple disputes (N = 48) with its neighbors had become ritualized.  Meaning, 
both belligerents would engage in combative, escalatory behavior up to a predetermined 
war threshold and then deescalate.  
Third, the presence of high-risk ally, defined by a robust material capability score 
and major power status, significantly increased the possibility of violence.  This finding 
could be supported by the fact that maintain credible armed forces and executing military 
operations are expensive, thereby only states with those attributes are able to either risk 
or wage war.  One could argue that states do not go through the trouble of acquiring 
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military might and creating defense pacts unless they felt threatened.  So, dispute dyads 
with outside defense pact alliances were more susceptible to violence. 
There is one final statistic that appropriately summarized whether China's use of 
power politics would end in violence.  The stepwise binary regression output afforded 
predicted probabilities.  With respect to China and violent conflict inducement, the 
average predicted probability (M =.7868, SD =.160) was relatively high compared to Asia 
(M = .6819, SD = .249).  Based on the revised pathway to violence sequence, research 
showed there was a 78% chance that China would engage in some form of militarized 
interstate violence over a territorial revision with a long-standing rival who had a 
powerful ally.   
Equally germane was a comparison with Vasquez’s findings, which outlaid that 
the probability of war onset did increase.  As previously mentioned, militarized disputes 
of territory had a predicted probability of .15 of leading to war. After multiple MIDs, 
dyadic interstate warfare chances increased to .45. With the addition of alliance, 
characterized by outside partners and major powers, war likelihood increase to .65.  The 
final predicted probability rose to .90 when arms buildups were included (Colaresi et al., 
2002; Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al. 2008; Vasquez, 1987, 2004).  Taking the STW theory 
into account, it is therefore conceivable that the aggregated predicted probability of 
interstate violence associated with China’s revisionism (78%) was reasonably aligned 
with the COW project and Vasquez’s global findings (65%), when arms build-up was 
removed as a covariate. 
In total, research showed a historical, empirical connection between the correlates 
of war and China’s grand strategy over a 50-year period.  Despite having fought two 
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interstate wars, China’s aggressive actions should be characterized by interstate violence 
that culminated short of war.  China’s revisions were based on its strategic goal outlined 
in its numerous five-year plans.  Sino revisions, which were primarily over territory and 
policy issues, were influenced by their near abroad security dilemma and perceived low 
domain status within the international order.  China routinely entered militarized disputes 
with its neighbors, which ultimately led to rivalry.  As a result, numerous Asiatic major 
powers situated on the East and South China Seas entered bi-lateral defense pacts with 
the U.S.  Despite the lack of empirical evidence on either war or violence onset, data 
indicated that China has steadily increased military capacity in terms of personnel and 
war materiel for almost 50 years. 
Prediction 
For China, all roads lead to revisionism.  Meaning, the Chinese Communist Party 
intends to upend the current status quo within the international order. This is essentially 
China’s strategic aim—the Return to Glory.  It is also critical to note the below-listed 
inferences diverge from the overall dissertation methodology.  Thus far, the research 
focus has been characterized by an objective, quantitative analyses.  Since the research 
aim here is a well-informed prediction, this section calls for a more subjective approach 
because of the lack of an updated COW dataset. 
The strategic overview from 2001 onward could be separated into two distinct 
stages.  In the first period (2001 to 2013), China’s strategic goals were to improve 
internal stability, continue economic growth, assimilate Taiwan, and increase status 
within the international order.  For example, slogans such as “Peaceful Rise” and “Win 
without fighting”, dominated Sino diplomatic lexicon and were openly linked to former 
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Chinese president Hu Jintao’s five-year plans (Bosbotinis, 2010; DIA, 2017; 
Heginbotham et al., 2015; Haglund, 2004; Renshon, 2016).   In the second stage (2013 to 
the present), Sino goals have become more aggressive on the national security front: 1) 
domestic stability, 2) the Taiwan dilemma, 3) dominance in the South China Sea, and 4) 
Countering Japan (Bosbotinis, 2010; Jones, 2020; Liff & Ikenberry, 2014; OSD, 2019, 
Work, 2019).  Aligning nationalistic fervor and revisionism from perceived insults was 
current President Xi Jinping’s strategic shift from internal concerns to those of a global 
nature.  Blackwill and Tellis further clarified: 
Given this painful history, it is not surprising that China’s primary strategic goal 
in contemporary times has been the accumulation of ‘comprehensive national 
power’. This pursuit of power in all its dimensions—economic, military, 
technology, and diplomatic—is driven by the conviction that China, a great 
civilization undone by the hostility of other, could never attain its destiny unless it 
amassed the power necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this 
quest. (Blackwill & Tellis, 2015, p. 7) 
What this quotation implied, according to the authors, was that superior power 
alone created order.  And more, China’s chances of achieving regional hegemony and 
matching the United States as a great power was predicated on the CCP, or political elite, 
possessing greater capabilities than any other entity, both internal and external to the 
Middle Kingdom (Blackwill et al., 2015). 
The correlates of war, or rather power politics behavior, provide key signposts on 
the chances of Sino interstate conflict. Revisionism is the first correlate in which two 
issues are most germane. First, territory claims dominate the current foreign policy 
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landscape.  Over the past decade, China has embarked on numerous territorial revisions.  
In the East China Sea, both the Peoples Republic of China and the Government of Japan 
fight over the Senkaku Islands.  Although the international community recognizes the 
islands as Nipponese, China maintains the landmasses are part of their cultural heritage 
(DIA, 2017; Krepinevich, 2015, 2017, 2020).   
To the southeast, China has engaged both the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(SRV) and the Republic of the Philippines (ROP) over territory.  The CCP has laid claim 
to both Spratly and Paracel Islands from Vietnam.  These two states have engaged in tit-
for-tat tactics to military and diplomatically force the situation (Kim, 2015; Work, 2018).  
Equally important is Sino territorial conflict with the Filipinos.  With its predicted 
windfall in oil reserves, the Scarborough Reef is a salient issue to both the PRC and ROP.  
To reinforce their claims in Vietnam and the Philippines, China has built man-made 
islands, which can support military action, throughout the South China Sea.  This 
construction has threatened freedom of navigation, a major point of contention with the 
United States and Japan (Allan, Vucetic, & Hopf, 2018; DIA, 2017; OSD, 2019). 
On the other hand, the Taiwan-situation remains a major revision for China. The 
Republic of China (ROC and commonly known as Taiwan) is the most salient foreign 
policy agenda for the Chinese Communist Party.  Many IR scholars contend since 
Taiwan is about territory, policy, and regime that it is the most volatile flashpoint within 
the region. (Freidman, 2013).  China believes the island of Formosa is an extension of the 
Chinese mainland and therefore should belong to them.  This revision is the territorial 
aspect. Politically, since Taiwan is a democratic government, the CCP perceives it as an 
existential threat to their legitimacy in both the domestic and international arenas.  
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Therefore, the Chinese have diplomatically and militarily isolated the ROC. With Sino 
pressure, the United Nations has not recognized the Taiwanese state since 1971 
(Friedberg, 2011, 2012; Friedman, 2013).   
Perhaps most important is the fact that Taiwan is primarily regarded as a regime 
issue for the Chinese elite.  The CCP leadership fundamentally believe that the 
Taiwanese government, with their democratic ideals and ties to China’s adversaries, 
prevents the Middle Kingdom from achieving their power status goal as a global and 
regional hegemon.  It is important to remember that both large-scale interstate wars that 
the Chinese fought involved regime revisionisms. For these reasons, one should consider 
that territorial ambitions and Taiwan’s affront are indeed the first steps on a path to future 
conflict (Heginbotham et al, 2015; Jalil, 2019). 
Rivalry is the second correlate. Currently, China has multiple enduring rivalries.  
As a reminder, an enduring rivalry is defined as six or more militarized interstate disputes 
between two states.  The last decade Chinese rivals have remained constant.  They are 
Japan, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and the United States (Holmes, 
2014; Mohan, 2012; Schweller & Pu, 2011).  For brevity, this dissertation does not 
explore these relationships.  They are arguably to complex and beyond the scope of this 
research.  However, what is important to remember is that China is actively engaged in 
MIDs in three of the five Asian subregions.  Border disputes with India monopolize the 
southern region.  Force displays, in terms of warships and tactical bombers, dominates 
both the east and southeastern subregions (Leverett & Bingbing, 2016; Mohan, 2012; 
Zhang, 2016). 
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Alliances are the third power politics behavior that leads to conflict. Outside of 
Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Asia contains the highest 
concentration of major powers and alliances.  The former mainly reside in the south and 
east.  India is the key power in the south.  Russia, South Korea Japan, and the United 
States are active in the east.  Unlike Europe, Asian alliances lean toward bi-lateral 
defense pacts.  There is no overarching construct, but states form ties based on one-on-
one relationships (Jones, 2020).  For example, Japan has a formal defense treaty with the 
United States, but not one with South Korea.  Seoul has an alliance with Washington but 
refuses to form one with Tokyo.  Even so, this patchwork has thus far prevented any 
large-scale interstate conflict for the last 20 years (Holmes, 2014).  However, it also 
reinforces rivalry and distrust, ultimately leading to a regional security dilemma in which 
most states respond by increasing their military capability. 
Lastly, there are interstate arms races. Although not statistically significant within 
a historical Asian context, arms buildup is indeed a key predictor of violence (Mitchell, 
2014).  China, since 1996, has steadily increased its defense spending to nearly $264B 
USD, which currently places them globally second in terms of expenditures 
(Heginbotham et al., 2015; OSD, 2019).  They have either built or procured a surface 
fleet of over 300 ships, including three aircraft, carries, rivaling the U.S., which currently 
has the largest fleet.  The PLA has made the same strides in terms of tactical aircraft, 
ballistic missiles, and other high-end equipment (DIA, 2017; Krepinevich, 2015, 2017; 
OSD, 2019; Rider, 2011). 
Equally important is the people factor.  The PLA has transformed its military 
units from domestic orientation to expeditionary operations (O’Rourke, 2019).  This 
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restructuring, coupled with amphibious ships and aerial refueling tankers, afford the PRC 
operational reach to effect Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, thereby increasing the 
insecurity and volatility within East Asia.  Meaning, these countries have followed the 
Sino lead and increased their own capability.  Aside from building their own weapons, 
GOJ, ROK, and ROC have procured weapons for their biggest ally—the United States of 
America (DIA, 2017, Krepinevich, 2015, 2017; Rider, 2011; OSD, 2019). 
What is the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s revisionist 
strategy in Asia?  Fifty years of data outlaid that China relied on force, both displays and 
use, to achieve their geopolitical strategic aims.  Current Sino activity, which is power 
politics at its highest pinnacle, suggests continuity.  Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 
present five-year strategic plan specifically calls for China to return as a global power.  
As a result, the Chinese Communist Party and its instrument of purpose, the People 
Liberation Army, have and arguably continue to use aggressive power politics to achieve 
this goal.  Research has shown that violent interstate conflict, not war, is the Sino way. 
China will continue to use the same playbook until there is a fundamental geopolitical 
shift that forces abandonment. After all, the Chinese elite does not want to upend 
international order but alter it so they can return to their rightful position as a great 
power.  It is not about prestige; it is only about prestige (Schweller et al., 2011).   
Conclusion 
In examining Asia’s 461 dispute dyads that covered a fifty-year period, an 
inductive method was used to determine the relationship between the correlates of war 
and China’s revisionism.  This approach had two overarching themes.  The first was the 
determination of the geopolitical landscape in Asia with respect to disputes, revisionism, 
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and war pathways.  The supporting research questions provided the necessary 
examination framework. 
Research Question 1 explored the association between war probability and 
militarized disputes.  The results were not expected.  The literature suggested a positive 
correlation between the two variables.  With respect to Asia, crosstabs revealed an 
opposite effect, however.  Force associated disputes (i.e., displays and usage) were 
correlated with an inverse relationship—as MIDs increased, then wars decreased.  What 
this finding suggested was that Asian states, despite the exuberant amount of dispute 
cases, primarily avoided war.  
Research Question 2 examined what revisions increased the propensity for war.  
This finding was most profound.  The Correlates of War project and Vasquez’s Steps-To-
War theory proclaimed certain revisions led to war.  Inferential tests proved these 
propositions would not statistically correspond to Asia and therein, China.  When the 
outcome variable was switched from war to violence, the revisions became statistically 
significant.  Another key research discovery was that major powers had a dampening 
effect on Asiatic interstate violence.  This result was counter to most COW thought. 
Research Question 3 determined whether the Steps-To-War theory held true for 
Asia.  Simply put, there was no statistical evidence that territorial revisions, followed by 
rivalry, alliance-making, and arms races increased war onset chances.  This finding was 
further supported when East and Southeast Asia was examined. However, when war was 
substituted for low-intensity violence as an outcome variable, binary regression afforded 
considerable results.  Territorial revisions and a high-capability ally were proportionally 
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increased the chances of interstate violence, whereas enduring rivalry participation was 
the opposite.   
The other inductive aspect explicitly and implicitly linked China’s current and 
past national security strategies to the COW-defined correlates of war.  The main 
research question resulted in two key implications.  Collating previous Sino grand 
strategies and using the same research-defined dataset, China was empirically 
crosswalked with the research findings ascertained from Asia.  This retrodiction 
contended China was essentially war-adverse, but violence-prone.  The latter was by their 
own choosing.   The second inference entailed the current strategy of Chinese President 
Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”.  Although not empirical, this prediction was informed by 
the retrodiction analysis. Arguably, the final takeaway here is that China will not seek 
war but accept the associated risks of interstate violence to increase their power domain 
status and thereby obtain long-sought prestige.  The question now moves from one of 
analysis to one of mitigation.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Why war? David Singer’s eloquent question is perhaps the best way to conclude 
this dissertation. War onset is arguably the most important variable in war and peace 
research.  The rationale is that if one could reasonably determine the factors that lead to 
war, then it may be possibly avoided.  Therefore, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s five-
year plan calling for the Chinese people to avenge their 100-year humiliation at the hands 
of Western major powers and take their rightful place on the global stage as a superpower 
is salient.  According to Sino national security strategists, not only is the overarching aim 
dependent on a strong economy, but it is also evenly predicated on a robust, capable 
military and an aggressive, yet balanced foreign policy stance. This proclamation 
characterizes the Peoples Republic of China as a revisionist state, a connotation that if not 
properly addressed could have devastating consequences.  Some could argue this 
challenge of the status quo means war.  However, this doctoral dissertation posited that 
China would continue to use military force; however, this force will be short of open 
warfare to achieve their nationalistic dreams.  To provide scope and clarity, this chapter is 
portioned into two sections.  The first provides a summary of this research study, whereas 
the second illuminated salient implications. 
Summary 
Overall, this doctoral study was a comprehensive endeavor.  This first section 
included four subject areas that when examined in totality should afford requisite 
comprehension with regards to the relationship between state-based power politics and 
Sino revisionism.  Up first, there is the Correlates of War project.  This subsection spelled 
out the foundations for the empirical study of war and peace, which guided the research. 
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Next, there is a theoretical discussion of the steps-to-war theory.  The goal here is to 
illuminate both the theory’s history and core premises.  Another area summarized is the 
data overview.  Therein, data collection methods and the operationalization of variables 
are delineated.  Equally germane was the discussion concerning study modifications that 
were made in dataset generation and inferential statistical tests.  The last subarea 
presented the research findings.  This dissertation examined ten suppositions, five 
hypotheses and five propositions, using an inductive approach.  The results were nuanced 
because some were divergent from the steps-to-war core premises.  With this scope in 
mind, it is now appropriate to proceed. 
Correlates of War Project 
One of the essential and foundational aspects of this dissertation is the Correlates 
of War (COW) project.  Founded by political scientist John David Singer and historian 
Melvin Small in 1963, it is an intellectual movement of peace-based researchers 
dedicated to the empirical study war and its onset attributes, i.e., correlates.  Initially 
charged with data collection on interstate armed conflict, Singer and Small (1972, 1982) 
published two seminal books that galvanized the war-studies, peace-research, and 
international relations fields.  Since its formation, the COW project has substantially 
grown. It now consists of 13 datasets that provide empirical information on war correlates 
that illuminate why warfare occurs to include interstate, intrastate, and extrastate 
conflicts.  There have been over 274 empirical scientific studies conducted base on the 
concepts and theories of the COW project (Izmirlioglu, 2017).  What is important to 
remember is that COW research is solely quantitative, which contrasts with the conflict 
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resolution and international relations study fields mostly qualitative-based inquiries.  A 
key point with further implications. 
Continuing, this dissertation had two overarching purposes.  The first was the 
empirical study of interstate conflict at the international, systematic level.  The second 
was to examine the extent to which the Correlates of War covariates associated with the 
People’s Republic of China’s revisionist strategies.  Combining these objectives led to 
the formulation of the main research question: What is the relationship between the 
correlates of war and China’s revisionist strategy in Asia?  To that end, there were three 
supporting research questions, when inductively researched, provided essential context 
on the geopolitical situation in Asia.  They are: 
RQ1:  What is the probability of war onset based on associated MID in Asia? 
RQ2: What revision type causes the greatest propensity of war in Asia? 
RQ3:  What does the war onset covariates imply for chances of war in Asia. 
In short, when these queries were aggregated, a clear analytical picture was formulated 
the provided greater comprehension and synthesis.  An integral part of this scientific goal 
was dependent on an applicable theory. 
Theoretical Discussion 
Using a theoretical framework is foundational in most scientific research studies, 
here it was no different. As discussed, The Steps-To-War theory was arguably the most 
insightful byproducts of the COW project.  Renowned peace researcher John Vasquez, 
credited with its creation, claimed that it is grounded on the behavioral and relational 
impacts of when two states, who are initially involved in a territorial dispute, experience 
repeated conflict, form alliances and increase military capability, all of which intensifies 
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the likelihood of war onset (Senese & Vasquez, 2005, 2008).  Moreover, there are three 
distinct characters that distinguish the STW model from other international relations (IR) 
and conflict theories. First, it is empirically based.  This construct allows for statistical 
evaluation of why interstate interactions are either war-prone or peaceful, Second, it is 
dyadic.  A characteristic that fosters descriptive and inferential assessment. Last, it is not 
exclusively sequential.  Meaning, step order is not imperative instead it is their mutual 
reinforcement (Mitchell & Vasquez, 2014; Senese et al., 2005). 
The key takeaway here is that the STW theory is a novel way to study peace, 
especially from an anti-realist point of view. To put it plainly, one should remember the 
theory contended war resulted from issues and disputes that are managed by the realist 
school of thought; specifically, power politics.  Territorial issues, by far the most 
common, festers into greater hostility.  According to Owsiak (2017), this circumstance 
caused recurring MIDs, which led to enduring rivalries.  When alliance-making and arms 
races are added, a security environment riddled with volatility, uncertainty, and chaos is 
produced or war-prone.  More importantly, each part of the sequence; specifically, 
territorial dispute to rivalry to alliances to the procurement of weapons, empirically 
increased the probability of interstate warfare (Owsiak, 2017; Senese et al., 2008; 
Vasquez 1987, 1996). 
Data overview 
Data collection and management was an extensive process. A researcher-defined 
dataset was constructed using applicable Correlations of War data depositories and the 
EUGeneve_v3.2 dataset generator.  Within temporal confines from 1949 to 2001, a total 
of 1683 interstate dyads were identified at the systematic level.  From there, a query was 
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performed, and 461 dispute dyads were linked to Asia.  Next, each case was modified to 
create a dyadic-dispute history that included militarized disputes, revision type, national 
material capability, as well as other vital COW-defined war correlates. Of significance, 
dyadic analysis of each disputed case afforded comprehension on the behavior and 
interaction between Asiatic states to include China.  These attributes were critical to 
understanding as to why and how states act on the national and international geopolitical 
stage. 
The research design was intricate, yet simple.  Five hypotheses and five 
propositions, evenly spread between the three supporting questions, formed the analytical 
framework. Using descriptive analysis, which primarily focused on central tendencies 
and frequencies, and various inferential statistical tests, the supporting research questions 
were used to address how the correlates of war are linked to Sino revisionism in Asia.  
The questions had an inductive quality that once answered formulated synthesis and 
provided insight for the next research inquiry.  The culmination was an objective 
inference on whether China was susceptible to war given the current geopolitical climate.  
That said, it is appropriate to review this dissertation’s key findings. 
Research Findings 
To begin with, research results were comprehensive and informative.  In 
examining Asia’s 461 dispute dyads that covered a fifty-year period, an inductive method 
was used to determine the relationship between the correlates of war and China’s 
revisionism.  This approach possessed two overarching aims.  The first was a 
retrodiction. By defining Asia’s geopolitical landscape with regards to disputes, 
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revisionism, and war pathways.  The three supporting research questions provided the 
necessary examination framework. 
Research Question 1 explored the association between war probability and 
militarized disputes.  The results were not expected.  The literature suggested a positive 
correlation between the two variables (Senese et. al, 2003, 2005, 2008; Vasquez, 1995).  
With respect to Asia, the descriptive analysis revealed an opposite effect, however.  Force 
associated disputes (i.e., displays and usage) were correlated with an inverse relationship 
as MIDs increased, then wars decreased.  What this finding suggested was that Asian 
states, despite the exuberant amount of dispute cases, primarily avoided war.   
Research Question 2 examined what revisions increased the propensity for war.  
This finding was most profound.  The STW theory proclaimed certain revisions led to 
war.  Inferential tests proved these propositions would not statistically correspond to Asia 
and therein, China.  When the outcome variable was switched from war to violence, the 
revisions became statistically significant.  Another key research discovery was that major 
powers had a dampening effect on Asiatic interstate violence.  This result was counter to 
most COW thought (Leeds, 2003; Senese et al., 2005, 2008; Vasquez, 1993). 
Research Question 3 determined whether the Steps-To-War theoretical framework 
held true for Asia.  Simply put, there was no statistical evidence that territorial revisions, 
followed by rivalry, alliance-making, and arms races increased war onset chances 
(Sample, 1998, 2016; Senese et al., 2005).  However, when war was substituted for low-
intensity, interstate violence as an outcome variable there were plausible empirical 
results.  Territorial revisions and an outside alliance with a major power proportionally 
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increased the chances of interstate violence, whereas enduring rivalry participation was 
the opposite (Leeds, 2003; Levy, 1981; Senese et al., 2008).   
The other inductive aspect was predictive in nature. It explicitly and implicitly 
linked China’s current national security strategy, which is revisionism to the COW-
defined correlates of war.  The main research question resulted in two key implications.  
Collating previous Sino grand strategies and using the same research-defined dataset, 
China was empirically crosswalked with the study results ascertained from Asia.  This 
retrodiction contended China was essentially war-adverse, but violence-prone.  The latter 
was by their own choosing.   The second inference entailed the current strategy of 
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”.  Although not empirical, this prediction 
was informed by the retrodiction analysis. Arguably, the final takeaway here is that China 
will not seek war but accept the associated risks of interstate violence to increase its 
power domain status and thereby obtain long-sought prestige.  With these findings, there 
is trade space for knowledge expansion and policy recommendations. 
Implications 
One of the most important outgrowths from a doctoral dissertation is the 
implications.  Specifically, the latter is significant because it links ascertained research 
findings to future applications.  That said, this section outlaid four areas of connotations.  
First are the conflict analysis and resolution field, which posited the cross-pollination 
between conflict analysis/resolution and other study disciplines is indeed warranted. The 
second subarea entailed both Correlates of War project and the steps-to-war theory.  Here 
the goal was to expand the knowledge base and theory.  Third is policy 
recommendations.  The aim here was to offer U.S. national security decision-makers 
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options that could provide an off-ramp from the path to war with China.  And last, there 
are future research applications.  In short, this dissertation offered several courses of 
action to expand the knowledge on the scientific study of war and peace.  That said, 
below listed is a more thorough examination. 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution Study Field 
At its crux, this dissertation and associated research is an empirical treatise into 
conflict analysis and resolution (CAR).  Through the course of this research journey, 
there were five distinct implications that became apparent. The first entailed the empirical 
study of conflict.  The conflict analysis field is considered by most scholars as a subset of 
the social sciences (Rioux & Redekop, 2013).  Furthermore, Singer (2001) proclaimed 
the field lacked a more rigorous empirical research methodology rooted in the scientific 
method.  Despite the time-tested qualitative methods, which are used in historical case 
studies etc., there was a need to “observe the unobservable” (Lear, 2012).  And perhaps, 
the only way to achieve this stated ideal was to develop propositions and hypotheses, 
operationalize behavioral-related variables and then rigorously assess them with 
statistical tests.  The net result would deliver better comprehension, allowing peace 
scholars the ability to move beyond mere extrapolation to correlational knowledge.  
Whereby, policy recommendations could be devised to prevent the spread of violence 
(Lear, 2012; Rioux et al., 2013).  This dissertation arguably accomplished these stated 
research ideals and further expanded the empirical study of conflict. 
The second connotation, for the conflict resolution area of study, concerned 
analysis at the systematic level. There is perhaps a perception that modern conflict 
analysis revolves around the individual, group, and societal levels (Bremer, 1995; Rioux 
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et al., 2013, Vasquez, 1995b; Wayman, 1995).  And perhaps, there is a need for greater 
inquiry at the state and systematic level.  One of the most tragic outgrowths of conflict, at 
all levels, is human suffering.  War is perhaps the greatest contributor to that calamity.  
As a potential solution, this research outlaid interstate conflict at the regional and to a 
lesser extent the global level.  More so, the findings could possibly afford why war 
occurs, which is one of the COW project’s major charter. 
The third implication centered on the cross-pollination of study fields. Many 
war/peace scholars contend international relations, both liberalism, and realism, strongly 
correlated to the conflict analysis and resolution field of study. Research, here, supported 
this notion. More specifically, it purported that Asian states and their leadership who 
practiced realist-based practices of power politics—i.e., revisionism, militarized disputes, 
alliance making, and arms buildups—did not secure peace, rather increased the 
possibility of war.  Arguably, this viewpoint should be considered as anti-realism (Singer, 
2001) and is aligned with most CAR principles.  That is, the distributive nature of 
obtaining one’s goals often leads to intractable conflict.  By examining this premise 
through the prism of IR, the benefits cross-pollination is arguably laid to bare for the 
greater conflict resolution community. 
The fourth proposition is the addition of a new theoretical framework.  As 
mentioned, CAR analysis mainly revolved around social conflict theories, such as critical 
race theory, grounded theory, feminist theory, and human needs theory.  This dissertation 
introduced the steps-to-war theory as a suitable construct to examine interstate conflict.  
Perhaps most controversial is that the STW theory could be considered as a better 
alignment with mainstream CAR scholarly thought versus other IR theories. 
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Lastly, this dissertation promulgated the imperativeness of negotiation, a central 
tenet within the CAR field.  A war between the People’s Republic of China and the 
United States and its allies would be disastrous for both belligerents and the international 
order.  Allison stated, “There is no ‘solution’ for the dramatic resurgence of a 5,000year-
old civilization with 1.4 billion people.” (Allison, 2017, 215). His statement should be 
comprehended as the military defeat of China would be nearly impossible and foolhardy.  
Therefore, this potential conflict should be resolved by negotiation—or diplomacy.  In 
fact, with the U.S.’s return to great power competition and the escalatory nature of the 
current geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific, there should be considerable efforts 
to expand the knowledge and practice of strategic negotiation at the state-level and above 
within the CAR study field.  This doctoral research has identified a capability shortfall in 
which the CAR community could fulfill. 
Correlates of War Project and Steps-To-War theory 
Arguably, the Correlates of War project, and to a slightly lesser extent, the Steps-
To-War theorist benefited from this doctoral research.  There are four suppositions as to 
why; first, the benefit entailed interstate war analysis at the regional level.  As stated, the 
preponderance of COW studies encapsulated the global, systematic level.  These efforts 
were due to the severity of interstate war and the influence of U.S.-Soviet bipolar 
aggressive actions after WWII.  For nearly 50 years, global interstate conflict has been 
the status quo.  The data, research, and scientific analysis focused on determining the 
probability of war based on a prolonged temporal aspect and international economies of 
scale.  To be clear, what this research did was empirical analyze a region based on the 
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COW-defined principles and datasets, which should not be confused with the step-to-war 
theory.   
Taking the above into consideration, equally germane was the use of the STW 
theory to explore a region.  Since the founding of the COW project, this theoretical 
framework has only been done once.  During the mid-1990s, Latin America was the 
region, and the study examined relationships between war onset and militarized disputes, 
using Bremer’s statistical methods (Bremer, 1993; Hensel, 1994; Singer, 2001).  This 
research was relevant because policy-based wars of communist ideology were rampant. 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras all participated in some form of 
revolution to overthrow of a government and this led to offensive civil wars.  The latter 
entailed the secession of a geopolitical entity from the legitimate government, whereby 
forming a separate, sovereign state (Lebow, 2010; Vasquez,1986).  Arguably, this 
dissertation results similarly applicable. Ascertaining that Asia was mildly divergent from 
the STW major tenets could have major implications for CAR and IR researchers and 
scholars in future research.  
Another implication was that militarized disputes are a far more common event, 
whereas wars are uncommon.  This research indicated that MID occurrence (N = 461) 
was significantly higher than wars (N = 14) in Asia, almost 97% higher. Although 
common knowledge and the research data reflected this assessment, it is often lost in both 
academic and policy circles.  Wars are high profile events, which possibly caused the 
oversight (Bremer, 1995; Lear, 2012; Rioux et al., 2013; Singer, 2001).  That said, COW 
research has proved that interstate conflict disputes lead to wars, as such, they should be 
studied in greater detail.  This dissertation only reinforced this suggestion. 
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Last are the implications concerning COW and STW research methodologies. 
This doctoral study should prove the scientific study of war and its principles are indeed 
sound.  For example, Singer stressed data operationalization and sound propositions were 
essential in the scientific study of war (Lear, 2012; Star, 1995).  Both activities were 
meticulously followed, resulting in statistically significant results from both descriptive 
and inferential tests.  Even more, Vasquez’s suggested road to war was duplicated in this 
research within the confines of Asia (Senese et al, 2008).  Albeit there were some 
nuances, his stepwise conflict model held true.  Taken as a whole, this congruence 
promotes the steps-to-war as a viable theory for interstate war. 
Policy Recommendations 
One should not mistake that Sino revisionism is about power and prestige. 
Resources are indeed important, and prior to the current Chinese five-year plan, this was 
perhaps the case.  Nevertheless, President Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party have 
opted for a strategy to recapture prestige.  The chosen mechanism is power in the form of 
military capability (Gompert, Cevallos, & Garafola, 2016; Rioux & Redekop, 2013).  
One should ask, what happens when China cannot achieve its strategic aims? Despite the 
PLA’s ongoing arms buildup, the U.S. military is better equipped, trained, and by far, 
more seasoned as a warfighting organization (Ratner et al., 2019; Roy, 2020).  Despite 
the rhetoric, this gap will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future, placing the 
PRC at a disadvantage.   And as earlier stated, the U.S. cannot conquer mainland China, 
which leads to a point of common interest. 
From a U.S. conflict resolution and national security professional, there are three 
prioritized, policy recommendations that annotate plausible solutions to the increased 
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hostility within Sino-U.S. relations.  First, the United States should look to find ways to 
collaborate with the Peoples Republic of China.   More pointedly, there must be an 
integration of needs and interests between the great powers.  Katz and McNutly (1994) 
contended collaboration worked best when: 1) Concerns are vital for compromise; 2) 
Either party is at lost on how to achieve their objectives, and 3) Resolutions prevent the 
feelings of resentment.  The current and trending relations between both states perhaps 
meet these criteria.   
Arguably, Washington should communicate to Beijing that war should be avoided 
at all costs, and both countries could develop two peace reinforcing goals.  Improving the 
global commons is such an area.  One way or another, most nations depend on the oceans 
and airways to sustain their economies and well-being.  The global commons are oft 
subject to risk because terrorism, piracy, overfishing, civil war, etc. all of which benefit 
neither America nor the Middle Kingdom.  The other buttressing idea is for the U.S. to 
suggest and support that China becomes the lead on climate control.  Of late, the CCP has 
begun to understand the devastating repercussions of environmental mismanagement 
(OSD, 2019).  With China in the lead, it would afford them the status and prestige they 
strongly desire from the U.S. The latter gains a strategic partner in promoting 
international stability, which ultimately maintains the international order. 
Second, if collaboration is untenable, the USG should aim to develop some form 
of accommodation with the PRC.  The conflict style is predicated on three benchmarks: 
1) One party has a better solution; 2) Associated issues and interests are more important 
to one state; and 3) Continued competition could further damage the relationship, thereby 
escalating the conflict (Katz & McNulty, 1994).  Here is a case-by-case justification on 
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how the accommodating conflict style overlays over current Sino-U.S. interstate 
behavior.  Arguably, the U.S. wants a peaceful and satisfied PRC coexisting within the 
international order.  This should be considered a better solution over China challenging a 
status quo that already provides considerable benefits.  Another justification is that 
China’s quest for regional hegemony and global recognition is more important to them 
than it is to the U.S.  The fact that Jinping’s five-year plan centers on this strategy goal 
should be considered as proof.  Lastly, the Sino-U.S. relationship is already strained. 
Case in point, the Sino-U.S. conflict escalation in the South and East China Seas and 
hardliner foreign policy activism by both states correspond to the environment (Erickson, 
2016). These signposts illuminate decision-space in which the U.S. should look to 
exploit.   
From the U.S. vantage point, the political elite and national security hawks must 
accept that neither regime change, nor elimination of the Chinese state will occur in the 
near-term.  Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea combined could effectively deter Sino 
aggression, both in terms of military and economic instruments.  Aside from the United 
States, China’s top-tiered trading partners are these three countries.  More importantly, 
the U.S. must acknowledge China is already a great power.  This is not necessarily 
accommodation, but merely the facts.  As stated, the PRC already possesses the national 
material capability, military capacity, and power projection instruments that meet the 
acceptance criteria as a great power.  Therefore, the U.S. officially acknowledging 
China’s “greatness”, whether they believe it or not, will perhaps placate Sino 
aggressiveness and afford the time to negotiate and discover tradeoffs.  Of note, this 
recommendation is possibly the hardest to convince the U.S. electorate. 
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Last, U.S. policymakers could choose to expand the U.S-Sino competition space 
beyond the obligatory defense realm into other areas.  This recommendation entails a 
three-way approach.  Economically, the U.S. worker is far more productive than its 
Chinese counterpart.  The latter’s competitive advantage is capacity and not capability 
(Nacht, 2019; OECD, 2019; Roy, 2020).  The USG should implement domestic and 
international incentives in which enhances American productive throughput on a massive 
scale, essentially grow the “pie” and further bind China to the U.S.  Of note, the current 
Sino-U.S. policy is distributive.  It is defined by the U.S. wants of low-price finished 
goods and the Chinese desire to manipulate their currency and steal other states' 
technology to maintain a competitive edge.  This situation is arguably win-lose for both 
parties. 
Another contest area is renewable energy.  This recommendation’s saliency and 
benefits are beyond the scope herein.  Nevertheless, wind, solar, and high-end battery 
technology improvements could reduce resource consumption, protect the environment, 
and afford resource reallocation to more pressing state needs. That said, it is worth noting 
the state that master future energy technology would indeed have a competitive 
advantage.  Although time-tested, the final competition space is military capability.  
Here, the U.S. DOD could transparently and rapidly develop and increase defensive 
weapons systems.  By that, this dissertation ascertains these armaments are purely 
defensive, oriented towards the maritime versus land domains, and not expeditionary in 
nature.  Ballistic Missile Defense, submarines, and fighter aircraft are examples.  
Choosing this competition space forces the Chinese into a dilemma. They must continue 
to consume resources to build weapons to counter the U.S who has no intention 
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whatsoever of invading Chinese sovereign territory or seek outside alliances to balance.  
From a CCP vantage, neither of these choices is optimal.  The former requires 
exponential economic growth, whereby domestic opportunity costs are incurred because 
of the need to develop and procure weapons for an opponent that does not seek regime 
change.  The latter compels the CCP to compromise or accommodate with other powers, 
and most of the major powers in Asia are allied with the U.S.  When combined, these 
dilemmas should induce some form of either collaboration or accommodation with the 
U.S. In sum, one must remember these proposals are layered with collaboration deemed 
the desired outcome and each subsequent policy goal as a fallback. 
Future Research 
A key tenet of the doctoral dissertation process is to recommend future research.  
Although there were numerous topics and propositions considered during this academic 
journey, there are four that warrant further discussion.  First is investigating other regions 
and subregions with COW research methods and principles.  This primary research goal 
would both expand and correlate knowledge of war onset using empirical analysis.  For 
instance, the recent uptick in intra- and inter-state violence in the Middle East- North 
Africa region render it apt for empirical analysis.  Arguably, there is no shortage of 
qualitative assessments on the MENA subregion.  What is lacking are the hard-empirical 
data analyses that could provide invaluable insight as to why the subregion is excessively 
volatile and chaotic. 
Within the same thread, a secondary goal would concern advancing the steps-to-
war theory.  After reviewing the literature, the dissertation determined there was only one 
credible study on the theory within the last five years (2016).  Perhaps, the reason is the 
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higher frequency of intra- and extra-state war, thereby making them more relevant. And, 
since the steps of war theory are predicated on system states, it is of marginal use to 
scholars who study civil and revolutionary war.  That said, further developing scholarship 
on how the intra-state conflict and wars commence based on the steps-to-war theory 
could prove most useful in the conflict analysis and resolution field. 
Second is researching how group-based interactions between the government, the 
political elites, and the populace writ large impact the decisions on whether to wage an 
interstate war would be most useful.  The main study goal would be to empirically 
ascertain the behavior between the three groups and then correlate it to an outside polity.  
Graham Allison accomplished this in his seminal work, Essence of a Decision, which 
showcased the relationship between the White House, the Pentagon, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and the Soviet Union (Allison, 2017).  His work was a qualitative 
case study on the Cuban Missile Crisis, whereby this proposal would be empirical 
analysis on modern interstate conflict.  Both the Russo-Ukraine and U.S.-Iraq wars are 
potential research examples. 
Third is ascertaining why states choose to escalate regional conflicts.  Using a 
two-axis research approach could establish how conflict vertically escalates to war and 
horizontally expands to surrounding states.  The potential findings could help provide key 
policy recommendations on the prevention of multi-state wars, which are the most 
destructive in terms of human life and infrastructure. With the ongoing arms races and 
territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, there is indeed utility in this research. 
Last is expanding the knowledge on war outcomes.  Here, the analytic goal would 
involve the empirical collection and analysis of all forms of interstate violence and how 
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they end, based on the causal factors, means of warfare, and associated risks. Of 
significance Lear (2012) inferred that most wars end in stalemate.  In fact, his analysis 
showed that approximately 64% of intra- and inter-state wars conclude without a clear 
victor.  Taking this into account, a question could be asked, “Why would a state risk war 
onset based on a precarious expected outcome?”  Of note, there has been COW work in 
this subject area but most of it was retrodiction.  This proposal would employ prediction 
based on inferential analysis and simulation.  In sum, these potential research topics 
could expand the knowledge and research techniques for the CAR study field and better 
integrate it with other peace research communities, such as war studies and conflict 
prevention. 
Conclusion 
All in all, the notion that China will pursue an interstate war to achieve the “China 
Dream” of great power rejuvenation is summarily rejected in the dissertation.  History 
and empirical evidence do not support a great power war in Asia.  More so, China 
arguably wants to redefine and not destroy the international order.  That said, the issue 
soon becomes if the U.S. will muster the resources, willingness, and opportunity to block 
those ambitions.  Although beyond the scope of this treatise, answering this question is 
indeed worth the effort. 
The results of this doctoral study suggested that there are five findings that 
ascertain how the correlates of war related to Sino revisionist strategy were: 1) Despite 
the exuberant amount of militarized dispute cases, Asian states primarily avoided war; 2) 
Major power involvement dampened the likelihood of Asiatic interstate violence; 3) 
There was no statistical evidence that the STW theory, territorial revisions, followed by 
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rivalry, alliance-making, and arms races increased war onset chances; 4)  When war onset 
was substituted for low-intensity interstate violence as an outcome variable, there was 
strong, empirical evidence that the correlates of war were statistical significant; and 5) 
China was essentially war-adverse, but violence-prone. 
Perhaps most importantly is the idea that great power war in modern times could 
be won in a short, violent timeframe.  Wars usually last longer than anticipated. Again, 
history and data have proved that when states have the economic means, national will, 
and wherewithal, they deliver considerable damage to one another.  One should 
remember that both World Wars were supposed to be short. Despite IR scholars and 
DOD strategist proclamations that a U.S.-Sino war would be constrained with 
manageable losses, history and data have determined that is not the case.  Instead, there 
would be substantial suffering for both belligerents and the possible collapse of the 
international order.   
So, it is in the interest of U.S. policymakers and national security professionals to 
absorb a major tenet of the conflict resolution field.  That is, it is better to collaborate 
than to compete to achieve one’s needs and interests.  This holds true for the individual, 
the group, the state, and the liberal world order.  More so, realist and liberal policies will 
not work with the People’s Republic of China because both will lead to war.  Realism 
does so by escalation; liberalism through miscalculation due to perceived weakness.  In 
short, the prudent way is for the U.S. to take a hard, objective look at the future, 
determine what truly are vital interests, build consensus amongst like-minded states, and 
convince the Chinese it is in their interest to cooperate because both countries “can” 
coexist.   
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